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Introduction 
What is central to the pluralistic Weltanschauung is neither 
consensus nor conflict but dissent and praise of dissent […] 
Dissent draws from both consensus and conflict,  
but coincides with neither. 
-Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, 2016[1976], p. 14 
 
The Need to Separate Political and Economic Power, and Important Definitions  
Already in the 4th century BCE Aristotle noted that economic power should not be equal to political 
power to ensure stability and justice in a political system, even though wealth remained one of the 
essential resources of politics1. More than two thousand years later, Giovanni Sartori echoed this idea 
in his “Parties and Party Systems” (Sartori 2016[1976]: 15), emphasizing that unless religion, politics 
and wealth are separated, and the rights of individuals are protected, it is too risky and too costly for 
politicians to respect the rules of political competition. One of the solutions to this problem was the 
introduction of salaries to a wide range of politicians in the 20th century. Further, direct financial 
support from the state for political parties became standard political practice in the second half of the 
20th century. John Rawls, a modern philosopher of liberalism and contractualism, saw this latter 
solution as necessary to guarantee political justice. In particular, he wrote (2003[1971]: 198): 
What is necessary is that political parties be autonomous with respect to private demands, 
that is, demands not expressed in the public forum and argued for openly by reference to 
a conception of the public good. If society does not bear the costs of organization, and 
party funds need to be solicited from more advantaged social and economic interests, the 
pleadings of these groups are bound to receive excessive attention. 
To address the uneasy relationship between politics and money, transparency has also entered the 
policy domain as a governing principle since the 1980s. The Oxford Dictionary of Economics explains 
transparency in terms of policy measures that “make it clear who is taking the decisions, what the 
measures are, who is gaining from them, and who is paying for them” (Hood 2006: 4). In this 
dissertation I will address the policy measures which make clear who is paying for political parties while 
analysing transparency regulation of political finance. Also, I will study the question of who is taking 
the decisions by studying regulation of conflict of interest. By ‘regulation’, following Bolleyer (2018: 
 
1 Aristoteles (1872): Aristoteles´ Politik: Erstes, Zweite und Drittes Buch, ins Deutsche übertr. von J. Bernays. 
Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, p. 159, 176-180. 
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33), I understand “formalized rules adopted in the respective jurisdictions that are binding to actors 
they apply to, with a focus on statutory, primary law passed by legislative bodies, and in some areas 
also binding parliamentary proceedings”. In my analysis I consider both transparency and preventive 
constraints inherent in the regulation as this approach allows me to study transparency across 
countries and over time. 
A well-designed and effectively enforced transparency regulation of political finance and conflict of 
interest2 constitutes the load-bearing beams of and simultaneously presents big challenges for 
contemporary liberal democracy (GRECO Rec(2003)4; GRECO Res(97)24). In line with Gardiner and 
Lyman (1989: 827), these types of regulation must reduce corruption since, by definition, they “must 
reduce incentives and opportunities for corrupt behaviour and the costs of noncorrupt behaviour, and 
increase incentives and opportunities for noncorrupt behaviour and costs for corrupt behaviour”. A 
special feature of transparency regulation of political finance and conflict of interest is the fact that 
politicians and political parties design it in order to directly constrain themselves (Grzymala-Busse 
2007: 26; Saint-Martin 2008: 46). And this makes public control of its design and understanding of the 
mechanisms affecting its evolution of paramount importance. This brings me to the research questions 
that are central to this cumulative dissertation. 
Research Questions 
1. On transparency regulation of party finance: 
1.1. How can we measure regulation of party finance that allows for transparency? 
1.2. Why do the rules on transparency of party finance change over time? In particular, what 
are the factors and the driving mechanisms that lead parties to change the transparency rules 
for their own financial activities? 
2. On conflict of interest regulation: 
2.1. How constraints inherent in the conflict of interest regulation can be measured? 
2.2. Why does conflict of interest regulation vary across national contexts?  
Emergence of Transparency Regulation of Political Finance and Conflict of Interest  
Perhaps, one of the first political philosophers who expressed support for transparency in public policy 
was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his work The Government in Poland, finalized in 1772, he described 
 
2 There are other types of transparency regulation at the national level, according to the cited definition of 
transparency, which I leave outside of the scope of this dissertation: e.g. lobby regulation, the regulation of 
public procurement, the transparency regulation of political decision-making and the regulation of freedom of 
information. 
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what we now call conflict of interest rules, designed to make politicians “incorruptible” (Rousseau 
1985: 72)3:  
I should like you to permit no office-holder to move about incognito, so that the marks of 
a man´s rank or position shall accompany him wherever he goes… if the rich man wants 
to shine in his fatherland, let him have no choice but to serve it and to aspire … to posts 
that only public approbation can bestow on him and that public blame can take away from 
him at a moment´s notice. That is the way to sap the power of wealth and to produce men 
whom money cannot buy. 
The first regulation of conflict of interest dates back to 1810, when corruption was penalised in the 
French Napoleonic Code of 1810 (CoE 1996: 15). These rules applied to public officers, judges, 
administrators, clerks, commanders of military divisions, and every agent of public administration4. 
Currently, most countries have regulation of conflict of interest, for all three branches of government 
(OECD 2011: 211). Most of this regulation appeared in the aftermath of political scandals, as a result 
of policy diffusion, professionalisation of politics and “self-reinforcing” reforms (Saint-Martin 2008). In 
turn, first attempts to regulate political finance date back to the end of 19th century with the campaign 
regulation laws of New York 1880, Michigan 1892 and Massachusetts 1883 (Pollock 1926), as well as 
the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 1883 of Great Britain5. And if the British regulation 
dealt mostly with preventing bribery and corruption practices, the US regulation on the state level, 
primarily referred to as `publicity laws`, aimed at making political finance transparent to the general 
public even though the quality of that information due to the weak enforcement instruments remained 
quite poor (Pollock 1926: 235, 242). In continental Europe substantive changes in political finance 
resulted from the intense political competition between political parties and the introduction of mass 
suffrage. Maurice Duverger explained the development of mass party organizations in terms of the 
need of parties on the left to secure financial resources as a means of independence from a few big 
donors – industrialists or bankers – and as a necessary condition of enabling political education of the 
working class and funding for election campaigns (Duverger 1964: 63). Commenting on that Peter Mair 
noted that “parties of the right […] which enjoyed the support of the wealthy backers and clients, could 
still afford a more cadre-type organization” (Mair 2002: 35). But transparency of political funds 
 
3 Note that a similar passage was first cited in Hood (2006: 7) as an example of regulation of transparency. This 
author did not, however, attribute it to the regulation of conflict of interest. 
4 Section II of the French Napoleonic Code of 1810. Book the Third of Crimes and Delicts, and of their 
Punishment. Transcribed by Tom Holmberg. Retrieved 25.02.2020 from http://www.napoleon-
series.org/research/government/france/penalcode/c_penalcode3a.html 
5 The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act with Introduction and Full Index, 1883. By J. Renwick Seager, 
1918, London: P. S. King & Son, Parliamentary Agency. Retrieved 25.02.2020 from: 
https://archive.org/details/corruptpracact00grea/page/20 
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remained beyond the public attention for much longer. The blurring of traditional class boundaries 
since the 1970s, and the rise of awareness that democratic representation should not be biased by 
undue financial pressures6, forced already catch-all political parties, in terms of Otto Kirchheimer, to 
rely on state subventions rather than on membership fees and affluent donors. In this regard Robert 
Dahl noted that, by relying on state subventions, parties guaranteed the enforcement of the key rule 
of democracy, that is, “a continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, 
considered as political equals” (Dahl: 1971: 1). As a rule, with the direct state subsidies, transparency 
requirements were introduced as part of a carrot-and-stick solution to make parties accountable for 
their usage of taxes in the US, Canada, Israel, Denmark, Germany and Bolivia (Casas-Zamora 2005: 39), 
and most of the post-communist countries (Casal Bértoa and van Biezen 2014: 306). But many 
countries did not introduce transparency rules accompanying the introduction of state subsidies, for 
example Uruguay, the first country to introduce direct state funding (1928), and Sweden and Norway, 
which introduced state subsidies on the national level in 1970 and on the subnational level in 1975.  
Transparency rules ensure that other rules on political finance are not violated and, provided they are 
properly enforced, aim thereby at securing the integrity of political finance. Although the first attempts 
to make political finance transparent are 140 years old, in the 1990s most political finance remained 
unopen to the public (Nassmacher 2006: 452; Smilov and Toplak 2007: 10-17). This fact led to the 
establishment of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) within the Council of Europe. My 
analysis of its work reveals that transparency regulation for political finance and conflict of interest 
varies across European countries and, interestingly, not all countries were and are ready to undertake 
further anti-corruption reforms. As this field of comparative political studies still suffers from under-
theorizing (Norris and van Abel Es 2016: 5; Mendilow 2018; Scarrow 2007), this thesis particularly 
contributes to closing this gap.  
The Argument 
I argue that to study transparency regulation of political finance and conflict of interest, it is essential 
to consider both preventive and transparency constraints inherent in the regulation.  
Further, to explain the launch and the outcome of changes in transparency regulation of political 
finances, we need to take into account both domestic and international explanatory factors. A policy 
change in party finance transparency is a product of domestic competition between political parties, 
policy diffusion, as well as reputational benefits and losses for the country in the international arena.   
 
6 The legitimate rejection of conflict of interest in politics happened not only to political parties but to politics in 
a broad sense. Consider, for instance, the fact that countries in Europe experienced a change of public offices 
that were honorary posts, carrying no salary, to overwhelmingly state funded posts. This development can be 
attributed to the victory of the centre-left and left parties. 
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Different regulatory patterns of COI regulation are embedded in the different administrative traditions 
of countries, closely related to their type of democracy. 
Transparency Regulation of Party Finance and Other Types of Regulation of Political Finance7 
Following Ohman (2014) and Norris and van Abel Es (2016), who refer to the OSCE definitions of 
political finance, I consider political finance to be all money involved in the political process. It includes 
the financial practices of political parties, their branches, parliamentary groups and party ancillary 
organisations, candidates, social movements, ad-hoc organisations of political support and also third 
parties. Due to the central role that political parties play in contemporary democracies (Dalton et al. 
2011; Müller and Sieberer 2006: 436), in this dissertation I have decided to focus on the party8 finance 
regulation that is most closely related to electoral democracy, and a particular aspect of it – 
transparency – which enables public control over the enforcement of party finance regulation (Casas-
Zamora 2005: 23) and thus contributes to the integrity of democratic elections and government.  
Echoing Norris and van Abel Es (2016: 8), I define party finance transparency as official rules – a type 
of regulation of political finance – that deal with the reporting of party finance to the state authorities, 
disclosing the information on party finance to the general public and with regulating the supervision 
and sanctioning of violations of these rules. How does this type of regulation refer to other regulatory 
dimensions of political finance? 
According to Ewing and Issacharoff (2006) and Norris and van Abel Es (2016), party finance 
transparency regulation is a type of party regulation which is conceptually more constraining than 
laissez-faire, or free market, policy regulation but less constraining than any other types of party 
finance rule, as it only requires parties to disclose their activities but does not constrain them 
otherwise. Regulation of party income and state subsidies is a second constraining type of party 
finance regulation. It ensures that parties “are not seen to be dependent on inappropriate sources of 
funding and not dependent on appropriate sources of funding to inappropriate extent” (Ewing and 
Issacharoff 2006: 3). In this regard, Ohman (2014: 21) differentiates between distinct types of ban that 
are commonly used: on foreign donations to ensure the national people´s sovereignty, on donations 
from corporations and trade unions to limit the influence of special interests, on corporations with a 
state as a regular stockholder to prevent misuse of public funds for political purposes and on 
corporations with government contracts to reduce quid pro quo contributions. Anonymous and 
indirect donations are also popularly banned to ensure the non-violation of other party finance rules. 
 
7 Note that the conceptual analysis of the COI regulation is presented in Chapters III and IV and is thus not a 
part of the introduction. 
8 Hereby I refer to ´parties in central office´ (Katz and Mair 1993) and neither to ´parties on the ground´, 
meaning the members and supporters of political parties, nor to ´parties in public office´, meaning sections in 
the parliament.  
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The regulation of state subsidies also belongs to this group of constraints as it can be paired with the 
rules around acquiring income from other sources. For example, in Germany state subsidies to political 
parties cannot exceed 50% of the party’s funds. Italy would be another example, where the state 
payment is linked to the amounts received from membership fees.   
The most constraining type of party finance regulation entails regulation of party expenditure aimed 
to limit the demand for political funds (Ewing and Issacharoff 2006: 4). Conceptually, it directly 
regulates party activities and not only the sources that the party may use to finance their activities. 
Discussing the ranges of constraints inherent in party regulation, Norris and Abel van Es (2016: 15) 
compare them to other types of state regulation and place them on a continuum from free market 
policy, with political parties being treated as private associations, to policies of state management of 
political parties, as Epstein (1986: 157) put it, resembling `public utilities`9, or natural monopolies. 
Echoing the rationales presented above, Figure 1 shows the relationship of transparency regulation to 
other types of party rules.  
Figure 1. Transparency regulation of party finance and other party finance rules 
 
Source: Norris and Abel van Es (2016: 15) and own considerations 
Figure 1 reflects the relationships between different types of party finance regulation in terms of 
constraints imposed from the state, while treating party finance regulation on a par with other policies. 
Despite several merits, this approach ignores constraints that party finance regulation imposes on the 
electoral process, which is its key limitation. This limitation prevents us from understanding why, 
bearing the least behavioural constraints for political parties, transparency in political finance is so 
hard to achieve. From my perspective, provided its proper enforcement, transparency regulation is the 
most constraining type of party finance regulation for at least three reasons. First, it reveals to the 
 
9 The definition that Epstein suggests says that a public utility is “an agency performing a service in which the 
public has a special interest sufficient to justify governmental regulatory control, along with the extension of 
legal privileges, but not governmental ownership or management of all the agency´s activities”. 
Free market policies      State management policies 
No regulation 
Transparency 
regulation 
Constraints on 
party income, 
regulation of 
subsidies 
Constraints on 
party 
expenditure 
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voters the parties´ supporting interests that in turn may affect parties´ abilities to raise their votes. 
Secondly, it may prevent some groups from donating if they fear publicity and thus shrinks parties´ 
capacities to raise funds. Those are the first and the second arguments that make Professor Karl-Heinz 
Nassmacher (2009: 244) suggest transparency should become “a safeguard for democracy”. That is 
because transparency forces politicians “at any time […] to balance the need for funds against the risk 
of interested money” (Nassmacher 2009: 244) and gives voters some power to control undue influence 
on politics. Thirdly, transparency regulation ensures that the limits on income sources and expenditure 
are respected. The regulation of expenditures is the type of party finance regulation that affects the 
electoral process least, as it is conceptually designed to keep the costs of political competition down 
and not to exclude or diminish the importance of any social groups. Constraints on contributions as 
well as the regulation of state subsidies have higher effects on electoral competition than the 
regulation of expenditures because their prime motive is to level the field of political competition 
(Paltiel 1981: 161) and limit undue influence. Furthermore, in some cases the regulation on state 
subsidies can substantively affect the prospects of party survival (Casal Bértoa and Spirova 2017). Now 
when availability of state subsidies for parties below electoral threshold matters only for certain 
parties, transparency regulation affects all political parties participating in the electoral competition. 
Figure 2 reflects my argument. The depicted relationship between different types of party finance rules 
suggests why transparency regulation of party finance, although poorly designed, remained untouched 
in Europe until the 1990s whereas constraints on expenditure and income as well as regulation of state 
subsidies were quite common. Among other types of party finance regulation, the transparency 
regulation affects the electoral competition to the largest extent.  
Figure 2. Effects of party finance regulation on the electoral competition 
 
Source: own considerations 
Having discussed the relationship of party finance transparency regulation to other types of party 
finance rules, I will now focus on party finance transparency regulation itself. For that I utilize the three-
Low effects         High effects 
No regulation 
Constraints on 
party 
expenditure 
Constraints on 
party income, 
regulation of 
subsidies 
Transparency 
regulation 
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level concept model of Gary Goertz (2006). Let us first focus on the basic level – party finance 
transparency regulation which I define as official regulation aimed at bringing to light10 the financial 
activities of political parties. Legal norms, supervision and sanctions as regulatory dimensions 
constitute the secondary level of the concept. Here transparency is clearly distinguished from 
openness. According to Heald (2006: 26), openness does not require “legally binding enforceable 
obligations”11. Thus, transparency is unthinkable without enforcement rules. Sanctions inherent in the 
formal rules are also an inseparable part of transparency regulation. Following James (2000: 327), I 
take regulation to mean rules on standards of behaviour backed up by sanctions. Formal sanctions 
distinguish transparency regulation from surveillance. So, echoing Norris and Abel van Es (2016: 8) and 
as already noted above, I define party finance transparency regulation as official rules that deal with 
the reporting of party finance to the state authorities, disclosing information on party finance to the 
general public and rules that regulate the supervision and sanctioning of the violations of these rules.  
Substantively, following Nassmacher (2009) and Ewing and Issacharoff (2006), I classify party finance 
regulation into three dimensions: 1) regulation of party income and party expenditures for reporting 
and public disclosure (bans and caps on income from certain sources/expenditures, thresholds for 
reporting or disclosure, aggregation rules, anonymity); 2) sanctions for violations of the regulation 
listed; and 3) supervision of compliance with regulation on bans, caps, reporting and disclosure. This 
logic is reflected in Figure 3. 
Following Nassmacher (2009: 73), I differentiate between general regulatory constraints, and 
constraints that only apply during campaign periods. As the regulatory focus on campaign and non-
campaign periods depends on the development of the electoral and party systems (see Table 1 for an 
overview of countries with different regulatory preferences), conceptually I treat these types of 
regulation as equally important and equally constraining.  
The third level of the concept, along with Goertz (2006), consists out of regulatory indicators. Let us 
first turn to the indicators that refer to the legal norms. Echoing McMenamin (2013:22-23) and 
Bolleyer and Smirnova (2017), I detect two dimensions: the one on transparency and the permissive 
one. The first dimension encompasses reporting and disclosure rules on party income and party 
expenditure. To measure the level of transparency here means to determine the range of available  
 
 
 
10 Note that the word transparent comes from Medieval Latin trans “through” and parere “come in sight, 
appear”, which together mean “that can be seen through”. Online   Etymology   Dictionary, retrieved 
11.03.2020 from https://www.etymonline.com/word/transparent?ref=etymonline_crossreference. 
11 Another feature of transparency which extends it beyond openness, according to the work of Heald, is the 
provision of comprehensible information. High complexity and disorder prevent transparency. 
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Table 1. A distribution of regulatory preferences on reporting regular and campaign finances  
of political parties across countries 
Data source: IDEA Database 
 
 
 Political parties must report on their 
campaign finance extra 
Political parties do NOT have to 
report extra on their campaign 
finance 
Political 
parties 
must 
report 
regularly 
on their 
finance 
Albania, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, 
Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, 
Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Korea, Republic of, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, 
former Yugoslav Republic (1993-), Mexico, 
Moldova, Republic of, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Serbia, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, 
Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, United Republic 
of, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Fiji, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Iran, Islamic Republic of, 
Jordan, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, 
Myanmar, Netherlands, Panama, 
Republic of The Congo (Brazzaville), 
Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Timor-Leste, Turkey, 
Uzbekistan, Yemen 
Political 
parties do 
NOT have 
to report 
regularly 
on their 
finance 
Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Libya, 
Philippines 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Dominica, El 
Salvador, Gambia, Grenada,  Kiribati,  
Lebanon,  Malawi,  Marshall Islands,  
Mauritius,  Micronesia, Federated 
States of,  Monaco,  Nauru,  Palau,  
Saint Kitts and Nevis,  Saint Lucia,  
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines,  
Samoa,  Switzerland,  Tonga,  Trinidad 
and Tobago,  Turkmenistan,  Tuvalu,  
Vanuatu,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe 
xxi 
 
policy instruments, or ´instrument density´, and the level of policy constraints imposed by each of 
these instruments, ´instrument intensity´ (Knill et al. 2012: 430). Based on previous research (Ohman 
2014; Piccio 2012; Koss 2011; Nassmacher 2009; Nassmacher 2006; Casas-Zamora 2005; van Biezen 
2004) I derive 28 rules of income and expenditure that can be systematically applied by states12. That 
is the density of the policy instrument. 
The intensity of the regulatory instrument incorporates the preventive logics of the regulatory 
framework and can be realized in the following forms: no regulation, caps or bans. Here, regulation of 
income sources, echoing Ewing and Issacharoff (2006: 3), refers to the number of legal sources for 
funding and the amount of funding which can be won from these sources. Further, for every regulation 
concerning party income or expenditure, I differentiate between the following five levels of 
transparency: no regulation, reporting only to the supervising institutions, disclosing information to 
the citizens upon request, public disclosure of information upon a threshold, or full public availability 
of financial information. The interplay between instrumental density and transparency constraints – 
inherent in one regulatory instrument – is presented in Table 2. Note that rules on caps and bans used 
for the index refer only to negative regulation (Casas-Zamora 2005: 17), which restricts financial 
activities, and do not refer to positive regulation aimed at the stimulation of financial activities.  
Bringing both logics together enables us to measure the transparency constraints on parties across 
countries and over time13 in an unbiased way, which is important while dealing with comparative 
political data driven by the financial reports of political parties. As with all the other measurements, 
this index also has its limits. These are the factors that are important for the integrity of party finance 
transparency but are hardly possible to include in the index. 
 
12 The dimension of ´party income´ includes party member dues, anonymous donations, domestic individual 
financial donations, domestic individual in-kind donations, foreign individual financial donations, foreign 
individual in-kind donations, domestic financial corporate donations, domestic in-kind corporate donations, 
foreign financial corporate donations, loans offered by foreign corporate or individual donors, foreign in-kind 
corporate donations, donations from the trade unions, donations from political committees and foundations, 
direct state finance, in-kind state subsidies (provision of free radio and television air time), foreign public or 
semi-public contributions, revenues from the party´s own business (e.g. lotteries, revenues from interest 
rates), domestic loans, donations from other party units, donations from party-associated organizations, 
sponsoring, contributions from domestic state agencies (or semi-state companies). The dimension identified as 
´party expenditures´ covers regular staff expenditures, professional fees for non-regular party workers, 
administrations (e.g. office rents), conferences (and other similar expenditures for communication), PR and 
political advertisement, support of other party units. 
13 Enabling a comparison of party finance regulation over time is especially a problem as a cross-country 
comparison works well with the help of cross-tabulation (Casas-Zamora 2005; Koss 2011). 
 
 
Secondary Level  Basic Level Analytical Functions and Regulatory Indicators 
 
Party Finance 
Tranparency 
Regulation
Regular Party Finance
Legal Norms
prevention of activities no rules, caps, bans
disclosure of activities
no rules, to supervisor only, 
public on request, full 
availability
Supervision detection of violations
audit, supervising institution, 
publicity
Sanctions regulatory costs of 
violations administrative,  criminal
Campaign Party 
Finance
Legal Norms
prevention of activities no rules, caps, bans
disclosure of activities
no rules, to supervisor only, 
public on request, full 
availability
Supervision detection of violations
audit, supervising institution, 
publicity
Sanctions costs of violations administrative,  criminal
Figure 3. A three-level concept of party finance transparency regulation 
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Table 2. The interplay of preventing and disclosure 
constraints on party finance transparency 
Ranking of 
constraints 
Prevention of 
activity 
Disclosure of 
activity 
0 No rules No rules 
1 No rules 
To supervisor 
only 
2 No rules Public on request 
3 No rules 
Public upon 
threshold 
4 No rules Full 
5 Cap No rules 
6 Cap 
To supervisor 
only 
7 Cap Public on request 
8 Cap 
Public upon 
threshold 
9 Cap Full 
10 Total ban - 
 
If there is a requirement to report and disclose information on party finance, I consider important: 1) 
whether the donors´ names are reported and disclosed together with the amount of their 
contributions, or if the donors and their contributions are listed separately; 2) whether the 
contributions from one donor are aggregated in the whole campaign period or electoral cycle to 
differentiate among the regular and occasional contributions; 3) if conveyer organizations are allowed 
to channel political support; 4) the timing for reporting and disclosure of financial data; 5) the public 
availability of data on violations of party finance regulation. The timing of reporting and disclosure of 
political finance is of particular importance. Regulators must balance the benefits of real-time 
reporting of political finance data with the drawbacks of disclosing such large quantities of data. On 
the one hand, real-time reporting of parties’ financial activities is vital for voters to be able to reward 
and punish parties immediately (Fisher 2015: 224). Transparency is undermined if the data is not 
presented on time, complete, consistent and in clear and simple terms (Etzioni 2010: 399). On the 
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other hand, real-time reporting of campaign funding can overwhelm parties and decrease the quality 
of the information disclosed, which in turn can cost parties their votes and undermine the elections 
themselves. Research on the accelerated disclosure of data by firms for the capital markets suggests 
that pressure put on the auditors to file information rapidly compromises the quality of the 
information (Bryant-Kutcher et al. 2013).  
Party finance transparency also includes rules associated with the institutions supervising compliance. 
The broader the mandate of supervising institutions, and the more independent these institutions are 
from partisans (Ewing and Issacharoff 2006: 7; Grzymala-Busse 2007: 84-85), the higher is the 
likelihood that violations of party finance regulation are detected. The dimension ´supervision´ should 
cover: 1) the existence of supervising institutions; 2) their independence from party members; and 3) 
whether they have adequate staff and resources to realize their mandates. We can differentiate 
between institutions that collect party financial reports, pro-actively examine these financial reports 
and can impose sanctions for violations of party finance transparency regulation. For each of these 
institutions, following Bolleyer and Smirnova (2017), I differentiate between partisan, semi-
independent and independent composition. Beyond the supervising institution auditing is also crucial 
to ensure the integrity of financial reports. It is important to differentiate: 1) whether the auditing is 
required; and if it is required whether it should be: 2) pursued by the party-related auditors; or 3) 
executed by independent auditors. 
The last substantive component of party finance transparency regulation captures sanctions,14 and 
determines the costs of violations of party finance regulation once they are detected. Following Ewing 
and Issacharoff (2006: 3), Casal Bértoa et al. (2014) and Bolleyer and Smirnova (2017), I consider 
whether the violation of party finance transparency rules can be punished by criminal sanctions, 
administrative sanctions, or both.  
This dissertation focuses on party finance transparency regulation along the dimensions listed above. 
The rules can be either loosened or tightened. I apply this concept for party finance transparency 
regulation issued on the national level for the national party in its central office. Future research may 
subsequently apply this concept to parliamentary groups, party branches on regional and local levels, 
as well extend it to other political actors such as political candidates, political associations, etc.  
 
14 The dimension ´sanctions´ covers the availability of the following sanctions for the violation of party finance 
regulation: deprivation of state funding; suspension or deregistration; other non-criminal sanctions (e.g. fines, 
etc.); criminal sanctions (imprisonment). 
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So far, I have discussed the concept of state regulation of party finance transparency. As this type of 
regulation can dramatically affect the electoral process, it is paramount to understand the reasons 
why it can change. 
Reforms of Party Finance and COI Regulation: State of Research 
Research into reforms in regulation of political finance commonly refers to the three types of neo-
institutionalism. In the following I focus on theoretical explanation of reforms of party finance 
transparency regulation. This part is by no means an exhaustive exploration or a literature review of 
the studies of neo-institutionalism15. My purpose here is to explain my main theoretical argument 
through the lenses of neo-institutionalism customarily used to explain changes in or reforms to 
political finance regulation.  
Rational choice institutionalism 
Rational choice institutionalism sees regulation as a deliberate creation of instrumentally oriented 
actors. According to this approach, political parties tend to initiate and support reforms of party 
finance regulation when it gives them a comparative electoral advantage (Scarrow 2004: 656; Koss 
2011: 29) and secures their survival in case of an electoral loss (Grzymala-Busse 2007: 63).  
In her seminal article “Explaining Political Finance Reforms” (2004), Scarrow suggests that political 
parties pursue their own interests in reforms to party finance regulation, which is understood to 
require a trade-off between the revenue- and votes-maximizing goals. Hereby the political survival of 
the parties in the electoral competition stands in the very core of the theoretical argument. Also 
Scarrow suggests that constitutional courts and independent regulatory commissions adjust the policy 
of party finance in a manner such that they: 1) put the party finance reform on the agenda; and 2) 
change the regulation to integrate all broad partisan interests and not only those of the dominant 
political parties. Evidence that Scarrow finds on party finance reforms in Germany and the UK supports 
this theoretical argument.  
Koss (2011) extends these ideas in his book The Politics of Party Funding. Echoing Strøm (1990), Kaiser 
(2002) and Nassmacher (2009: 325), he argues that political parties became supportive of state 
 
15 See Fisher (2015) for a broader discussion on neo-institutionalism and its application to political finance 
research. Fisher (2015) reviews all three types of neo-institutionalism for research into political finance, 
referring to the classic works of March and Olson, Steinmo and Thielen as well as Guy Peters. Echoing an 
earlier contribution by Clift and Fisher (2004), Fisher (2015) calls for a differentiation between the mechanisms 
which explain stability and revision of the regulation of political finance, on the one hand, and the mechanisms 
which explain the nature of the resulting policy, on the other hand. The overall book, entitled The Deregulatory 
Moment? A Comparative Perspective on Changing Campaign Finance Laws (Boatright ed. 2015), wonders 
whether the tightening regulation of political finance in Europe and a deregulatory trend for campaign finance 
regulation in the USA can be systematically explained by the theory. 
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funding to parties because of the prospect of thereby maximising either their revenue- or office-
seeking goals, and due to their often being forced to cooperate with each other by the veto-points 
understood as “institutions enabling actors to influence decisions (be it by actively shaping or just 
vetoing them)” (Koss 2011: 43).  
In contrast to the research on the introduction of state funding, where a consensus and cooperation 
between parties is a central explanatory factor, I argue that transparency reforms result from party 
competition. In particular, political parties initiate, delay or block transparency reforms according to 
their own interests: to maximise votes, to get a comparative advantage in their revenues or to signal 
their loyalty and interest to a potential coalition partner. Hereby, political parties whose income 
primarily consists of sources widely regarded as legitimate, such as state funding and membership 
fees, have stronger incentives to push for party finance transparency as it makes them more attractive 
to voters. Parties can be interested in transparency in order to attack the funding sources of their 
political rivals, to decrease their popularity or to discredit those parties. Coalitional partners may 
compromise their positions to maximize their chances of keeping the coalition alive or getting into 
office in the first place. Transparency reforms in party funding are often the realisation of a 
comparative electoral advantage. I find additional support for this argument in the broad literature on 
party funding. 
Grzymala-Busse, in her book Rebuilding Leviathan (2007), suggests that robust political competition 
leads to the introduction of a more stringent regulation of party income, the establishment of 
independent audit systems and of an effective supervision system for political finance. Also, the 
oppositional parties themselves actively monitor activities of the governing parties, thereby 
preventing the misuse of state resources and other dubious financial activities. Empirical findings 
suggest that robust competition led to the establishment of the supervising institutions and audits for 
political finance in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Lithuania and Estonia. At the same time the absence of 
a credible threat of replacement to the governing parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia and 
Bulgaria largely led to a delay and failures in the establishment of politically independent monitoring 
institutions. Most of the monitoring institutions in the latter group of countries were built later under 
EU pressure (Grzymala-Busse 2007: 107). Chapter 5 of the book suggests that robust party 
competition did not only lead to stricter formal regulation, but also ensured better enforcement of 
the legal rules in practice, because opposition parties effectively revealed covert funding practices. 
Katz and Mair, in their influential ´cartel´-party theory, suggested, inter alia, that incumbent political 
parties may want to establish such an equilibrium when the system of the allocation of state subsidies 
prevents new parties’ entry into political competition (Katz and Mair 2009: 759). This echoes the 
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seminal approach of George Stigler, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1982. From his perspective 
regulation is the result, on the one hand, of lobbying aimed at protection of the existing rents of firms 
and, on the other hand, of the will of politicians to maximize their shares of votes and campaign 
contributions. In this case, the resulting regulation should prevent newcomers from entering the 
market (Ghertman 2009: 352). Similarly, a political cartel strives to change regulation to favour 
themselves and discourage other parties from entering the political competition. Again, according to 
Katz and Mair, the absence of political competition should lead to a low level of overall transparency 
in political finance. At the same time a cartel may lead to transparency reforms that are aimed at a 
decrease of funds or a decrease of supporters for political newcomers.  
National anti-corruption regulation is closely related to the national reputation in the international 
arena. That is because transparency belongs to the guiding principles of good governance promoted 
by the World Bank16 (1994: 30), the Council of Europe (CoE 199617; CoE 2003), the United Nations (UN 
2003) and the European Union (EU 201018), and its importance as a deterrent to corruption is 
internationally acknowledged. Belonging to the family of civilized countries is strongly associated with 
democratic government and the idea that democracy does not tolerate corruption (CoE 2003; UN 
2003). Following Guzman, countries care about their reputation as it reflects the beliefs of other 
international actors on their credibility with respect to their mutual commitments. Chapters I and II 
further develop these ideas. In a nutshell, countries tend to comply with international 
recommendations on transparency in party financing, to demonstrate their commitment to anti-
corruption reforms and democratic values.  
Closely related to the rational choice perspective is the concept of institutional conservatism (Kaiser 
2002: 105). This concept provides explanations in cases when regulation of party finance transparency 
does not change. Echoing Kaiser, I argue that regulation does not change if: 1) the status quo is an 
optimal equilibrium of interests of all the participants; and 2) the expected revenues of the reforms 
exceed the costs of the reform, including the costs of consensus-building, working out the reform 
proposal and the implementation of the reform. Along with the institutional conservatism, my 
 
16 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Staff (1994): Governance. The World Bank´s 
Experience. Washington: World Bank Publications. Retrieved 25.02.2020 from 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/711471468765285964/pdf/multi0page.pdf 
17 CoE 1996: Programme of Action Against Corruption GMC(96)95, Committee of Ministers. Retrieved 
25.02.2020 from 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806ccfb
6 
18 EU 2010: The Stockholm Programme — An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens (2010/C 
115/01). Retrieved 25.02.2020 from https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF 
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argument suggests that the transparency reforms of political finance do not happen because they do 
not bring any considerable comparative advantages for the ruling party (parties), they are too costly, 
and they do not bring any substantial reputational benefits in the international arena at that moment. 
Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism considers regulation to reflect the dominant political culture, and changes 
in institutional development to be institutional adaptation to societal changes (Kaiser 2002: 109-110). 
From this theoretical perspective, understanding the evolution of party finance regulation in the 1990s 
towards transparency largely depends on considering political parties as overwhelmingly state-
dependent19 (Poguntke et al. 2016; van Biezen 2004; van Biezen 2008). The work of Mendilow (1992: 
96) on Israel echoes this argument. In his analysis of the causes of the introduction of state subsidies 
in Israel, he states that it was increased awareness of party finance corruption that led to direct state 
funding paired with transparency requirements. Thus, high transparency requirements are paired with 
direct state subsidies as part of a carrot-and-stick solution to make parties accountable for their usage 
of taxes. To ensure that parties do not misuse public finance and that they promote public interest, 
public oversight becomes legitimate. This logic was embedded in the reforms in the USA, Canada, 
Israel, Denmark, Germany and Bolivia (Casas-Zamora 2005: 39), and in the party finance regimes of 
most of the post-communist countries.  
Van Abel es (2016: 219) conducted a cross-sectional analysis of 99 countries to identify factors 
responsible for differences in the strictness of political finance regulation as captured by the Political 
Finance Regulation Index, constructed as a latent variable. She finds that the legal origin of a country 
– the main independent variable for historical institutionalism in her study – remains a consistently 
significant predictor, with countries close to the French or German legal tradition regulating political 
finance significantly less than countries that are close to the English legal traditions. She also shows 
that countries affected by the Socialist legal tradition and new democracies tend to regulate political 
finance more than countries with the English legal origin. Smilov and Toplak (2007) draw similar 
conclusions on the importance of institutional setting and the ideological experience while analysing 
differences in regulation of political finance in the Eastern European countries. They attribute these 
differences in regulation of political finance to the different systems of separation of powers, 
 
19 The state regulation of political parties, and in particular state subsidies, is often justified with a concept of 
parties as ´public utilities´ (Epstein 1986), or in economic terms as natural monopolies. As with other natural 
monopolies, here the state sets the level of state subsidies to support political parties so that they can fulfil 
their functions to ensure social welfare – in the case of parties, a democratic representation and competition. 
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differences in electoral systems, as well as to the dominant preferences for egalitarian or libertarian 
ideology.  
Along with the literature cited above, changes to transparency regulation of political finance happen, 
as Molenaar (2010, 6) puts it, “within the embedded national preferences”. This is especially the case 
when international organizations, like the EU or GRECO, suggest regulatory tailor-made revisions of 
party finance regulation. I echo this evidence in Chapter I on finding out that changes in regulation of 
party finance on a foreign advice are most likely to be implemented if they are moderate and in line 
with national conventions. 
Apart from the evolutionary path described above, historical institutionalism explains policy changes 
with an argument about policy diffusion (Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2019; Koss 2011: 32). Policy diffusion 
happens when reforms follow the updated knowledge regarding the effectiveness (policy learning) 
and symbolic value (policy emulation) of policy decisions applied in other contexts – countries or 
subnational regions that follow a similar historical, cultural or geographical path. The widening of 
transparency in other policy-fields also matters. Knowledge about regulation and its effects in other 
contexts suggests possible or popular solutions for similar problems and illuminates the risks of 
enforcement for parties with similar profiles (Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2019: 7), thereby influencing their 
preferences in favour or against a policy change. Chapter II in this dissertation finds out empirical 
support for this theoretical approach, when it observes how political parties in Norway refer to the 
similar regulation and its implementation in Denmark. 
The policy diffusion is a popular argument to explain the evolution of the COI regulation. In a broad 
literature review Saint-Martin (2008: 40-42) finds considerable evidence on spread of the COI 
regulation via policy diffusion on the transnational level, among national and subnational units of 
government as well as among subnational units. That said, the author himself sees the main reasons 
for the COI evolution in policy feedback loops conceptualized along with path-dependency developed 
by Pierson (2004). This approach unites historical and normative institutionalism, as Saint-Martin 
suggests that the COI regulation is affected by other decisions regulating politics and carries a high 
symbolic value especially important in times of political crises (2008: 53). Chapter IV of this 
dissertation further investigates and largely supports this argument. 
Normative institutionalism  
Normative institutionalism emphasizes scandals, a concern for equity and rising campaign costs as the 
main factors responsible for reforms in party funding (Paltiel 1981: 153). For transparency reforms 
scandals are particularly important. The reforms and the paths that the reforms take follow a “logic of 
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appropriateness” – acceptable regulatory solutions need to be deeply rooted in the shared values of 
the decision-makers (Fischer 2015: 158). These values may vary across social groups, countries and 
time. Pujas and Rode (1999: 42-43) note on this, “what is ´illegal´ and ´corrupt´ in some societies may 
be considered acceptable in others […]. An act tolerated during a given period in a particular society 
may not be in another, since the values of that society will have changed […]. The corrupt behaviour 
of political elites known to only a limited number of citizens […] can become scandalous when revealed 
to the public”. Public scandals have been posited to be triggers for reforms in Italy, Spain and France 
(Pujas and Rodes 1999), Germany (von Alemann 2002) and Great Britain and France (Clift and Fisher 
2004: 681), to name just a few studies. In this instance, a policy change is seen as an appropriate 
reaction to a policy failure and is thus a crucial remedy for public distrust of political parties. However, 
the direction of the regulation adopted in the aftermath of a scandal cannot be predicted per se. Pujas 
and Rodes (1999) prove this using the example of the introduction of direct state subsidies to political 
parties in Italy in 1974 and its subsequent abolition in the public referendum in 1993. Chapter IV 
echoes these findings when examining the COI reforms in the UK and Belgium.  
Koss (2011: 51) suggests that we look more broadly and, alongside the real scandals, consider all public 
communication on corruption, including perceived corruption and the threat of corruption – together 
described as the ‘public discourse on corruption’. An intense discourse on corruption shapes parties’ 
policy goals in favour of constraining transparency regulation. And in our globalised world, corruption 
in one country may affect politics in another. Chapter I and II suggest empirical support for these 
theoretical expectations upon revealing the importance of reputational benefits and losses for 
countries involved in international anti-corruption programmes. Empirical work on Chapter II also 
showed that corruption scandals in other countries affected the perception of the threat of corruption 
in Norway. 
Concluding Remarks 
To conclude, I would like to suggest several avenues for future research. In my view, future works may 
be interested in studies of the effectiveness of party finance regulation and regulation of conflict of 
interest. Indices and approaches to measure the regulation presented in this thesis can be used to 
capture the dynamics of regulatory change across countries and over time as well as for the case 
selection. Hereby I echo Heald, who emphasizes the importance to consider the differences between 
the nominal transparency, measured by the law, and effective transparency - the gap that Heald calls 
the ´transparency illusion´. Heald states (2006: 34-35) that “even when transparency appears to be 
increasing, as measured by some index, the reality may be quite different […]. For transparency to be 
effective, there must be receptors capable of processing, digesting, and using the information”. Also, 
xxxi 
 
 
James K. Pollock noted on this that “the remedy for eliminating sinister money influences does not lie 
in passing more laws, but rather in improving the moral sense of the electorate and raising the 
standards of public service” (Pollock 1926: 262). This means that the integrity of political finance 
depends to a large extent on: 1) whether politicians, political parties and their supporters want to 
follow the spirit of the law, and not only its letter; and 2) how business and the society, in particular 
social scientists and mass media, understand the open data on political finance and critically reflect 
upon it. This implies further research on issues that may help to make open data on political finance 
and conflict of interest effective tools to understand and affect politics. With this regard, the use of 
new technologies in increasing transparency of political finance and tackling the conflict of interest 
also seems to be a promising field of research. Additional studies may want to investigate the effects 
of anti-corruption regulation of political finance and conflict of interest (COI) on trust of citizens 
towards democratic institutions and their satisfaction with democracy. Further research can also 
benefit from extending the analysis of transparency regulation in political finance to the local level of 
politics as well as to the conveyer organizations of parties. Concepts, empirical evidence and 
conclusions presented in this work can be thus tested for their external validity and contribute to a 
broader research agenda. 
A Brief Summary  
Effective design of the mechanisms enabling political equality – with economic inequality remaining a 
big challenge for democracy in the 21st century (Gilens 2012; Piketty 201420) – constitutes one of the 
main research fields of contemporary political science. I contribute to the studies of one of these 
mechanisms – transparency regulation of political finance – in particular by studying different 
responses of national states to the internationally agreed norms on transparency of political finance 
(Chapter I), and the interplay of national and international factors affecting policy-making on 
transparency regulation of political finance (Chapter II). I argue that it is domestic politics that 
overwhelmingly determines the development of regulation on such a delicate issue as political 
finance. In particular, political parties initiate, delay or block transparency reforms according to their 
own interests: to maximise votes, to get a comparative advantage in their revenues or to signal their 
 
20 Thomas Piketty studies the distribution of wealth and income using comprehensive data on more than two 
centuries primarily from Germany, Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States, but also from other 
countries. The author concludes that private return on capital grows higher and more rapidly than income 
rates. This development exacerbates economic inequality and may thus endanger political equality. Martin 
Gilens studies the responsiveness of the U.S. politics to the demands of voters with different income levels. 
Survey data analysis from 1981 till 2002 largely indicates a significantly higher convergence of the policy 
outputs with the policy preferences of voters from the high-income percentiles than of those being in the low- 
or middle-income percentiles. 
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loyalty and interest to a potential coalition partner. Stricter transparency regulation of political finance 
is primarily a result of political competition that is why I cannot agree more with Sartori (2005: 14), 
when he states that dissent is central to democracy. This finding on transparency regulation contrasts 
with the main finding of Koss (2011) on the evolution of state funding regulation that consensus is 
crucial for the introduction of party state funding. Simultaneously, it echoes the idea of Pinto-
Duschinsky (2002) and Nassmacher (2009: 244) that it is only well-designed and effectively enforced 
transparency regulation of political finance that ensures the enforcement of political finance 
regulation. Having said that, I consider it important to also control for international factors - such as 
policy diffusion and involvement of international organizations - while studying changes in the party 
finance transparency regulation as they may contribute to the launch or/ and to the choice of the 
reforms` paths. Chapters III and IV discuss the theoretical framework and measurement applied to the 
conflict of interest regulation. Chapter IV discusses the development of COI regimes in Belgium and 
the UK, largely attributing its path to historical institutionalism. Further contributions of my 
dissertation are three original data sets. Two of them are based on the GRECO evaluation and 
compliance reports which is a reliable source of data on regulation of political finance transparency 
and conflict of interest (see Appendix 1.8.1. for further details). And the chapter on Norway delivers 
original data on the reforms of party finance in Norway based on GRECO reports, original documents, 
and interviews conducted for this dissertation. In the following I discuss the main contributions of 
each of the chapters in a broader detail. 
A Detailed Overview of the Main Contributions21  
Chapter I makes several contributions to the ongoing debates on why political finance regulation 
changes, and in particular it a) suggests a theoretical framework to address political finance reforms, 
taking into account international obligations, existing party finance regulation, and demands for 
greater legitimacy of political institutions; b) introduces a unique dataset of 46 member-countries of 
the GRECO project operated by the Council of Europe; and c) concludes that unwillingness to pay the 
high domestic costs of changing national regulation is the prime impediment to compliance with 
transparency regulation proposed by GRECO.  
Chapter II makes two contributions to the emerging theory on the evolution of political finance 
regulation as a) it conceptualizes the underlying causal mechanisms that explain when and why party 
finance transparency regulation changes, and b) it presents the first detailed study of party finance 
transparency reforms in Norway – a deviant case for the introduction of such reforms. The findings 
 
21 Note that this part entails parts of abstracts of the published articles properly identified in the next passage 
below. 
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demonstrate that, in the absence of major scandals, an intense political discourse on corruption and 
political competition are sufficient factors to launch transparency reforms. Whether reforms are 
enacted depends on the interaction of several factors. Parties that predominantly rely on state funding 
and grassroots support push for and adopt more constraining transparency regulation, while parties 
that are close to business oppose it. Experience of regulation in similar contexts and intense discourse 
on corruption – stimulated by domestic or international events – are necessary for the reform to 
succeed. Norwegian cooperation with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) further 
demonstrates that the success of party finance transparency reforms initiated by a foreign actor is a 
function of the existing tradition of party regulation, the policy position of a governing party, and the 
international reputational costs of non-compliance.  
Echoing the discussion of party finance transparency regulation in the introduction, Chapter III a) 
introduces a three-dimensional conceptualization of COI regulation applicable to parliamentarians; b) 
presents a new dataset based on the GRECO reports to empirically differentiate between COI 
Strictness, Sanctions and Transparency, and c) presents empirically separate dimensions of 
parliamentary COI regimes adopted in European democracies. To illustrate the usefulness of these 
three indices, the chapter examines the relationship between the COI dimensions and trust in national 
parliaments across 25 democracies. Unlike the Sanction and Transparency Index, the COI Strictness 
Index (composed of strictness of rules and enforcement) has a significant and robust negative 
association with trust, which highlights the importance of disentangling different elements of COI 
regimes.  
Chapter IV continues to study the growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation adopted over 
the last decades. It explores the variation in countries´ regulatory preferences along all the dimensions 
using the data on 27 European democracies, and thus updating the data set used in the Chapter III. Its 
main contribution is the investigation into the rationales underpinning regulatory choices. Based on a 
cross-national comparison, the paper identifies two cases for an in-depth analysis in which legislators 
chose very different solutions in response to growing pressures to regulate themselves: the United 
Kingdom, which adopted a highly transparency-oriented regime, and Belgium, which adopted a highly 
sanction-oriented COI regime. Echoing neo-institutionalist perspectives, the longitudinal analysis 
indicates how the two democracies’ different institutional environments shape distinct answers to 
similar functional pressures. The appendix to this paper provides an additional analysis on the 
relationship between the COI regulation and the levels of trust in national parliaments as well as the 
perceived level of corruption. 
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A Publication Status of the Articles and an Overview of my Contributions to the Co-authored Works 
Chapter I is an accepted manuscript of the article Smirnova, Valeria (2018): ´Why make political 
finance transparent? Explaining the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)’s success in reforming 
national political finance regulation´ published as the version of record in European Political Science 
Review, 10 (4), 565-588  which can be accessed at http://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773918000103. I am 
a sole author. An earlier version of this article won the Peter Mair Prize 2015. 
Chapter II is an accepted manuscript of the article Tonhäuser, V.; Stavenes, T.: ´Why change party 
finance transparency? Political competition and evidence from the ‘Deviant’ case of Norway´ first 
published online on the 23th of October 2019 as a version of record in European Journal of Political 
Research and which can be accessed at http://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12369. I took the lead of 
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methods, designed the interview questions and participated in conducting of the interviews while 
staying in Oslo in 2017. I identified the first reform process in the secondary literature, largely wrote 
a passage on the political competition in Norway and the discussion as well es edited the case study 
analysis. Also, I produced all tables and figures in the main text of the paper, including the case study. 
Chapter III is the authors´ accepted manuscript of the article Nicole Bolleyer and Valeria Smirnova 
´Parliamentary ethics regulation and trust in European democracies´ published as the version of 
record in West European Politics, 40 (6), 1218-1240 [2017] Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & 
Francis Group, which can be accessed at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1290404. In this 
article I contributed to the selection of the items that constitute the dimensions of the indices, coded 
a half of the data set, developed and realized the construction of the COI Indices, developed, 
conducted and wrote down the study on the relationship between the COI regulation and trust. Also, 
I suggested to use the GRECO evaluation reports to construct the original data set. 
Chapter IV is the authors´ accepted manuscript of the article Bolleyer, Nicole; Smirnova, Valeria; Di 
Mascio, Fabrizio; Natalini, Alessandro: ´Conflict of interest regulation in European parliaments: 
Studying the evolution of complex regulatory regimes´ first published online on the 04th of October 
2018 as the version of record in Regulation and Governance, which can be accessed at 
http://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12221. For this paper I coded a half of the data set, constructed the 
indices and conducted the cross-sectional analysis. I presented the cross-sectional part of this paper 
in the RC48 joint seminar of the Russian Political Science Association and the Standing Group RC48 of 
the International Political Science Association in June 2017 in St. Petersburg, Russia.  
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1. Why Make Political Finance Transparent? Explaining the GRECO´s Success 
in Reforming National Political Finance Regulation 22 
 
Abstract 
If transparency in political finance is part and parcel of democracy, why do some countries adopt 
internationally agreed standards to regulate political finance in a more transparent way, while others 
do not? This paper a) suggests a theoretical framework to address this question, taking into account 
international obligations, existing party finance regulation,  and demands for greater legitimacy of 
political institutions; b) introduces a unique dataset of 46 member-countries of the GRECO project 
operated by the Council of Europe; and c) concludes that unwillingness to pay the high domestic costs 
of changing national regulation is the prime impediment to compliance with transparency regulation 
proposed by GRECO. Right-of-centre cabinets are, on average, associated with a poorer level of 
compliance. Interestingly, compliance with recommendations which reduce the privileges of 
parliamentary parties does not deviate from the overall pattern.  
Key words 
GRECO, political finance, policy change, rational choice 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Political finance is a key resource that parties and candidates need to campaign and to survive 
between elections (Fischer and Eisenstadt, 2004: 620). Although there is no unanimous position 
among political scientists on what factors drive political finances up, the tendency for ever-increasing 
demands for political finance is unambiguous (Nassmacher, 2009: 173). Accepting extensive financial 
and in-kind donations renders political parties and candidates susceptible to the influence of affluent 
donors. Transparency and accountability in political finance are intended to preserve the 
responsiveness of political parties and candidates to their voters, not donors. Given that transparency 
and accountability in political finance are part and parcel of democracy, we need to understand why 
countries regulate this sphere differently.  
Internationally agreed principles on the transparency of political finance regulation (OSCE/ODIHR and 
Venice Commission, 2010: 35; CoE, 2003; UN Convention against Corruption, 2003: Article 7.3) and 
 
22 This is an accepted manuscript of the article Smirnova, Valeria (2018) ´Why make political finance 
transparent? Explaining the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)’s success in reforming national 
political finance regulation´ published as the version of record in European Political Science Review, 10 (4), 
565-588 which can be accessed at http://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773918000103. An earlier version of this 
article won the Peter Mair Prize 2015. 
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comprehensive projects like the ´Group of States against Corruption’ (GRECO) allow researchers to 
examine countries´ attitudes towards regulation of political finance. Compliance with internationally 
agreed norms helps to capture these attitudes, as adherence is not assured by any coercive 
enforcement mechanism. My research question here is why only some countries voluntarily adopt 
internationally agreed standards intended to increase transparency and accountability in political 
finance, while others do not. 
This article proposes to analyse compliance with recommendations from international organizations 
on transparency of political finance, taking into account the dual nature of accountability that national 
authorities are exposed to: voters and international partners. I test propositions with a multiple 
regression on a new dataset derived from the GRECO project, involving 46 member-countries of the 
Council of Europe (CoE). The main finding demonstrates that countries tend to comply with 
international standards on transparency of political finance when the reforms required are moderate. 
Following Sarigil (2015: 233), I call such reforms path following or path-dependent.23 It means they 
preserve the logic of existing regulation and institutions; they thus require few resources to implement 
and carry little uncertainty as to their outcome. In other words, countries are more likely to introduce 
new standards on political finance when they already regulate political parties extensively. These 
findings are in line with path-dependency approaches claiming that existing institutions reduce the 
options available to change the policy’s direction (Olsen, 2009: 11).  A cross-country measure of the 
level of party regulation helps to capture this effect.  
Surprisingly, the national compliance is mediated by the political preferences of the governing 
coalition, with left-of-centre cabinets tending to adapt more transparency requirements for political 
finance than right-of-centre ones. By identifying systematic patterns in reforming party finance 
transparency regulation, this article contributes to the rapidly developing theory on policy change in 
political finance regulation (Koss, 2011; Norris and Abel van Es, 2016; Nwokora, 2014). Notably, the 
countries which co-founded GRECO, show more compliance than other GRECO participants. 
I define political finance as both party organizational finance and party and candidate finances for 
electoral campaigns (Nassmacher, 2001: 10). I deliberately do not differentiate between party and 
campaign funding for two reasons. First, conventional financial practices make it difficult to clearly 
separate them (Nassmacher, 2009: 32; Norris and Abel van Es, 2016: 7; Roper, 2007: 98). Secondly, 
according to the transparency and accountability recommendations of the CoE, political finance 
encompasses both funding of political parties and electoral campaigns (CoE, 2003).  
 
23 For the purpose of this study, I define ´a path´ as an existing regulative norm or/and an existing system of 
institutions. 
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Second section discusses the underlying logic of commitment to the reforms, based primarily on a 
rational choice approach. Third and fourth sections examine under what conditions countries tend to 
comply with or ignore international recommendations on reforms of political finance, and set out 
testable hypotheses. Fifth section introduces a new dataset based on the GRECO reports; the measure 
of party codification capturing the national level of party regulation; and further details on the data 
operationalization. Sixth section presents and discusses the main findings. The concluding seventh 
section underlines the article’s contributions to the field and suggests avenues for future research. 
1.2. Policy Change on Foreign Advice: Why do Countries Care?  
My primary interest in this article is to explain a variation in compliance with international 
recommendations on party finance reforms across countries. I use compliance here to mean ´all 
behaviour by subjects or actors that confirms to the requirements of behavioural prescriptions or 
compliance systems […] noncompliance (or violation) is behaviour that fails to confirm such 
requirements´ (Young, 1979: 4). Drawing on previous research (Abel van Es, 2016; Thomson, 2007; 
Trachtman, 2010), I conclude that national authorities working within international organizations are 
subject to twin accountability requirements. On the one hand, they represent their national electorate 
and should act in the interests of their voters as they won´t be re-elected otherwise (Przeworski et al., 
1999: 32). On the other hand, national authorities need to remain predictable and co-operative with 
their international partners ‒ international organizations and foreign national authorities ‒ in order to 
maintain prospects for further cooperation (Guzman, 2008). Consequently, I argue that both foreign 
(Gauja, 2016; Molenaar, 2010; Timus, 2010; van Biezen and Molenaar, 2012) and domestic (Koss, 
2011; Nwokora, 2014; Scarrow, 2004) costs of compliance should be taken into account when 
analysing changes in party finance regulation that result from international recommendations. 
Variations in party finance regulation have been recently addressed in a cross-sectional study 
encompassing more than 100 countries (Abel van Es, 2016). I contribute to this field by specifically 
studying the evolution of party finance transparency regulation and testing new theoretical 
implications on the subset of reforms induced by foreign advice in Europe. 
Studying foreign costs implies detecting relevant international actors who are able to influence 
national regulation on political finance. Addressing the European context, van Biezen and Molenaar 
(2012: 635) identify the following institutions relevant to the development of this regulation: the 
Council of Europe (CoE), the European Court of Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), regional organizations and initiatives of the EU and, last but not least, 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and quangos24. The CoE, through its GRECO 
 
24 ´Quango´ stands for a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation which is publicly financed but is 
not controlled by the central government.  
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expert pool and the Venice Commission,25 works out the norms and recommendations for countries, 
establishes guidelines and benchmarks, and also monitors progress on anti-corruption reforms 
(Molenaar, 2010: 6, 37). The GRECO mechanism plays a crucial role in ensuring that CoE member-
states comply with international standards. Through a comprehensive evaluation procedure it 
develops tailor-made recommendations for the CoE members on how to adjust their regulation and 
practice to conform to the CoE´s anti-corruption standards.26 The EU can facilitate implementation of 
the CoE´s recommendations with the prospect of EU membership and provision of international aid 
(Abel van Es, 2016: 221; Levitsky and Way, 2006). The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODHIR) and Election Monitoring Organization of the Commonwealth of the 
Independent States (CIS-EMO) are in charge of monitoring how existing principles of party and 
electoral regulation are put into practice. Meanwhile, NGOs and quangos share their country expertise 
(Norris, 2013: 565) at various stages of the reform process.  
The CoE thus plays a crucial role in elaborating new norms and providing countries with 
recommendations on how to improve their democratic integrity. The EU can play an important part 
in the implementation of CoE recommendations. From this perspective, non-compliance with CoE 
standards imposes normative (reputational) costs on national authorities in relation to the CoE and it 
can impose reputational costs with regard to other international partners, like the EU. Of course, the 
costs of noncompliance for a country diminish if it does not acknowledge the CoE (and GRECO 
specifically) as a legitimate agenda-setter (Börzel et al., 2010: 1371). The costs for compliance 
decrease, if a country can shape the GRECO standards along with its national policy goals (Börzel et al. 
2010: 1368). 
So far, I have discussed compliance costs arising from national authorities’ accountability to their 
international partners. Yet compliance with international standards on party finance requires closing 
the gap between a recommended regulatory norm and an existing domestic rule. The CoE 
recommendations aim, primarily, at changing inter- and intra-institutional routines in a political 
system via improvements in the state regulation of political parties. So, the act of compliance can 
change a traditionally accepted status quo in matters of acquiring, channelling, spending, reporting 
and disclosure of political finance. Sarigil (2015: 231) attributes the stability of the status quo to path 
dependence: ´through the habituation [repetition of action and thought], individuals acquire or 
develop pro-status quo cognitive frames, which shape their awareness and interpretation of reality. 
 
25 The Venice Commission is the CoE’s European Commission for Democracy through Law. It provides countries 
with legal advice on democratic issues. 
26 See Appendix 1.8.1 for further information on GRECO evaluation rounds and on how GRECO develops 
country-specific recommendations. 
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Such cognitive frames constitute barriers to change´. Thus, even in an attempt to comply with 
international recommendations on combating corruption, an abrupt change to the status quo must 
be costly. These reforms affect the historical tradition of party finance regulation – a long-term existing 
regulatory norm, practice and (if they exist) administrative units enforcing political finance regulation 
‒ which I also refer to as ´a path´. 
The CoE motivates countries to reflect upon their regulation. These reflections can produce at least 
two types of change. The first is path-dependent, or context-bounded, reforms, which Molenaar 
(2010: 6) describes as ´within the embedded national preferences´. These reforms change party 
regulation in minor ways ‒ lowering the threshold for disclosure of anonymous donations, for example 
‒ and, hence, generate only moderate costs. They maintain the overall status quo – the core of the 
national policy tradition ‒ but calibrate it to meet international standards.  
The second type of reform ‒ path-breaking ‒ generates discontinuities in the rules and traditions. For 
instance, when national law treats political parties on a par with non-governmental non-profit 
associations, it would hardly be possible, without defining political parties legally, to demand greater 
disclosure of finance used by parties. But defining political parties for the first time would inevitably 
restrict freedoms previously customary. Obviously, such path-breaking changes bring high adaptive 
costs, at least in the short run (March and Olsen, 2006: 13). And, given that domestic costs of 
compliance are more immediate than being shamed internationally,27 path-breaking changes are 
unlikely to be implemented. Simultaneously, we need to control for whether national authorities tend 
to implement path-breaking recommendations if they experience domestic political demand for 
enhancing the legitimacy of democratic institutions.28 Domestic political demands can be 
conceptualized as voters` dissatisfaction with domestic political institutions (Easton, 1957), which, in 
turn, can derive from political corruption scandals (Koss, 2011: 50). 
Domestic compliance costs may have different effects on political parties and their complementary 
institutions. International recommendations for reform can be treated as an exogenous shock which 
separates the political community essentially into two domestic political coalitions (Trachtman, 2010; 
Nzelibe, 2011): those who will benefit from the state´s compliance with these recommendations and 
those who risk losing from it. These coalitions are prone to crystallize along the left and right 
dimensions of party competition (Nzelibe 2011: 648), with right-of-centre parties, in general, 
supporting less transparency than their left-of-centre counterparts. These preferences may be traced 
 
27 Implementation of GRECO`s recommendations on transparency of party finance directly affect political 
parties and therefore can hinder or enhance their performance as soon as the next election.  
28 See a detailed discussion on control variables in the subsection of section 1.5. Data and Operationalization, 
Explaining variation in compliance: controls. 
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back to the socio-economic inequalities historically clustered around labour and capital and reflected 
in party support (Cioffi and Höpner, 2006: 486), as well as to the established party finance regime 
(Nwokora, 2014). Centre-right parties are traditionally closely related to the corporate elite and 
centre-left parties accordingly are traditionally willing to delegitimize and undermine that relationship 
(Cioffi and Höpner, 2006: 488). Transparency in political finance can be a tool to make the relationship 
between right-of-centre political parties and business groups visible to a broad public, and thus 
vulnerable to attack.  
Finally, we need to consider an interaction effect between foreign and domestic costs. Given that 
failure to implement new standards may entail unbearable normative costs in the international arena, 
while the domestic costs of reform are substantial, national authorities may opt for selective 
compliance (Börzel and Pamuk, 2012: 91) and, driven by rational choice, intentionally ignore 
recommendations that disadvantage parties in parliament. Compliance with CoE recommendations 
often requires amending legislation. Given that parliamentary parties have direct access to the law-
making process, they generally have greater opportunity to protect their interests than non-
parliamentary parties. Figure 1.1 summarizes factors that affect compliance. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 
develop testable hypotheses. 
Figure 1.1. Factors diminishing country´s compliance 
 
Note: the total cost of compliance is the difference between, on the one hand, all resources and 
losses required to comply with the recommendations, and, on the other hand, all losses resulting 
from non-compliance with these recommendations. 
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1.3. Variation in Compliance: Foreign Costs 
High non-compliance costs for relations with the CoE  
Why would countries change their regulations on such an intrinsically sensitive political issue as party 
finance? The CoE cannot impose any material sanctions for non-compliance (CoE, 2012: Rule 32), so 
retaliation cannot explain the logic of compliance with GRECO. Neither does reciprocity ensure 
compliance in this type of multilateral agreement: low compliance in one country does not undermine 
the whole agreement and mean that other countries would want to limit their compliance. Rational 
choice theory suggests that, rather than retaliation or reciprocity, it is concern for reputation that 
fosters compliance with multilateral agreements. Countries care about their reputation: it reflects the 
beliefs of other international actors about their credibility (Guzman, 2008: 69).  
Evidence from GRECO statutory documents confirms this logic. GRECO monitors compliance and can 
publicly ´censure´ a non-complier.29 Normative costs are accrued as a country ignores mutual political 
targets which an overwhelming majority of European countries has already agreed upon – in the third 
GRECO round the set of principles underpinning a transparent, accountable and democratic political 
finance system. Adherence to democratic rule and transparency in democratic procedures are 
cornerstones of European political values (CoE, 2003). So, countries participating in GRECO should 
generally comply with international recommendations, lest international actors cease to consider 
their commitment to anti-corruption reforms and transparency credible.  
Some authors argue that acceptance of international organizations as legitimate agenda-setters is a 
primary condition for the imposition of normative costs for non-compliance (Beach, 2005: 125; Börzel 
et al., 2010: 1371). I assume that a country´s relation to the international organization is systematic. 
Hence ´repeated cycles of interactions´ (Koh, 1997: 2655) between a country and a particular 
international organization would reflect the extent to which that country recognizes the organization 
as a relevant agenda-setter and is willing to compromise its national regulation. A country with a weak 
commitment to GRECO as an agenda-setter may consider normative costs for non-compliance with 
GRECO recommendations to be low and domestic costs for reforms necessary to comply high.  
Compliance with GRECO recommendations in previous evaluation rounds is, therefore, a reasonable 
 
29 GRECO has several ways of censuring a non-complier. It can require the head of a national delegation to 
GRECO to report on the implementation progress within a fixed period of time. It can invite the Secretary of 
the CoE to draw the attention of the national Minister of Foreign Affairs to the non-compliance of their 
country. Furthermore, the President of the Statutory Committee of GRECO can contact the Permanent 
Representative to the CoE of the non-complying country. The Statutory Committee is a high-ranking GRECO 
organ consisting primarily of the representatives on the Committee of Ministers of the Member States of the 
CoE (GRECO Statute, Article 18) 
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proxy for capturing the readiness of countries to compromise their national regulation on GRECO´s 
advice and, thus, to understand progress on compliance in the GRECO political finance round. 30 
Hypothesis 1: Levels of compliance in previous GRECO evaluation rounds are positively associated 
with progress in compliance with recommendations on political finance. 
Low compliance costs for the co-founders of GRECO 
Should a country be one of the co-authors of the GRECO project, it not only acknowledges GRECO’s 
legitimacy, but is also able to shape international norms according to its preferences (Börzel et al., 
2010: 1368; Koh, 1997: 2636), thus minimizing the costs of compliance. Being a founding member of 
the anti-corruption standards body may additionally indicate a country’s deep commitment to the 
fight against corruption and, therefore, its readiness for reform in this field. In contrast, if a country 
becomes a GRECO member ex officio (on joining international conventions), it may, unlike a founding 
member, be less interested in pursuing reform in such an intrinsic area as political finance or in 
deferring to the norms some other countries have agreed upon.  
Hypothesis 2: Countries which are founding members of GRECO should comply better with 
GRECO recommendations than other GRECO members. 
High non-compliance costs for EU candidates 
Additional international obligations may increase the costs of compliance. Whereas the CoE pushes 
all member-countries equally to implement common principles for anti-corruption regulation, the 
EU’s power to promote political finance reforms may vary considerably by country. In particular, 
countries experiencing democratic transformations may have higher incentives to show their 
commitment to the rule of law and demonstrate their progress in anti-corruption reforms than old 
democracies with a stronger reputation in this respect (Guzman, 2008: 91). At the same time, the EU 
seems irrelevant to political finance reforms in its member states because political finance does not 
belong to the aquis communitare. Renwick (2011: 461) postulates that ´significant power for external 
actors is antithetical to the principle of democracy, and stable democracies are unlikely to interfere 
with each other`s particular electoral institutions. But involvement of transnational actors in 
transitions is widespread´.  
EU compliance research explains this phenomenon in terms of ´the power of obstinacy´ displayed 
during the enforcement stage. Powerful countries do not depend on a particular partner´s good will 
for future cooperation because they have alternatives. Hence they are more resistant to reputational 
costs and thus to external pressure (Börzel et al., 2010:  1368). Unlike them, however, weaker 
 
30 Political finance was not an issue in focus in the first and second GRECO rounds. 
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countries cannot cover reputational costs easily. So I conclude that countries with EU membership in 
prospect ‒ but not those already members, nor those not desirous of joining ‒ should have higher 
incentives to comply with the CoE recommendations. Previous findings strengthen this argument: 
both the CoE and the EU contributed to political finance reforms in ten European non-EU countries in 
the period 2000–6 (Walecki, 2007). While the CoE developed a set of best-practice recommendations 
for anti-corruption regulation, the EU facilitated implementation of these recommendations by 
making it a political condition for EU enlargement.  
Hypothesis 3a: Countries applying to join the EU are more likely to comply with GRECO 
recommendations than EU members and non-EU countries. 
Following the same logic and benefiting from the seminal contribution of Levitsky and Way (2006: 
386), I control for whether countries with low obstinacy power (high vulnerability to external pressure) 
and close links (high density of ties and cross-border flows) with the international community comply 
with GRECO recommendations better than others. Here I treat confirmed status of EU candidacy as 
an indication of high density of ties between the EU candidates and established democracies. And, like 
Abel van Es (2016: 223), I consider countries which receive international aid to be highly vulnerable to 
external pressure to improve the quality of democracy. All in all, low obstinacy power and close links 
with the international community should be associated with a high compliance level.  
Hypothesis 3b: Countries applying to join the EU and receiving international aid are more likely 
to comply with the GRECO recommendations than EU members and non-EU 
countries.   
1.4. Variation in Compliance: Domestic Costs  
High costs of changing traditional party codification  
Even if international conditions are favourable, high domestic costs for national authorities can 
prevent successful compliance (Börzel and Risse, 2003; Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). By forcing a 
country to introduce transparency regulation into political finance, GRECO can indirectly challenge its 
tradition of party codification. In line with the definitions introduced above, path-breaking reforms 
are high-cost decisions: they may fundamentally alter ´national policy goals, regulatory standards, the 
instruments or techniques used to achieve policy goals, and/or the underlying problem-solving´ 
(Börzel and Risse, 2003: 61). They may seriously affect the mechanisms of power distribution, 
challenge domestic procedures and the collective understandings attached to them, even change the 
entire political regime in a particular country. Thus, by challenging domestic procedures and the 
collective understandings attached to them, as well as by introducing uncertainty over policy 
outcomes, path-breaking reforms make compliance difficult. 
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Path-dependent changes, on the contrary, evoke low-cost solutions that, as a rule, preserve the core 
logic of existing policy and polity structures, and allow for further moderate changes (Kaiser, 2002: 
104). High compatibility of domestic norms and internationally proposed recommendations means 
that path-dependent reforms do not induce severe compliance problems. They demand no 
redistribution of resources on the domestic level and go along with the logic of national preferences.  
It is adaptation pressure that determines the costs of a change. As most international 
intergovernmental organizations cannot exert adaptational pressure in the field of political finance 
(Börzel and Risse, 2003: 61), the higher the domestic costs of compliance with recommendations, the 
lower the level of compliance. Alongside this rationale, in order to understand cross-sectional 
variations in compliance, I follow Steunenberg and Toshkov (2009), who suggest measuring the 
national legal architecture and comparing it to compliance obligations. Compliance with the CoE 
regulation differs from compliance with EU policies, where countries are often free to change an 
existing or adopt a new regulative norm. To avoid any bias, I compare countries´ compliance rates to 
the level of intensiveness of party codification on the national level. 
To measure the intensiveness of existing party regulation, I suggest utilizing a proxy for party 
codification31. In a broad sense, intensive party codification means a wide range of official legal norms 
guiding the behaviour of political parties. Van Biezen (2008) detects three sources of party 
codification: 1) mentioning political parties in the constitution; 2) statutory regulation of the finance 
of political parties; and 3) the law on political parties.32 These three types of state-based law do not 
encompass all the regulation affecting political parties, but they ´most directly affect the activities, 
organisation and behaviour of political parties´ (van Biezen and Casal Bértoa, 2014: 72). We can 
differentiate between these three types of law according to the amount of detail they involve – their 
scope.  
Typically, constitutions have fewest provisions for political parties, even though they can refer to 
different domains of regulation (van Biezen, 2012: 207; van Biezen and Casal Bértoa, 2014: 76). 
Constitutions reflect the nature of democracy and the role political parties play in it. Party finance laws 
are more detailed: they can, for instance, require financial reports, fix limits to donations and 
introduce sanctions for violating party or campaign funding rules (van Biezen and Casal Bértoa, 2014: 
82). Party laws score as the most intensive regulation: they may include finance standards, 
requirements for intra-party democracy or rules relating to party registration (van Biezen, 2008: 343; 
 
31 Another way would be to use the Political Finance Regulation Index of Abel van Es (2016), but it is only cross-
sectional and is based on the IDEA data 2012. My model requires capturing the state of national regulation 
before countries started to comply with GRECO recommendations, which in some cases is from 2007 onwards. 
32 See construction details in Section 5. 
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van Biezen and Casal Bértoa, 2014: 78). And the more laws regulating political parties a country has, 
the higher is the intensiveness of party codification. Countries with less intensive codification of 
political parties would need to invest more effort in regulating political finances in a transparent way 
and complying with international recommendations than countries with a high intensiveness of party 
codification.   
Hypothesis 4: The more intensive the party codification in a country, the higher that country’s 
compliance with international recommendations on transparency in political 
finance. 
High compliance costs for centre-right political parties in government 
Both legal and political science literature on compliance stresses the importance of domestic political 
coalitions in the decision to comply or defy (Trachtman, 2010). Given that governing political parties 
are prone to use compliance with international agreements to realize their policy preferences 
(Nzelibe, 2011) and increase their chances of re-election (Trachtman, 2010: 135), I expect political 
parties in government to have clear preferences on compliance with international recommendations 
on transparency in political finance. Scarrow (2004) suggests differentiating between the revenue- 
and the vote-maximizing goals that political parties pursue when reforming political finance 
regulation. I argue that, to maximize their revenues, right-of-centre parties should tend to oppose 
strict transparency regulation, whereas left-of-centre parties should tend to support these reforms to 
maximize their vote-share.  
I prove this in two steps. First, transparent party finance makes individual and groups´ political 
preferences identifiable (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 23), which can, in turn, limit their freedom and 
willingness to express these preferences ‒ a similar argument to that used to defend the secret ballot 
(Teorell et al., 2016). Given that the more transparent party finance is, the more constrained are 
political finance activities and relationships between right-of-centre political actors and their 
traditional supporters ‒ corporate donors ‒ right-of-centre parties stand to lose from strict 
transparency obligations. Consequently, they are likely to oppose them in order to realize their policy 
preferences (Nwokora, 2014: 923) and maximize their revenues, thus decreasing compliance. In 
contrast, the egalitarian approach, commonly used by the left-of-centre parties, suggests that 
governments have to reassure members of the polity that the collective good outweighs individual 
rights to anonymity (Casas-Zamora, 2005: 23).  
Second, disclosure of information on party support may discredit right-of-centre parties with their 
close links to affluent donors and business groups and thus benefit left-of-centre parties which stress 
their relations with the grass-roots. So, to maximize their votes, left-leaning parties should support 
12 
 
stricter party finance regulation; right-leaning parties, for the same reason, should tend to oppose it. 
As both these arguments relate primarily to the economic (and not cultural) dimension of party 
competition, I expect them to hold across most European countries.  
Hypothesis 5: The longer the government coalition (party) stays in power and the more to the 
right of the political centre it is, the less likely the country is to comply with 
international recommendations on transparency in political finance. 
High compliance costs for parliamentary parties  
Policy change creates winners and losers in the political landscape conditional on the consequences 
of the reform (Kaiser, 1997: 438). Given that the normative costs of ignoring international 
recommendations are high, and domestic costs of reforms are substantial, national authorities may 
opt for selective compliance. Parliamentary parties would then be unlikely to adopt new rules 
demanding more transparency of them and reducing their privileges. Börzel and Pamuk (2012) 
illustrate this argument with the introduction of anti-corruption regulation in Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
They show that parliamentary parties systematically implement those anti-corruption standards 
which are most unfavourable to their political opponents, whereas those that threaten their own 
practices are systematically excluded or delayed. In consequence, these reforms not only secure illegal 
private gains but, worse still, may restrict access to power (Börzel and Pamuk, 2012: 83). To address 
this mechanism, I differentiate between parliamentary political parties, which can directly affect the 
legislative process and protect their interests, and political parties not represented in the parliament.  
Hypothesis 6: Compliance with recommendations on party finance transparency is less likely the 
more recommendations address only parliamentary parties. 
1.5. Data and Operationalization 
The most recent international project to provide countries with recommendations on improving the 
transparency of political finance regulation is the third GRECO evaluation round. I have created a new 
dataset from the 46 participants of that project for which at least one compliance report was available 
by July 2017. The compliance process has not been finalized for at least 30 per cent of countries, which 
is the main reason why I do not treat the sample as a finite population. Nevertheless, I argue that we 
can rely on the findings from this sample as GRECO has already stopped monitoring compliance in 70 
per cent of countries, while others are at an advanced stage.  
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Operationalization of the dependent variable 
To estimate my dependent variable, I address the latest available country compliance report from the 
third GRECO evaluation round on ´Transparency of political parties´.33 To start with, each 
recommendation is awarded a score reflecting the country´s compliance with it. A score of 1 indicates 
that GRECO regards the recommendation as fully implemented or dealt with in a satisfactory manner; 
0.5 that it has been only partially implemented; non-compliance is scored 0. Finally, I calculate a 
proportion of the fulfilled and partially fulfilled recommendations for each country, standardizing the 
compliance score by its total number of recommendations in the evaluation round. Thus, the 
dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1, and is widely distributed across countries (Figure 1.2).   
Operationalization of independent variables  
Compliance in previous GRECO rounds 
Information on countries´ compliance in the previous two evaluation rounds is coded using the same 
approach as coding the dependent variable. Further, I add implemented and partially implemented 
recommendations from the first and second rounds and divide them by the overall number of 
recommendations issued during the same period.34 This procedure allows me to include those 
countries which experienced the first and second GRECO rounds as a single operation.  
GRECO founding members  
If a country is a GRECO founding member it scores 1, otherwise 0. The founding members are Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.35  
Candidates for EU membership  
This is a binary variable, coded as 1 if a country is a potential or an official candidate for EU 
membership, as defined by the EU Commission, while participating in the third GRECO evaluation 
round; otherwise 0. 
 
 
 
 
33 The monitoring system of compliance used by GRECO covers compliance with both ´the spirit and the letter 
of the law´ (Guidelines for Greco Evaluators, 2007: 6). So, at least partially, GRECO takes account of rule 
enforcement. 
34 See information on this variable in 1.8.2. Appendix B (Table B2). 
35 Information from the GRECO Secretariat. 
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International Aid 
Following Abel van Es (2016), I use the average percentage of official development assistance in gross 
national income during the period of GRECO compliance procedure as an indicator of dependence on 
international aid. 
Party codification 
The intensiveness of party codification is a dummy variable. Countries are ranked 1 if they address 
political parties in the national constitution and in a law on political parties. They can also have a 
separate law on party finance which refers to regular and/or campaign finance. Otherwise, countries 
are ranked 0. These are countries only mentioning political parties in the national constitution; 
countries with only a law on party finance; countries with only a party law; or countries that address 
political parties in the national constitution and in a law on political finance. Overall, the high position 
of the country´s ranking indicates the great scope and detail of the regulation political parties are 
subject to – the high intensiveness of party codification. I make use of the information on laws and 
constitutions provided in the GRECO evaluation reports, Piccio (2012) and van Biezen (2008). Finally, 
I ensure that the coding captures the regulation in place immediately before countries started the 
compliance procedure within the third GRECO round36. 
Left‒right cabinet positions 
The position of the cabinet on the left‒right dimension is measured as a mean position of parties in 
the cabinet during the compliance procedure weighed by the years that they stayed in power. Party 
positions may take values from -5 (very left) to 5 (very right). Original data are taken from the 
ParlGov.org dataset which is based on the mean values of party positions provided by expert surveys.37  
Changes for parliamentary parties  
This is a variable indicating the proportion of a country´s quasi-sentences, denoted with i-indices in 
the text of recommendations in the original GRECO evaluation reports, addressing only parliamentary 
parties. Parliamentary parties are operationalized as political groups whose representatives are 
elected to parliament. This continuous variable may take values from 0 to 1. 
 
36  See Table B4 in 1.8.2. Appendix B for country scores. 
37 ParlGov (largely based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey) was chosen because its data cover most of the 
observations in this article. Other measures of the left‒right party positions (e.g. Franzmann and Kaiser, 2006) 
should perform similarly, as on the economic dimension – relevant for the theoretical argument ‒ all the left‒
right measures are highly inter-correlated (Franzmann, 2015). 
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Figure 1.2. Compliance with GRECO recommendations on political finance reforms, proportions 
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Explaining variation in compliance: controls 
To isolate the effects of interests, the model controls for 1) unintentional delays in compliance; 2) 
substantive differences in the recommendations resulting from the different policy aspects they 
address; and 3) level of domestic demands to enhance the legitimacy of political institutions.  
Explaining compliance cross-sectionally presumes awareness of differences between deliberate 
recalcitrance and unintentional delay. The latter results from different interpretations of the standards 
set by the recommendation, political instability within a country, poor administrative capacities, or 
other similar reasons, and only postpones compliance (Falkner et al., 2005: 13; Mendez and Bachtler, 
2017: 583). Over time these factors should lose their power. In contrast, deliberate recalcitrance is 
resistant to the passage of time. As countries enter the third evaluation round at different time points, 
I measure time in years from when the country received its recommendations up until the monitoring 
of compliance was officially terminated or July 2017 if it was still continuing then. Additional variation 
in compliance across countries can result from the different scope of change that countries are 
expected to attain (Steunenberg and Toshkov, 2009: 960). Countries do not necessarily receive the 
same number of recommendations.38 The more change proposed by the recommendations, the less 
leeway supporters of reform have to logroll within the national legislative process (Kaiser, 2002: 106; 
Thomson, 2007: 995). Consequently, I expect a negative relationship between the scope of 
recommendations and a country´s progress on compliance. 
Compliance levels across countries may differ as recommendations address substantively different 
aspects of party finance regulation. To capture this, I disaggregate country recommendations on party 
finance regulation into more than 590 quasi-sentences, denoted by i-indices in the original evaluation 
reports. I code each of the quasi-sentences, differentiating between issues on reporting and publishing 
of information on political finance, accounting procedures, sanctions for violations of political finance 
regulation, changes to the monitoring institutions, and issues relevant solely to regional parties and 
elections.39 All the codes are mutually exclusive.40 The last category should hinder compliance: some 
countries have a high level of regional autonomy over electoral regulation, so that complying with 
recommendations may engender conflict between federal and regional competences. This is 
commonly controlled for in the compliance literature (Mendez and Bachtler, 2017: 571). I estimate a 
 
38 The overview of the years when countries started the third GRECO evaluation round and of the number of 
recommendations they received are listed in the 1.8.2. Appendix B, in Tables B1 and B2 respectively. 
39 See further details on the assignment of codes in 1.8.5. Appendix E. 
40 The intercoder reliability from the two consequent coding of quasi-sentences is Kappa = 81.5 for 5 per cent 
of the data.  
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proportion of quasi-sentences in recommendations within each of the policy areas for each country. 
Each of these controls can vary from 0 to 1. 
Lastly, I expect national authorities to comply with the GRECO recommendations more systematically 
when domestic political demand for legitimacy of political institutions in their country is high. Demand 
can result from a gradual decrease in confidence in institutional arrangements or from a ´sudden 
performance failure´ (Olsen, 2009: 15; Easton 1957: 388). Given that enhancing trust in and 
accountability of democratic institutions were the underlying motivations for recommendations on 
political finance expressed by the CoE (Molenaar, 2010: 19), I control for the level of satisfaction with 
democracy and a lack of confidence in political parties. Satisfaction with democracy is the proportion 
of respondents indicating if they are very or fairly satisfied with democracy developing in their country 
(European Values Study (EVS), 2008). Lack of confidence in political parties is the proportion of 
respondents saying that they have no or not very much confidence in political parties (EVS, 2008). 
Measures of confidence in political parties for Andorra (2005) and the United States (average for 2006 
and 2011) are taken from the World Values Survey (WVS).41 Missing answers are excluded from the 
population at the earliest stage of analysis. 
1.6. Results  
With a country as a unit of analysis and a continuous dependent variable, I fit the model with a multiple 
linear regression.42 Hypotheses to be tested state that high costs in the international and domestic 
arenas are negatively associated with progress on compliance with GRECO recommendations. The 
logic of the estimated models can be also formulated as follows: 
 
Country´s compliance = β0 + controls + β1compliance in previous GRECO rounds + β2aGRECO founding 
member+ β3acandidacy for the EU + β3bcandidacy for the EU*dependence on international aid + 
β4party codification + β5left‒right cabinet position + β6demands on parliamentary parties + ԑi ,         
where ԑi is an error term and β indicates the effects of interest.  
 
41 EVS and WVS use almost the same wording. EVS: ´Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, 
how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? Political 
parties´. WVS: ´I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all? Political parties´. 
42 The interclass correlation is ICC = 0.50, meaning that approximately 50 per cent of variation in the 
dependent variable is on the country level. Also, per the design of the GRECO evaluation reports, 
recommendations are seldom independent of each other. For example, in one recommendation a country may 
be advised to introduce a new norm on party finance reporting and in another to introduce sanctions for the 
violation of this new norm. This all supports the need to fit the model on the macro level, justifying the choice 
of a single-level model. 
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Table 1.1 presents the most interesting, significant and robust results of a series of multiple regression 
chains. I first discuss the overall trends in the data, then focus on the effects of interest. Model 1 
presents the main findings, which include indicators for GRECO founding members, intensiveness of 
party codification and the left‒right affiliations of the cabinets. Models 2, 3 and 4 test the robustness 
of the findings for the full sample and including different controls.43 
The positive and significant values of the constant across all the models indicate that, in general, 
countries tend to comply with the GRECO recommendations. We can also clearly identify those factors 
that strengthen or limit GRECO´s success in the national reform process. Model 1 demonstrates that 
GRECO founder-members, on average, comply by 16 percentage points more than countries which 
joined GRECO later (H2). Models 1 and 3 show that countries with cabinets more to the right of centre 
and longer in power during the compliance procedure show significantly less compliance (H5). At the 
same time, all the models indicate that intensive party codification is associated with a high level of 
compliance (H4). This effect is stable, even controlling for different regulatory areas. For illustrative 
purposes, Model 2 includes an indicator for potential conflict between regional and national levels 
over competences on regulation of political finance. Model 4 additionally controls for a proportion of 
recommendations that aim at facilitating the public availability of data on political finance44. The effect 
of high intensiveness of party codification remains robust even controlling for satisfaction with 
democracy and the lack of confidence in political parties (Models 2 and 3).  
The compliance level from the previous GRECO rounds does not necessarily predict that for the third 
round (H1), although seems to do so reasonably well for some countries, including Croatia, Estonia, 
Italy, Latvia, Norway, Romania, Russia. The cases of Denmark and Switzerland are puzzling. In the first 
two rounds both had high compliance rates: 90 and 96 per cent respectively. Yet in the third round 
they did not comply at all. The quantitative analysis suggests that their low compliance is associated 
with low levels of national party codification. Their compliance behaviour may be an interesting case 
for an in-depth investigation, but it is beyond the scope of this article. 
The hypothesis that prospective EU membership should be positively related to compliance in the 
third GRECO evaluation round in the time period covered was not confirmed (H3a).45  
 
43 See additional estimations (including tobit and robust regressions) as well as non-significant results in 
1.8.3. Appendix C. 
44 Controlling for the proportion of sanctions for violations of political finance regulation and changes to the 
monitoring institutions within the recommendations does not change the results. 
45 Additional models have been run as a robustness check. No significant differences were found in the 
compliance rates of EU members and countries that do not want to join, nor between EU candidates and 
countries that do not want to join. 
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Table 1.1. Ordinary least squares regression on compliance with the Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO) recommendations on the country level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IVs     
GRECO founding member 0.164* 0.207**  0.193** 
 (0.078) (0.065)  (0.061) 
High intensiveness of party codification   
     
0.268** 
(0.087) 
0.146* 
(0.061) 
0.208* 
(0.096) 
0.136* 
(0.063) 
Parties in cabinet  
/left‒right scores, weighted/ 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
 -0.041** 
(0.015) 
 
 
Controls 
    
Year  -0.074** -0.009 -0.068** 
  (0.024) (0.029) (0.022) 
Recommendations that may induce a conflict of 
competences /proportion/ 
 -0.981*  -0.957+ 
  (0.484)  (0.487) 
Recommendations on reporting and publishing of 
information on political finance /proportion/ 
 
   0.468* 
(0.179) 
Satisfaction with democracy  -0.079 
(0.178) 
  
No confidence in political parties   0.084 
(0.484) 
 
Constant 0.584*** 1.043*** 0.962* 1.147*** 
 (0.107) (0.132) (0.445) (0.109) 
Observations 32 45 32 46 
R2 0.439 0.529 0.536 0.545 
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.468 0.447 0.489 
Notes. DV is the proportion of fully and partly implemented recommendations. Unstandardized 
coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
Residual diagnostic and robust regressions were performed to check the sensitivity of results to the 
outliers. No problems were detected. Additional model specifications are listed in 1.8.3. Appendix C. 
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Nor does dependence on international aid make any difference to the compliance level (H3b). The 
compliance levels of EU candidates vary greatly. Croatia (the only country in the sample which became 
an EU member during the third evaluation round), Albania and Serbia complied with the 
recommendations 100 per cent. The compliance level of Macedonia and Montenegro lies around the 
sample average. Surprisingly, Turkey’s level is below 40 per cent, as is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s. One 
could argue that the latter had no realistic prospects of joining the EU during the period of analysis, 
hence the prospect of EU membership turned out to be systematically irrelevant. This finding echoes 
Walecki (2007), who identifies substantive EU power with regard to political finance reforms within 
the EU-enlargement procedures in 2004 and 2007, when membership prospects were clear. In brief, 
the current quantitative analysis contradicts the proposition that, on average, EU candidates will be 
more compliant than other countries.  
My findings do not support the argument that a coincidence of the subject and object of reform leads 
to blocking recommendations intended to reduce privileges of parliamentary parties. So I conclude 
that there is no empirical evidence of discrimination against recommendations that require more 
transparency from parliamentary parties (H6). 
Regarding the controls, additional recommendations, distinct regulatory areas and government 
efficiency (not shown here) neither systematically hinder, nor support compliance. Only the time 
variable suggests a relationship in the opposite direction to that I expected. This demonstrates that at 
the final stage, where the GRECO third round is now, those countries willing to comply have already 
been proven to have done so in the earlier monitoring rounds. And ‒ holding all the other factors 
constant ‒ giving countries more time does not substantively change compliance rates. 
To explore the size of the effects of domestic factors, I focus on Model 1, which has very good 
explanatory power, capturing over 40 per cent of the data variation (R-sq.=43.9) and is quite 
parsimonious. On average, countries with a high level of party codification comply 26.8 percentage 
points better as compared to the countries with a low intensity of party codification. This indicates 
that the less intense a country’s party regulation, the poorer its compliance with GRECO 
recommendations. Predictive margins suggest that countries with the high level of party codification 
would comply with the GRECO recommendations, on average, at a rate of 87.1 per cent. In countries 
with a low party codification the compliance with their GRECO recommendations drops to 
approximately 60.3 per cent.  
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Figure 1.3.  Predictive margins for the effects of parties in cabinet 
 
Based on the current sample, predictive margins suggest that changes in the variable capturing the 
left‒right position of the governing parties and the time this coalition has been in government are 
associated with an almost 56 per cent difference in compliance rates (Figure 1.3). This variable best 
explains the 60 percentage points difference in compliance between Norway and Iceland to the left-
of-centre and right-of-centre Hungary. Overall, the R-squared indicates that about 43.9 per cent of 
the variability in compliance with international norms is due to the type of reforms countries need to 
pursue, the political constellation of national government, and whether the country is a founding 
member of GRECO (F(3, 28) = 7.72, p < 0.001).  
In a nutshell, the empirical analysis demonstrates that changes to the regulation of political finance 
are most likely to be implemented if they are moderate and in line with national conventions. Those 
countries which have already established a detailed regulatory framework for political parties tend to 
comply with international standards on political finance. Left-of-centre cabinets tend to introduce 
more transparency regulation in accordance with foreign advice than their right-of-centre 
counterparts. High domestic costs for reform and governing parties to the right of centre are likely to 
impede compliance with international standards. As theoretically expected, GRECO founding 
members show greater commitment than other GRECO members. 
1.7. Conclusion 
Addressing reforms to party finance launched by the CoE, this article bridges two research traditions. 
It brings together foreign and domestic factors affecting the evolution of political regulation, thus 
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contributing to the emerging theory of political finance reforms (Fischer and Eisenstadt, 2004; Koss 
2011; Norris and Abel van Es 2016; Nwokora 2014) and extending the literature on the impact of 
international organizations on reforming political finance regulation (Gauja, 2016; Haughton, 2007; 
Molenaar, 2010; Timus, 2010; van Biezen and Molenaar, 2012; Walecki, 2007). In addition, by 
analysing policy changes on foreign advice in such a highly intrinsic matter as political finance policy, 
the article contributes to the compliance literature (Beach, 2005; Börzel et al., 2010; Guzman, 2008; 
Koh, 1997; Nzelibe, 2011; Trachtman, 2010), testing the external validity of available theoretical 
approaches on a new policy field.   
Substantively, the article confirms that changes to political finance regulation are a function not only 
of what is appropriate but also of what is feasible. The analysis shows that a potential policy change 
triggered at the international level is shaped by domestic factors. Although party finance regimes tend 
to converge worldwide, with state funding of political parties becoming an ordinary source of party 
finance (Koss, 2011: Introduction), as this article demonstrates, we still lack empirical evidence that 
most countries implement identical principles on transparency and accountability in party finance. 
The introduction of equal standards on political finance in Europe may interfere with ´different and 
competing conceptions of party democracy´ (Gauja, 2016: 12; van Biezen, 2012: 207). Resistance to 
the implementation of internationally agreed standards is especially to be expected, as these 
standards are derived from a particular conception of party democracy – participatory democracy, 
rather than procedural democracy where parties are, primarily, understood as public utilities (van 
Biezen and Molenaar, 2012: 644). This conclusion echoes Gauja (2016), who finds an international 
consensus on considering a political party an important mechanism for citizens to exercise their rights 
to freedom of political expression, while the acceptability of intensive party regulation nevertheless 
varies enormously across countries.  
This article delivers empirical evidence of the conflict between concepts of party democracies. It 
shows that even if countries receive tailor-made recommendations to promote transparency and 
accountability in party finance, they remain constrained in the implementation of these 
recommendations by their tradition of party regulation. This conclusion is in line with Abel van Es 
(2016), who identifies the relevance of legal tradition for explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
party finance regulation globally. It is, too, in line with findings from compliance studies on 
environmental issues (Bernhagen, 2008) and human rights (Powell and Staton, 2009). Comparative 
political science needs, therefore, to identify those causal mechanisms ensuring competitive elections 
without corruption which are successful in different regulatory regimes. Further, and directly related 
to the previous suggestion, the variety of party democracies demands further development of cross-
sectional time-series data on party finance regulation.  
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The article delivers systematic evidence of the relationship between the political constellation of the 
government and the progress of party finance reform, which supports previous findings across 
different policy fields and countries (Cioffi and Höpner, 2006; Nzelibe, 2011; Scarrow 2004; 
Trachtman, 2010). This evidence contradicts the assumption that, as the importance of direct party 
funding by the state rises, left- and right-of-centre parties develop similar preferences for funding 
transparency to account for taxpayers´ money. At the same time, it sheds new light on why strict 
regulation of political finance corresponds with a high level of perceived corruption in parties (Casal 
Bertoá et al., 2014). To better estimate the effect size of left‒right party positions on the evolution of 
political finance regulation and to trace the causal relationship, further in-depth analyses are 
necessary. Data on compliance with GRECO presented in this article may serve as a starting point for 
case selection. Note that the concept of compliance I use here is that applied by GRECO itself. Future 
research can undoubtedly benefit from addressing the true level of compliance with the letter and 
spirit of these recommendations over time and from elaboration on the effects of GRECO-induced 
regulation. 
Finally, an interesting implication of the article suggests that powerful countries being able to affect 
international norms deviate in their compliance preferences. Contrary to previous findings of EU 
compliance studies (Börzel et al., 2010), I find that participation in the development of the 
international norms is associated with more compliance. EU compliance studies in fact suggest an 
explanation for this phenomenon: countries which are involved in the development of international 
norms may shape these norms according to their own preferences, thus diminishing the costs of their 
compliance.  
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1.8. Appendix 
1.8.1. Appendix A. General Information on GRECO 
How does GRECO refer to party finding and whom does it refer to in the country? 
 The third round of GRECO, launched in 2007, addresses inter alia regulation on 
political finance. A particular focus of GRECO lies in transparency of party funding with 
reference to the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on 
common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral 
campaigns (Rec (2003) 4). The project is still running in 2018 capturing most recent 
developments of the regulation on political finance. GRECO issues evaluation reports 
to each country-member with a set of recommendations on how this country can 
ensure transparency and accountability in political finance. Afterwards, GRECO 
monitors countries´ compliance with these recommendations. GRECO evaluation 
reports are based on primary data (analysis of regulation) and a wide range of country 
expert interviews, including high-rank public officials and representatives from the 
civil society. Interviewed experts are always listed at the beginning of the GRECO 
reports. For instance, for the first country in the list – Albania – GRECO evaluation 
team conducted interviews with “officials from the following institutions: the Central 
Electoral Commission, the State Supreme Audit, the Ministry of Finance, the 
Constitutional Court, the Legal Commission of Parliament and the Council of Ministers 
[…] with representatives of the following political parties: the Democratic Party, the 
Republican Party and the Socialist Party […] with representatives of non-governmental 
organisations (INSIZ and Transparency International Albania) and the media”46. A 
similar list is provided for all other 45 countries in the sample. As Guidelines for GRECO 
evaluators prescribe, to assess the compliance with party finance regulation GRECO 
interviewers have to investigate ´the spirit and the letter of the law´ and have to 
differentiate between ´the implementation of the law and paper tiger´47. 
 
Who are the GRECO experts?  
 
46 GRECO evaluation report on Albania, p. 2, retrieved 26.09.2017 from https://rm.coe.int/16806c1b6e 
47 Guidelines for GRECO evaluators, p. 6, retrieved 26.09.2017 from https://rm.coe.int/16806cc121 
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 Each country participating in GRECO has to provide GRECO with up to five experts who 
will be added in the GRECO expert pool. For every country GRECO appoints expert 
teams out of this pool who run the first evaluation procedure. GRECO appoints a new 
expert team for each of the compliance rounds (Statute of GRECO, Article 10). Expert 
team should be also approved by the country under evaluation (GRECO Rules of 
Procedure, Rule 26). All the GRECO expert names are published in the introductory 
part of the country evaluation and compliance reports. Last but not least, countries 
become members of the GRECO voluntarily via an invitation from the Secretary 
General, or ipso factum on ratifying the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 
173) or the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (ETS 174).  
 
How are the GRECO assessments performed?  
 According to the GRECO Rules of Procedure, all GRECO country-members undergo a 
dynamic process of evaluation based on the standardized questionnaire filled in by 
the country delegation to the GRECO and a set of following-up on-site meetings in that 
country between GRECO expert team, national public officials (as GRECO indicates 
´domestic key players´48) and representatives of the civil society49. This standardized 
procedure assures the comparability of the reports cross-sectionally.   
 
 A detailed description of the procedure on how the report with recommendations is 
worked out is provided in the Rule 28 (GRECO Rules of Procedure)50. In brief, these are 
the following parties who participate in the establishment of the GRECO evaluation 
report: experts from the GRECO evaluation team, called GET; the Secretariat of 
GRECO; a country which stands in focus of the evaluation report; and the Plenary of 
GRECO. In particular, the GRECO Secretariat provides GET with a comprehensive reply 
to the standardized questionnaire filled in by the national delegation to GRECO and 
copies of relevant legislation. GET conducts on-site interviews. On coming back from 
the on-site visit, every member of the GRECO evaluation team delivers an individually 
 
48 GRECO informational brochure, p. 5, retrieved 26.09.2017 from https://rm.coe.int/16806fd621 
49 GRECO Rules of Procedure 2012, Rule 25, retrieved 07.04.2016 from https://rm.coe.int/16806cd443 
50 GRECO Rules of Procedure, retrieved 26.09.2017 from: https://rm.coe.int/16806cd443 
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written report with an analytical part and drafted recommendations along with the 
guidelines for evaluations51. Every evaluation report contains recommendations 
addressing the malpractices that experts managed to identify. All the 
recommendations must be thoroughly grounded in the draft, and subsequently also 
in the report. The GRECO Secretariat constructs an overall draft report and opens it 
for the comments to the whole GRECO evaluation team. As soon as all the parties 
agree upon it, this draft is provided to the country under evaluation for comments. 
The evaluation team has to consider these country´s comments52 and, in case of 
disagreement, the Secretariat helps to find a consensus. After final adjustments are 
finished, this report is distributed to all the other GRECO members. A final draft should 
be voted in the Plenary to come into effect. 
 
 Recommendations are structured along with the analytical part of the evaluation 
reports: general legislative framework transparency, structural party funding, 
supervision / monitoring, and sanctions. 
 
How is the compliance with GRECO recommendations determined? 
 The Guidelines for GRECO Evaluators (Rule 30) define compliance as a full 
implementation of a recommendation contained in the evaluation report within the 
time limit set by GRECO. As a rule, 18 months after the evaluation reports have been 
issued, a country has to report what has been done to fulfil recommendations issued 
in order to improve national regulation and national practices to tackle corruption. 
Based on these reports two rapporteurs appointed ad hoc by GRECO decide with 
regard to each individual recommendation how far a country has complied with 
GRECO recommendations. According to the Guidelines for GRECO Evaluators, GRECO 
experts assess both compliance with ´the spirit and the letter of the law´ and have to 
differentiate between ´ the implementation of the law and paper tiger´53. These results 
are debated in the Plenary. The GRECO Secretariat assists the two rapporteurs to draft 
 
51 Guidelines for GRECO evaluators, retrieved 26.09.2017 from https://rm.coe.int/16806cc121 
52 Statute of GRECO, Article 14, retrieved 26.09.2017 from https://rm.coe.int/16806cd24f 
53 Guidelines for GRECO evaluators, p.6, retrieved 26.09.2017 from https://rm.coe.int/16806cc121 
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a mutual report reflecting a consensus. A final draft is sent to the country under 
evaluation and then again revised by the rapporteurs. The Secretariat works as a 
mediator if needed. After all, the compliance report is debated and voted for in 
plenary.  
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1.8.2. Appendix B. Robustness Checks and Summary Statistics 
Figure B1. Relationship between intensiveness of party codification and a proportion of 
recommendations that demand a path-breaking change for countries in the third GRECO evaluation 
round   
  
Note. The white lines denote the medians.  
Source. Author´s estimations. 
Comment. I disaggregate country recommendation into more than 590 quasi-sentences, denoted with 
i-indices in the original evaluation reports of the GRECO. Each quasi-sentence is coded to indicate 
whether it demands a path-breaking or a path-dependent reform for a country. A path-breaking 
demand might be, for example, the establishment of a new supervising institution or the introduction 
of a legal definition of political parties. An example of a path-dependent demand is an adjustment of 
already existing regulation aimed to strengthen the inter-ministerial cooperation or a broadening of 
the definition of participants who are eligible to apply for the state support54. All the codes on path-
dependent and path-breaking demands are mutually exclusive.55 Finally, I aggregate the proportion of 
 
54 Further details for assignment of codes are available in 1.8.5. Appendix E. 
55 The Kappa intercoder reliability test from the two consequent coding of path-dependent and path-breaking 
quasi-sentences is Kappa = 81.5 for 5 per cent of the data.  
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quasi-sentences that demand a path change on a country level. The values of this variable can range 
from 0 to 1. 
 
Figure B1 indicates that, on average, the more intensive the regulation of political parties a country 
has, the less path-breaking recommendations on transparency of political finance it receives from the 
GRECO.  
 
Figure B2. Relationship between compliance progress in the third GRECO round (party finance) and 
levels of compliance in the previous GRECO rounds  
  
Source. Author´s estimations. 
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Figure B3. Compliance in the third GRECO round: a longitudinal perspective. 
 
Table B1. Years when countries received their recommendations within the third GRECO evaluation 
round  
Year Countries 
2012 Italy, Monaco, Russia 
2011 Andorra, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Georgia, Moldova, 
Switzerland, Ukraine, USA 
2010 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Portugal, 
Romania, Serbia, Turkey 
2009 Albania, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden 
2008 Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, UK 
2007 Finland, Slovenia 
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Table B2. Amount of recommendations across evaluation rounds: an overview * 
A B C D E F G H  
(Robustness 
check) 
I 
(Robustness 
check) 
Country Number of 
rec-s issued 
in the 1st 
round  
Implemented 
rec-s 
considered 
in the analysis 
(1st round) 
Number of 
rec-s issued 
in the 2nd 
round  
Implemented 
rec-s considered 
in the analysis  
(2nd round) 
Number of rec-s 
issued in the 3rd 
round on 
political finance 
Implemented 
rec-s considered 
in the analysis  
(3nd round on 
political finance) 
Number of rec-s 
in the 3rd round 
on political 
finance after 
adjustment 
Implemente
d rec-s out of 
those 
selected in G 
(after 
adjustment) 
Albania 11 11 13 11.5 7 7 6 6 
Andorra 0 0 18 14 10 10 9 9 
Armenia 0 0 24 21 11 11 11 11 
Austria 0 0 24 19 11 8 11 8 
Azerbaijan 0 0 27 21 8 5 7 4 
Belgium 14 14 9 7 11 6.5 10 5.5 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
18 16.5 16 11.5 9 3.5 9 3.5 
Bulgaria 14 14 11 11 16 14.5 15 13.5 
Croatia 16 15 11 11 6 6 6 6 
Cyprus 10 9 10 8 6 5.5 6 5.5 
Czech 
Republic 
9 8.5 12 8.5 9 8 9 8 
Denmark 4 3.5 6 5.5 9 0 9 0 
Estonia 12 12 15 13.5 9 8.5 8 7.5 
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Finland 8 8 4 4 10 10 10 10 
France 10 8.5 6 5.5 11 7 9 5.5 
Georgia 25 21 14 13.5 10 6.5 9 5.5 
Germany 6 5 6 5.5 10 6 9 5.5 
Greece 10 10 10 6.5 16 14.5 16 14.5 
Hungary 11 10.5 12 9.5 10 4 8 2 
Iceland 3 2.5 6 4.5 9 9 8 8 
Ireland 8 7 6 5.5 7 6 7 6 
Italy 0 0 22 18.5 7 6 7 6 
Latvia 15 14 13 11 5 4.5 5 4.5 
Lithuania 10 9.5 8 8 12 11.5 11 10.5 
Luxembourg 12 10 13 9.5 10 7.5 7 4.5 
Macedonia 17 15.5 14 13.5 6 4.5 4 2.5 
Malta 15 14 7 6.5 6 4.5 6 4.5 
Moldova 14 13.5 15 12.5 9 8.5 9 8.5 
Monaco 0 0 28 21 4 2 4 2 
Montenegro 0 0 24 23 9 8 9 8 
Netherlands 7 7 6 4.5 13 9 11 7.5 
Norway 5 5 4 4 6 6 6 6 
Poland 17 16 9 8 8 6.5 8 6.5 
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Portugal 12 11 10 9 7 7 6 6 
Romania 13 13 15 13 13 12 13 12 
Russia 0 0 26 20.5 12 10 11 9 
Serbia 0 0 25 22.5 10 10 10 10 
Slovakia 19 19 17 14.5 10 8 9 7 
Slovenia 12 11.5 10 8.5 13 13 10 10 
Spain 10 9 6 4.5 6 5.5 6 5.5 
Sweden 8 8 5 4 7 5 7 5 
Switzerland 0 0 13 12.5 6 0 6 0 
Turkey 0 0 21 17 9 2.5 9 2.5 
UK 12 10.5 7 7 6 4 5 4 
Ukraine 0 0 25 20.5 9 7 9 7 
USA 12 12 8 7 3 3 3 2 
 
*Note: Columns B-E were used to calculate compliance in the previous rounds of GRECO: ((C+E)/(B+D)). This procedure allows for keeping those countries in the 
analysis which experienced the first and second GRECO rounds as a single operation. Column F was used as a control variable for the overall number of 
recommendations issued per country in the 3rd round. Column G refers to the compliance with those recommendations which are accounted for in the Column 
F. Compliance level for the dependent variable used in the paper is calculated as G/F. Levels of recommendations as captured in columns B, D, F, G are constant 
across time. The indicators of compliance in columns C, E, G were measured based on GRECO compliance reports available by July 2017. 
Column H is the overall number of recommendations after the exclusion of the quasi-sentences which do not require regulation reforms (i.e. when a quasi-
sentence demands an arranging of a workshop for political parties on finance). Such quasi-sentences amount to 9 per cent of all quasi-sentences. Column I refers 
to the compliance with those recommendations which are accounted for in the Column H. Compliance level for the dependent variable (for a robustness check) 
is calculated as I/H. No changes to the results reported in the paper were found. 
34 
 
Table B3. Summary of the relevant variables in the sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Dummy 
cases coded 
as 1 
Country 46 - - 1 46 NA 
Year 46 5.225 1.47 1.58 8.5 NA 
Number of GRECO  
recommendations  
46 8.935 2.824 3 16 NA 
Proportion of quasi-sentences  
for parliamentary parties  
46 .025 .057 0 .256 NA 
Proportion of quasi-sentences for 
monitoring institutions  
46 .164 .092 0 .4 NA 
Proportion of quasi-sentences for 
sanctions  
46 .139 .079 0 .4 NA 
Proportion of quasi-sentences  
demanding path change  
46 .502 .197 .125 1 NA 
Proportion of quasi-sentences  
entailing conflict between levels of 
authority 
46 .023 .080 0 .339 NA 
Proportion of quasi-sentences  
for a better public availability of 
information on political finance 
46 .118 0.100 0 .333 NA 
Satisfaction with democracy 45 .468 .182 .095 .790 NA 
No confidence in political parties 45     .781 .116 .321        .937 NA 
Compliance in the third GRECO round 46 .777 .248 0 1 NA 
GRECO founding members  46 - - 0 1 17 
Compliance in previous GRECO 
rounds  
46 .885 .067 .75 1 NA 
Dummies for EU candidates  46 - - 0 1 7 
High intensiveness of party 
codification 
46 - - 0 1 29 
Cabinet affiliations  
(Left-right scores, weighted) 
32 1.719 3.026 -3.533 10.4 NA 
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Table B4. Codes used to construct the variable on intensiveness of party codification56 
 
56 Additional details can be provided by the author upon a request. 
Country Are political parties 
mentioned in the 
Constitution? 
Is there statutory 
regulation of the 
finance of political 
parties or 
campaigns related 
to the finance of 
political parties? 
Is there a party 
law? 
Level of 
party 
codification 
Albania 1 1 1 High 
Andorra 1 1 0 Low 
Armenia 1 1 1 High 
Austria 1 0 1 High 
Azerbaijan 1 1 1 High 
Belgium 0 1 0 Low 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0 1 0 Low 
Bulgaria 1 1 1 High 
Croatia 1 1 1 High 
Cyprus 1 0 1 High 
Czech Republic 1 1 1 High 
Denmark 0 1 0 Low 
Estonia 1 1 1 High 
Finland 1 1 1 High 
France 1 1 0 Low 
Georgia 1 1 1 High 
Germany 1 0 1 High 
Greece 1 1 0 Low 
Hungary 1 0 1 High 
Iceland 1 1 0 Low 
Ireland 0 1 0 Low 
Italy 1 1 0 Low 
Latvia 1 1 1 High 
Lithuania 1 1 1 High 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 Low 
FYR Macedonia 1 1 1 High 
Malta 1 0 0 Low 
Moldova 1 1 1 High 
Monaco 0 1 0 Low 
Montenegro 1 1 1 High 
Netherlands 0 1 0 Low 
Norway 1 0 1 High 
Poland 1 1 1 High 
Portugal 1 1 1 High 
Romania 1 1 1 High 
Russia 1 1 1 High 
36 
 
 
Serbia 1 1 1 High 
Slovakia 1 0 1 High 
Slovenia 1 1 1 High 
Spain 1 1 1 High 
Sweden 1 1 0 Low 
Switzerland 1 0 0 Low 
Turkey 1 0 1 High 
UK 0 1 0 Low 
Ukraine 1 1 1 High 
USA 0 1 0 Low 
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1.8.3. Appendix C. Testing Additional Specifications and Alternative Control Variables 
Table C1. Additional robustness checks for GRECO founding members 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IVs     
GRECO founding 
members 
0.197** 
(0.064) 
0.183** 
(0.062) 
0.157* 
(0.063) 
0.104* 
(0.045) 
     
High intensiveness of 
party codification 
0.155* 
(0.071) 
0.128+ 
(0.064) 
0.141* 
(0.061) 
0.099* 
(0.044) 
     
Candidates to the EU   -0.144+ 
(0.085) 
 
     
Controls 
 
    
Conflict of 
competences 
 
 -1.080* 
(0.497) 
-1.140* 
(0.503) 
 
Demands for a better 
public availability of 
information on political 
finance 
0.630* 
(0.234) 
  0.450* 
(0.214) 
     
Years -0.069** 
(0.022) 
-0.070** 
(0.023) 
-0.080** 
(0.025) 
-0.051** 
(0.015) 
     
Constant 0.891*** 
(0.129) 
1.022*** 
(0.101) 
1.098*** 
(0.113) 
0.934*** 
(0.096) 
     
Observations 46 46 46 46 
R2 0.411 0.467 0.502 0.274 
F 5.223 5.265 4.478 6.450 
AICR - - - 68.191 
BICR - - - 80.239 
DV is the proportion of fully and partly implemented recommendations. 
Unstandardized coefficients; Robust SE in parentheses. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 present results of multiple regressions. 
Model 4 shows results of a robust regression. 
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Table C2. Additional model specifications 
 Two-limit tobit 
model 
Two-limit tobit 
model 
Two-limit tobit 
model 
Two-limit tobit 
model 
Two-limit tobit 
model 
Two-limit tobit 
model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IVs:       
GRECO founding members      0.220** (0.077)   0.225** (0.080) 
High intensiveness of party codification  0.220* (0.095) 0.175* (0.084)   0.181* (0.087) 0.177* (0.077) 
Demands for parliamentary parties  0.618 (0.723) 0.213 (0.655)    
Parties in cabinet (left-right scale, w)    -0.035* (0.016)   
Candidates to join the EU     -0.171 (0.127)  
Controls:       
Year  -0.095** 
(0.030) 
-0.123*** (0.030) -0.083* (0.036) -0.108** (0.033) -0.114*** (0.031) 
Conflict of competences  -1.036* (0.498) -1.177* (0.467) -1.394** (0.490)   
Number of recommendations+      0.000 (0.008) 
Constant 0.680*** 1.119*** 1.311*** 1.277*** 1.299*** 1.101*** 
 (0.075) (0.189) (0.161) (0.211) (0.201) (0.210) 
Constant (Sigma) 0.301*** 0.242*** 0.231*** 0.239*** 0.268*** 0.236*** 
 (0.040) (0.031) (0.030) (0.036) (0.035) (0.031) 
Observations 46 46 46 32 46 46 
 
DV is the proportion of fully and partly implemented recommendations. Unstandardized coefficients; Robust SE in parentheses.  
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
+Number of recommendations is measured as a number of quasi-sentences per country. Note that tests with an overall number of recommendations per 
country does not change the results.
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Table C3. Results of the robust regression on some of the hypotheses of interest 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Compliance in previous GRECO 
rounds (H1) 
 1.047* 
(0.431) 
1. 062* 
(0.440) 
0.641 
(0.350) 
0.711* 
(0.347) 
      
Candidates to the EU57 (H3a)  -0.079 
(0.089) 
-0.174 
(0.154) 
  
       
International Aid  0.011 
(0.026) 
0.008 
(0.029) 
  
       
Candidates to the EU     X                   
International Aid (H3b) 
  0.048 
(0.075) 
  
      
High intensiveness of party 
codification (H4) 
0.170** 
(0.059) 
    
      
Parties in cabinet (H5) 
/left‒right scores, weighted/ 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
    
 
Demands on parliamentary 
parties (H6) 
    
-0.330 
(0.415) 
 
Year -0.013 
(0.020) 
  -0.042* 
(0.016) 
-0.048** 
(0.015) 
Conflict of competences -1.182*** 
(0.283) 
    
Government Efficiency     -0.031 
(0.025) 
Constant 0.871*** -0.096 -0.108 0.497 0.567 
 (0.125) (0.382) (0.390) (0.333) (0.332) 
Observations 32 46 46 46 44 
R2 0.400 0.091 0.095 0.200 0.234 
AICR 37.687 61.043 61.385 70.859 55.349 
BICR 48.304 69.751 72.407 79.856 65.711 
 
DV is the proportion of fully and partly implemented recommendations. 
Unstandardized coefficients; SE in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
57 The reference group consists of the EU members and countries that are not EU candidates. Findings stay 
robust if the reference group consist of the EU members only. 
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Table C4. Regressions on the adjusted dependent variable. 
 
Adjustment: at the very beginning of the analysis, I omit quasi-sentences (i-denoted parts of the 
recommendations) which do not require legal changes – for example, arranging a workshop for 
political parties on finance – while constructing the dependent variable. The following procedure is 
exactly the same as described in the part on the construction of the dependent variable in the paper. 
 
IVs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GRECO founding members  0.212** 
(0.071) 
0.200** 
(0.067) 
0.126* 
(0.058) 
High intensiveness of party 
codification 
0.250* 
(0.104) 
0.139* 
(0.067) 
0.144+ 
(0.075) 
0.145+ 
(0.076) 
Parties in cabinet (left-right scale) -0.043* 
(0.017) 
   
Controls     
Year -0.025 -0.076** -0.069**  
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.023)  
Demands for a better public 
availability of information on political 
finance 
 
  0.619** 
(0.220) 
 
Satisfaction with democracy  -0.200 
(0.220) 
  
Constant 0.821*** 1.083*** 0.883*** 0.656*** 
 (0.179) (0.137) (0.145) (0.080) 
Observations 32 45 46 46 
R2 0.374 0.402 0.392 0.282 
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.342 0.333 0.231 
 
DV is the proportion of fully and partly implemented recommendations (adjusted). 
Unstandardized coefficients; SE in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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1.8.4. Appendix D. Predictive Margins and Real Observations for the 3rd GRECO Round  
Figure D1. Predictive margins and real data observations for the 3rd GRECO round on political finance 
  
A 
 
Intensiveness of party codification Compliance rates 
Real observations Predictive margins 
High party codification 0.843 0.871 
Low party codification 0.665 0.603 
 
B 
 
 
 
 
  
Note. Predictions are based on the Model 1 (Table 1.1 in the main text). 
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1.8.5. Appendix E. Coding Details 
Coding instructions 
The code is to be assigned to each quasi-sentence of a GRECO recommendation available in the 
country report. One quasi-sentence is a part of a recommendation or a whole recommendation 
which is denoted with a marker (i) in the original evaluation reports. To assign the code, please, read 
carefully an analytical part provided in the GRECO report above the text of the recommendation and 
a quasi-sentence in focus. One quasi-sentence can have only one code.  
Follow the detailed description of the codes as provided in the table E1 and E2. 
 
Table E1. Coding instructions. Overview of codes 
Supreme 
categories 
 
 
Subcategories 
Path-
Breaking 
Path-
Dependent 
Working 
in 
Practice 
Regional 
competencies  
Other Not 
context-
specific 
NA 
Supervision and 
Enforcement 
1100 2100 3000 
 
5000 4000 
 
8888 
 
9999 
 
Requirements on 
Parliamentary 
Parties 
7100 2200 
Requirements on 
All Parties  
3100 2300 
Publishing / 
Reporting 
Obligations 
4100 2400 
Accounting 
Requirements 
5100 2500 
Regulation on 
Sanctions 
6100 2600 
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Table E2. Coding instructions. Detailed description of codes: excerpt with codes capturing 
recommendations on path-changing and path-development changes for parliamentary parties 
7100 Subcategory: Parliamentary Parties in Focus – Path-Breaking Demands 
 
Definition  
A quasi-sentence is coded as “Parliamentary Parties in Focus - Path Breaking” if it 
invokes fundamental changes in the regulation or exclusive status of ONLY those 
political groups whose representatives are elected to the parliament. Exclusive 
status is to understand as financing and other privileges which parliamentary 
parties and independent parliamentarians enjoy in contrast to the non-
parliamentary parties and other non-parliamentary groups.  
 
Limitations to other categories  
If a recommendation or a subunit demands path changes in the regulation of 
BOTH parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties, coalitions, candidates, or 
ONLY non-parliamentary parties, coalitions, candidates, it belongs to the 
category “Requirements on All Parties – Path Breaking”. If a quasi-sentence does 
not introduce any new norm for the parliamentary parties but some expansion 
or shortening in the existing norms in that field should take place, this quasi-
sentence should be coded within the category “Requirements on Parliamentary 
Parties - Path-Dependent”.  
 
Examples  
 A country is recommended to differentiate legally between 
parliamentary groups and political parties. There is no provision with 
regard to this issue in the existing law. 
 A country is recommended to obligate elected parliamentary 
representatives to report on their revenues and/or expenditures. There is 
no provision with regard to this issue in the existing law. 
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 A country is recommended to prevent the misuse of administrative 
resources. There is no provision with regard to this issue in the existing 
law. 
2200 Subcategory: Parliamentary Parties in Focus – Path-Dependent Demands 
 
Definition  
A quasi-sentence is coded as “Parliamentary Parties in Focus – Path-Dependent” 
if it invokes moderate changes in the regulation or status of ONLY those political 
groups whose representatives are elected to the parliament. Moderate changes 
mean the legal norm already exists but needs to be adjusted.  
 
Limitations to other categories  
If a recommendation or a subunit demands dependent changes in the regulation 
of parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties, it belongs to the category 
“Requirements on All Parties – Path-Dependent”.  
 
Examples  
 A country is recommended to reduce the direct state financial support to 
the parliamentary parties. The direct finance support from the state to 
political parties has already been established. 
 A country is recommended to expand the number of participants getting 
state support.  
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2. Why Change Party Finance Transparency? Political Competition and 
Evidence from the 'Deviant' Case of Norway58 
 
Abstract 
This article focuses on the development of a key type of regulation ensuring public surveillance of 
political finance – party finance transparency rules. It makes two contributions to the emerging theory 
on the evolution of political finance regulation. First, using previous research, it conceptualizes the 
underlying causal mechanisms that explain when and why party finance transparency regulation 
changes. Second, it presents the first detailed study of party finance transparency reforms in Norway, 
which is a deviant case for the introduction of such reforms. It is found that, in the absence of major 
scandals, an intense political discourse on corruption and political competition are sufficient factors to 
launch transparency reforms. Whether reforms are enacted depends on the interaction of several 
factors. Parties that predominantly rely on state funding and grassroots support push for and adopt 
more constraining transparency regulation, while parties that are close to business oppose it. 
Experience of regulation in similar contexts and intense discourse on corruption – stimulated by 
domestic or international events – are necessary for the reform to succeed. Norwegian cooperation 
with the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) further demonstrates that the success of party 
finance transparency reforms initiated by a foreign actor is a function of the existing tradition of party 
regulation, the policy position of a governing party, and the international reputational costs of non-
compliance.  
Key words 
GRECO, political finance, process-tracing, Norway, transparency 
 
2.1. Introduction. Importance of Studies on Party Finance Transparency Regulation 
The spread of regulation of political finance in Europe, Canada and Australia and the opposite 
deregulatory trend in the USA are regularly scrutinized to shed light on the quality of representative 
institutions (Boatright 2015; Casal Bértoa et al. 2014; Norris and van Abel Es 2016; Nwokora 2014) and 
the relationship between parties and state in contemporary democracies (Corduwener forthcoming; 
van Biezen 2004; van Biezen 2008; van Biezen and Kopecký 2007). Although the field is considered to 
be in its infancy (Mendilow 2018), and has been mainly approached through case studies (for 
exceptions, see Norris and van Abel Es 2016; Smirnova 2018), there are considerable theoretical 
 
58 is an accepted manuscript of the article Tonhäuser, V.; Stavenes, T.: ´Why change party finance 
transparency? Political competition and evidence from the ‘Deviant’ case of Norway´ first published online on 
the 23th of October 2019 as a version of record in European Journal of Political Research and which can be 
accessed at http://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12369. 
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developments (see Boatright 2015; Fisher 2015; Koss 2011; Scarrow 2004). This paper analyses one 
key type of political finance regulation: party finance transparency regulation, which ensures public 
surveillance of political finance.  
We see regulation of party finance transparency as a part of party finance regulation, consisting of the 
official rules and institutions obliging political parties to correctly and completely report and disclose 
all kinds of income and expenditure. Per definition, this type of regulation is designed to unveil the 
income sources and expenditure of political parties. There are at least four generally accepted reasons 
why this type of transparency is interesting for politicians, scholars, and society at large.  
First, political parties are crucial for the functioning of democracy in Europe (Dalton et al. 2011), and 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) considers it paramount to make their 
funds transparent to combat corruption. In particular, transparency regulation of party finance aims 
to compensate for public disengagement from established parties (Dalton 2002; van Biezen et al. 2012) 
and prevent the domination of affluent and illicit donors in contemporary politics (Pinto-Duschinsky 
2002: 72). Second, by obliging parties to disclose their financial data, the public can oversee parties` 
compliance with the income and expenditure restrictions (Nassmacher 2009: 244; Ohman 2014: 28), 
in turn opening parties up for public shaming in case of delinquencies. Regulation of public disclosure 
is, therefore, a tool for the effective enforcement of party finance regulation (Casas-Zamora 2005: 23; 
Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). Third, contemporary European parties are state-dependent (Orr 2018; 
Poguntke et al. 2016), and party finance transparency regulation ensures that parties publicly disclose 
their activities, preventing the misuse of public finance. Fourth, party finance transparency regulation 
allows voters to observe which actors support which political parties, thus making them better 
informed about parties’ special interests, and increasing the accountability of parties to their voters 
(Ewing and Issacharoff 2006: 3; Ohman 2014: 28). Acknowledging the pivotal importance of party 
finance transparency regulation for democratic integrity, we wonder when and why would political 
parties want to change their own transparency obligations? 
Previous research has explained changes in the regulation of political funding by major public scandals 
(Carlson 2016; Pujas and Rhodes 1999), party competition (Nwokora 2014; Scarrow 2004), party 
competition and cooperation (Koss 2011), the intervention of the judicial system (Koss 2011; Scarrow 
2004) and international factors (Smirnova 2018). This research is important and has high explanatory 
power for cross-sectional and longitudinal variation. Our contribution is twofold. First, following Fisher 
(2015), we examine the timing of transparency reforms and the causal mechanisms explaining their 
outcome separately. Second, we enrich the palette of case studies on party finance reforms with in-
depth evidence from Norway. Norway is a deviant case for the introduction of party finance 
transparency reforms, given that it has experienced no major political scandals, yet, paradoxically, has 
47 
 
established comprehensive party finance transparency regulation in recent years. As our goal is to 
investigate which causal mechanisms – including, but not restricted to, corruption scandals – explain 
party finance transparency reform, a deviant case like Norway is particularly suitable. 
In the following, we propose an analytical framework to study the mechanisms underlying the 
evolution of party finance transparency regulation, and develop testable hypotheses. We discuss case 
selection, our chosen method – process-tracing – and the data used. In-depth analysis follows, and we 
find that the presence of political discourse on corruption and political competition are sufficient 
factors to launch transparency reforms. Whether reforms are enacted depends on the interaction of 
several factors. While parties that predominantly rely on state funding and grassroots support push 
for and adopt more constraining transparency regulation, parties that are traditionally close to 
business oppose it. Experience with party finance transparency regulation in similar contexts and an 
intense discourse on corruption – stimulated by domestic or international factors – are necessary for 
the reforms to succeed. An analysis of Norwegian cooperation with the Group of States against 
Corruption (GRECO) further demonstrates that the success of party finance transparency reforms 
initiated by a foreign actor is a function of the existing tradition of party regulation, the policy position 
of the governing party and the international reputational costs of non-compliance. We conclude by 
discussing our findings and making recommendations for future research. 
2.2. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
When and why would parties change party finance transparency regulation affecting their own 
behaviour? In the following, we develop testable hypotheses derived from normative, rational choice 
and historical institutionalisms traditionally used to explain changes in party finance regulation. 
Normative institutionalism expects an exogenous shock, in our case a public scandal, to be the trigger 
for reform (Clift and Fisher 2004: 681; Fisher 2015: 156; Scarrow 2004: 657). In this case, policy change 
is an appropriate reaction to a policy failure, and is thus a crucial remedy for public distrust in political 
parties. Koss (2011: 51) suggests that we look more broadly and, alongside the real scandals, consider 
all public communication on corruption, including perceived corruption and the threat of corruption – 
together described as the public discourse on corruption. Following this argument, we consider the 
whole public discourse on corruption, expecting it to be particularly intense after a related public 
scandal. An intense discourse on corruption shapes parties´ policy goals in favour of constraining 
transparency regulation. In line with Koss (2011: 52) and Scarrow (2004: 657), we suggest 
differentiating between major corruption scandals that disadvantage all political parties and those that 
hit only some of them. We predict an overall increase in constraints on party finance transparency if 
the discourse disadvantages all parties. If only some political parties are damaged, we expect instead 
that the mechanisms theorized in hypotheses H2 and H3 will be responsible for the reform outcome. 
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Hypothesis 1: Discourse on corruption. Reform of party finance transparency regulation is likely 
to be initiated after a public scandal. A regulatory change happens if a decrease in 
trust disadvantages all political parties. If only some parties are particularly 
disadvantaged by the scandal, then the rationale on party competition (H2 and H3) 
determines the reform outcome. 
Rational choice institutionalism suggests that political parties tend to initiate and support the 
introduction of party finance transparency reforms when it gives them a comparative electoral 
advantage (Koss 2011: 29). Echoing Strøm (1990), Clift and Fisher (2004: 681) and Scarrow (2004), we 
can expect political parties to realize this advantage by maximizing their vote-, revenue- or office-
seeking goals. Following this logic, political parties should initiate, delay or block transparency reforms 
according to their own interests: to maximize either votes or revenue. Political parties whose income 
primarily consists of sources widely regarded as legitimate – such as state funding and membership 
fees – have stronger incentives to push for party finance transparency, as it makes them more 
attractive to voters compared to parties that rely heavily on donations from corporations or affluent 
donors. Parties close to business groups or affluent individuals have an incentive to actively oppose 
transparency of party finance, in order to maximize their own revenues. As transparency of party 
finance makes individual and group political preferences easily identifiable, it may limit donors’ 
freedom and willingness to express political preferences through donations. This rationale echoes 
underlying policy positions – economic equality secured by state regulation versus individual freedom 
associated with state laissez-faire – often captured by the left and right dimensions of party 
competition (Heidenheimer and Langdon 1968: 112; Nwokora 2014: 922).59  
Following Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2010), we expect political parties to put on the agenda 
transparency reforms which are advantageous to them and disadvantageous to their political rivals – 
especially while in opposition. Small parties can compromise on their policy position on transparency 
regulation to support their coalition partners in order to secure office or signal their loyalty. That brings 
us to the following set of hypotheses. 
 
59 That said, parties that heavily rely on support from peak organizations (or trade unions) should not be 
interested in more transparency, as voters may punish them for representing special interests. This argument is 
not prominent in the recent literature for at least two reasons: 1) the importance of trade unions has 
decreased as economic decision-making has become globalized, and 2) the importance of trade unions as 
reliable donors of money and voters for left-of-centre parties has declined considerably (Allern and Bale 2017). 
Likewise, parties benefiting from foreign support – such as the communist parties in France and Italy that 
received support from the Soviet Union (Corduwener forthcoming: 13) – and anonymous donations should not 
be interested in transparency reforms. Obviously, the main argument does not apply to countries where 
corporate donations are banned, i.e. Estonia, France, Latvia, Spain, and Portugal. If left-of-centre parties do not 
exclusively rely on financial support from trade unions and do not benefit from foreign or anonymous 
donations, we expect the argument to hold. 
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Hypothesis 2: Party competition. Left-of-centre parties tend to initiate more constraining party 
finance transparency regulation to maximize their votes and target the financial 
practices of their competitors. Reforms of party finance transparency regulation are 
only successful if left-of-centre parties are in government, and the reform exclusively 
disadvantages right-of-centre parties, and fail otherwise. 
Hypothesis 3: Party competition. Right-of-centre parties tend to oppose reforms of party finance 
transparency to maximize their revenues and restrict governmental intervention in 
party regulation. 
Hypothesis 4: Party cooperation. Small parties tend to support their coalition partners regardless of 
their ideological orientation, to signal their loyalty. 
The historical institutionalist approach suggests two further alternative explanations for transparency 
reforms, derived from its evolutionary and policy-diffusion arguments. In terms of the evolution of 
regulatory regimes, we observe that contemporary European parties have become largely state-
dependent (Katz and Mair 1995; Orr 2018; Poguntke et al. 2016). Increased reliance on state funds 
arguably decreases the differences in income sources between left and right parties. To control the 
cartel party system and ensure that parties promote the public interest, public surveillance becomes 
legitimate. It helps to prevent the misuse of public finance, as well as the unauthorized use of state 
resources (Pinto-Duschinsky 2002). Thus, to win public approval for increasing state subsidies, political 
parties – regardless of their ideological background – may want to introduce transparency 
requirements as part of a carrot-and-stick solution.  
Once initiated, what explains successful implementation of transparency reforms? As noted, 
transparency of party funding, especially for right-of-centre parties, may lead to a decrease in 
corporate donations, and all parties face higher operational costs in complying with the transparency 
requirements. To meet the challenges of new transparency requirements, parties will first secure 
sufficient state support.  
Hypothesis 5: Increase in state support. Increased state funding to political parties sparks party 
finance transparency reforms as demands for parties to give an account of the finance 
received from taxpayers rise. These reforms are more successful the less political 
parties are affected by a potential decrease in corporate donations and the more 
compliance costs the reforms cover. 
Historical institutionalism also suggests that reforms can happen as a result of policy diffusion 
(Gilardi and Wasserfallen forthcoming; Koss 2011: 32). Policy diffusion is the updated knowledge on 
50 
 
the effectiveness60 (policy learning) and symbolic value (policy emulation) of policy decisions applied 
in other contexts – countries or subnational regions which follow a similar historical, cultural or 
geographical path. Knowledge about regulation and its effects in other contexts suggests possible 
solutions for similar problems and illuminates the risks of enforcement for parties with similar 
profiles (Gilardi and Wasserfallen forthcoming: 7). We thus argue that policy diffusion can impact 
parties’ willingness to initiate and adopt party finance transparency reform.  
Hypothesis 6: Policy diffusion. A party is more likely to initiate or adopt a party finance transparency 
reform if it has updated its knowledge on similar regulation implemented elsewhere, 
and if that regulation was a success for political parties with a similar profile; otherwise 
it will oppose it. 
All three types of institutionalisms suggest a joint explanation for party finance transparency reform 
where an international organization is involved. In line with normative institutionalism, we expect 
international organizations to trigger revision of party finance regulation by increasing awareness of 
the problems concealed in national party regulation and practices. In line with historical 
institutionalism, international organizations can trigger reform by providing countries with tailormade 
recommendations for best-practice regulation and, should these align with national regulatory logic, 
policy change is very likely. Rational choice institutionalism (Smirnova 2018) suggests that policy 
change is a function of reputational benefits and non-compliance costs for the country in the 
international arena, as well as domestic benefits and costs. Put differently, on the one hand, 
compliance with international norms reflects a country’s commitment to the shared international 
agenda (Guzman 2008: 69). On the other hand, compliance involves not only what is appropriate, but 
what is feasible. Compliance is more likely when the discrepancy between existing national rules and 
those proposed by an international organization is low. Concomitantly, when there is a ‘misfit’ (Börzel 
and Risse 2003) – that is, the discrepancy between existing and proposed rules is high – the domestic 
costs of compliance are higher, and the likelihood of compliance is thus lower.  
Hypothesis 7: International reputation and the domestic costs of implementation. If instigated 
by an international organization, reforms of party finance transparency regulation 
are more likely to succeed when the discrepancy between existing national rules 
and international recommendations is low, and the country cares about its 
reputation in the policy field. 
 
 
60 By policy effectiveness, following Braun and Gilardi (2006: 301), we mean a policy’s ability to achieve its 
intended outcome. 
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2.3. Methods: Rationales for a Case Study and Process-tracing 
This article´s primary goal is to show how a given theoretical cause (or set of causes) explains the timing 
and nature of reforms in party finance transparency regulation. Cross-sectional analyses of party 
finance regulation are emerging (Lipcean 2019; Smirnova 2018; Norris and van Abel Es 2016; Poguntke 
et al. 2016; Casal Bértoa et al. 2014; Nassmacher 2009; van Biezen and Kopecký 2007), but 
considerable effort is still necessary to collect cross-sectional and time-series data on reforms of party 
finance transparency regulation. Thus, to observe the performance of the causal mechanisms 
theorized above – the ‘pathway or process by which the effect is produced’ (Gerring 2010: 1500) – and 
also to control for contextual variables and alternative explanations over time, we choose a single 
within-case study (Rohlfing 2012: 15) of a deviant case (Gerring 2007) among European democracies, 
with process-tracing (Collier 2011; Beach and Pedersen 2016). Tracing reforms over time enables us to 
control for confounders that are difficult to identify in a cross-sectional analysis. This approach is also 
useful for discriminating among causal mechanisms on the basis of necessary and sufficient criteria for 
the affirmation of causal inference (Collier 2011: 825; van Evera 1997: 31). It should also be noted that 
for every reform we differentiate between factors and mechanisms responsible for its initiation and 
for its outcome as separate processes.  
2.4. Selection of a Deviant Case 
To identify causal mechanisms that systematically lead to reforms in party finance transparency and 
avoid a positive confirmation bias, we focus exclusively on established democracies. That is because 
young democracies tend to regulate political parties more intensively than old ones (van Biezen 2008: 
341; van Biezen and Borz 2012: 343; van Biezen and Kopecký 2007: 250). Moreover, the introduction 
of party finance regulation is related to public concerns about political corruption (Casal Bértoa et al. 
2014: 369; van Biezen 2008: 338). Thus, to avoid a positive confirmation bias and to improve the 
external validity of our findings, we select a case with an average level of demand for policy change. 
Economic inequality can mediate the perception of integrity of democratic institutions, with high 
economic inequality often associated with disappointment with political parties (Donovan and Karp 
2017: 480). We therefore select a case that is average on both trust in political parties and economic 
inequality. For the latter, we use the Gini-index,61 reducing distortions caused by individual economic 
well-being. Figure 2.1 presents the cross-sectional overview of trust in political parties and Gini score 
 
61 An alternative would be to use the measures of corruption, but the level of corruption and the level of 
income inequality are interrelated (see e.g. Chong and Calderón 2000: 768; Gupta et al. 2002). 
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across established democracies at the earliest possible time point (2004). We pick up the closest case 
to the mean on both dimensions – Norway62 – for our in-depth investigation. 
Figure 2.1. Gini estimates and trust in political parties across established European democracies 
  
Sources: Trust: European Social Survey 2004, post-stratification weights applied; Gini (Index): World 
Bank.  
Note: ´Trust in political parties´ shows the percentage of respondents who choose to trust political 
parties scoring 6 or higher on the range 0–10. Gini (Index) ranges from 0 to 100%, with perfect equality 
being 0% and perfect inequality being 100%. 
Although Norway presents a typical democracy in terms of trust in political parties, it seems to be a 
deviant case (Gerring 2007) with regard to its development of party finance transparency regulation. 
Norway has not experienced any major corruption scandals, but has nevertheless established a 
comprehensive regulatory framework for party finance transparency. It was also one of the countries 
that implemented all GRECO’s recommendations aimed at increasing transparency in political finance 
(Smirnova 2018: 13). We thus expect evidence from a deviant case like Norway to be helpful in 
 
62 Norway belongs to the group of countries providing significant public funding, and where parties´ income 
from private sources is less significant, alongside Austria, Belgium, Finland, Israel and Sweden (Koss 2011: 18). 
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identifying new causes and causal mechanisms of party finance transparency reforms and refining the 
theory (Beach and Pedersen 2016: 849). 
2.5. Operationalization of Party Finance Regulation and its Reforms 
Party finance transparency regulation  
Following Norris and Abel van Es (2016: 8), we operationalize party finance transparency regulation as 
official rules that deal with reporting of party finance to state authorities and disclosing it to the general 
public, and rules that regulate the supervision of and sanctioning for violations of these rules. In line 
with Nassmacher (2009: 73), we differentiate between general regulatory constraints and constraints 
that only apply during electoral campaign periods. As the regulatory focus on campaign and non-
campaign periods depends on the electoral and party systems, conceptually we treat these types of 
regulation as equally important and equally constraining. Substantively, party finance transparency 
regulations can be classified into four dimensions: 1) regulation on reporting and public disclosure of 
party income and party expenditure (that is, thresholds, aggregation rules to differentiate between 
regular and occasional donations, anonymity); 2) timing of public disclosure of information on party 
finance; 3) supervision of compliance with regulation on reporting and disclosure; and 4) sanctions for 
violations of the regulations covered by 1) and 2) (Ewing and Issacharoff 2006; Nassmacher 2009). 
Reforms of party finance transparency regulation 
Our outcome is party finance transparency reform, which we define as a process that starts with the 
proposal for a reform in party finance transparency regulation (as defined above), and finishes with 
the subsequent handling of this proposal in parliament (rejected or approved). Studying both 
successful and unsuccessful reforms is key to identifying which necessary and sufficient factors explain 
the outcomes. A successful reform in party finance transparency legislation constitutes a bill that is 
introduced to and later approved by parliament.  A failed reform proposal is one that does not 
complete the legislative process. 
To analyse our hypotheses, we define a set of conditions that explain the outcomes of party finance 
transparency reforms. These conditions are corruption scandals (H1); closeness of political parties 
involved in policy formation to different donors, captured via their ideological positions (H2 and H3); 
constraints imposed on parties as coalitional partners (H4); proportion of direct state funding in the 
parties´ income structure (H5); other countries’ experience of party finance transparency regulation 
(H6); and, finally, the country´s reputation in the policy field, captured by involvement in the 
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international promotion of anti-corruption regulation, as well as the level of misfit between domestic 
party finance regulation and international recommendations (H7).63  
2.6. Data Sources 
The data comprises government law proposals, official party regulation, public consultation 
documents, reports from specially appointed commissions, protocols of plenary and committee 
debates as well as six in-depth interviews with key party representatives involved in the reforms.64 We 
triangulate our findings from the official sources with evidence reported in secondary literature on the 
relationship between business structures and political parties, as well as with GRECO reports and 
newspaper articles.65  
2.7. Distinguishing Features of Political Competition in Norway 
Norway is a unitary constitutional monarchy with a parliament elected by de facto closed party lists in 
19 plural-member constituencies (Bengtsson et al. 2014: 19). Political competition is mainly structured 
along the left–right dimension, with the Labour Party and the Conservatives constituting the main 
players on each side. The Christian People’s Party, the Centre Party (agrarian), and the Liberal Party 
constitute the centre of the Norwegian party system, while the Socialist Left and the Progress Party 
constitute the left and right fringes respectively.66 Even though minority cabinets have dominated 
Norwegian politics, three majority cabinets, two centre-left and one centre-right, have been in power 
in the past 15 years.67 Four out of ten party members have left Norwegian parties in the past 20 years, 
leaving Norway with 161,811 party members – a little over 3 per cent of the total population – in 2012 
(Heidar and Saglie 2003: 224; Poguntke et al. 2016). This reflects a well-documented general trend of 
declining party membership (van Biezen et al. 2012: 42), and about half of parties’ income thus stems 
from state funding, originally introduced in 1970 (Figure 2.2). Party finance transparency regulation 
applicable to political party organisations is only issued nationally. 
 
63 To measure the misfit, we disaggregate country recommendations on party finance regulation into quasi-
sentences, denoted with i-indices in the original evaluation reports. Each quasi-sentence is coded to indicate 
whether it contains a high or low level of misfit with the existing country regulations. High misfit can be 
associated with the establishment of a new supervising institution or the introduction of a legal definition of 
political parties. A low-misfit reform might prescribe adjusting existing regulation to expand the range of 
participants eligible for state support. All codes on misfit are mutually exclusive. 
64 See 2.11.6. Appendix F for an overview of interviewees.  
65 These newspapers are Aftenposten (Norway’s largest newspaper), Dagens Næringsliv (Norwegian Business 
Daily, the leading business newspaper) and the NTB (Norway’s central news agency). 
66 Following the 2017 election, these seven parties comprise the Norwegian parliament, plus the Green and the 
Red parties (one representative each), which first entered parliament in 2013 and 2017 respectively. 
67 Between 2005 and 2013 a centre-left cabinet comprising the Labour Party, the Centre Party and the Socialist 
Left governed under PM Jens Stoltenberg (Labour). A minority centre-right cabinet with the Conservative and 
the Progress parties under PM Erna Solberg (Conservative) followed it and governed from 2013 till 2018. In 
2019 PM Erna Solberg united the Conservative Party, the Progress Party, the Liberals, and the Christian 
People’s Party in a majority cabinet. 
55 
 
Figure 2.2. Share of public subsidies in the national party accounts, in percent 
 
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
In the 2000s, political parties in Norway, like many overseas, have typically established a broader range 
of contacts with interest groups, although the Labour Party and the Socialist Left are still closely linked 
to the trade unions, and the Conservatives and the Progress Party are linked to business groups and 
social movements respectively (Allern 2010).  
2.8. Tracing the Reform Process in Norway68 
This part of the paper presents the process-tracing analysis of six reform attempts (Table 2.1) at party 
finance transparency in Norway since the 1940s.  
The Labour Party was the first to suggest introducing transparency regulations for corporate donations 
in 1948. These were aimed at preventing financially strong organizations that were not subject to 
control or revision from influencing political life through donations (Heidenheimer and Langdon 1968: 
112). The reform was initiated as a direct consequence of a scandal related to the Libertas foundation, 
which was accused of secretly financing the Conservative Party, non-socialist Norwegian newspapers 
and various public events with the goal of shifting public opinion rightwards (Heidenheimer and 
Langdon 1968: 111). Public scandals (H1) and party competition (H2) were crucial for the reform’s 
initiation. 
Following the scandal, a parliamentary committee, with a Labour majority, was appointed to scrutinize 
party finance regulation. The non-socialist parties, led by the Liberal Party, surprisingly agreed that 
financial flows between certain foundations and parties should indeed be transparent. However, they 
 
68 The appendix discusses the ordinary legislative process in Norway.  
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also demanded that the finances of the labour unions become transparent as well. This made the 
proposal equally disadvantageous for the Labour Party, as it primarily aimed to reveal the finances of 
the trade union Landsorganisasjonen (LO), its main donor (Heidenheimer and Langdon 1968: 112). 
Table 2.1. Overview of observations (reforms) analysed with process-tracing 
№ Reform´s Label Year  Main Issues Result 
1. The Libertas Reform 1948 Transparency of party income Failed 
2. The Sponheim Reform 1994 Transparency of party income Succeeded 
3. The Stoltenberg-Solberg reform 2002 Transparency of party income 
on regional and local levels 
Failed 
4. The Giske Reform 2003 Transparency of party income 
on regional and local levels, 
income transparency for 
collateral organizations (i.e. 
youth organizations) 
Failed 
5. The Political Party Act-Reform 
(PPA-reform) 
2004 A detailed disclosure of party 
income (i.e. in-kind and 
financial donations), a ban on 
foreign and anonymous 
donations, a ban on donations 
from state entities, 
establishment of a supervising 
body, administrative sanctions 
for non-compliance in form of 
withholding of state support. 
Succeeded 
6. The GRECO- reform 2009 Transparency of party 
expenses, separate reporting of 
campaign finance, a broad 
range of administrative  
sanctions (i.e. fines) and 
criminal sanctions. 
Succeeded 
Note: The year indicates the launch of a reform process. 
Consequently, the final version of the proposal was changed and recommended only that parties be 
encouraged to voluntarily disclose their corporate donations (Justis- og politidepartementet 1952). 
The Labour Party’s resistance in the committee indicates that its interest lay in scrutinizing the 
relationship between the right-of-centre parties and their corporate donors, not in transparency of 
donations in general. This is in line with hypothesis H2 on party competition, which is thus confirmed.  
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The second attempt to reform party finance regulation was a success. In 1998 the first requirements 
for party income transparency were introduced, following a proposal from Liberal MP Lars Sponheim.69 
The regulation obliged the national branch of each political party to report its income, including 
donations above 20,000 NOK and the overall amount received from anonymous donations, to the 
Storting, where these accounts were available for the public to see.70 The reform was sparked by the 
Liberal Party’s bid for a comparative electoral advantage (Øgrey 2017). In opposition at the time, it was 
the only party which got its income primarily from state funding and membership fees (Antonsen 
2017). 
Policy diffusion was a necessary condition for the initiation of the reform. Specifically, the Liberal Party 
learned from press reports about the Danish experience with party finance transparency regulation, 
and subsequently consulted their Danish sister party and the Danish Ministry before drafting the 
proposal for Norway (Antonsen 2017; Øgrey 2017). Additional evidence in this case disconfirms H5 on 
state funding. The provision of state funding (Figure 2.3) did not substantively change between 1994 
and 1998, and it was neither mentioned in the initial reform proposal (Dok 8:17, 1994), nor, according 
to interviewees, was it relevant for the initiation of the reform (Øgrey 2017).  
The outcome of the reform indicates the importance of the policy diffusion rationale. The design of 
the similar Danish law of 1991, as well as the Danish experience of its implementation, was frequently 
referred to during the Norwegian reform process (Antonsen 2017; Øgrey 2017; Innst.S.167, 1994–5), 
thus offering support for H6 on policy diffusion. Indeed, the newly introduced 20.000 NOK threshold 
for reporting donations in Norway was the same as in Denmark. These clear parallels were intended 
to reduce uncertainty for political parties with regard to the reform’s consequences. The Labour Party 
consistently supported transparency regulation in this reform process, while the Conservatives, 
benefiting from corporate donations more than any other party, opposed it (Bjørnestad 1994; Ot. Prp. 
82, 1996–7; Statistics Norway), thereby confirming hypotheses H2 and H3 on party competition. A 
representative of the Conservative Party confirmed that the party’s opposition was due to its wish to 
protect its donors’ privacy and thus maintain their donations (Foss 2017). 
 
69Direct state funding was introduced for national party organizations in 1970 and for subnational branches in 
1975, but no transparency issues were contained in these law proposals at any stage. Therefore, although we 
traced these reforms, they were eliminated from the final version of the analysis. 
70 The financial record had to be signed by the party leadership and approved by an auditor. No sanctions for 
non-compliance with the new law were introduced.  
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Figure 2.3. Development of direct public subsidies for political parties on different levels 
 
Sources: 1970–2004: NOU 2004(25): 39; 2005–2015: Statistics Norway. 
This, too, speaks to the Danish experience: donations to the Danish Conservatives dropped after the 
transparency regulation was introduced (Ot. Prp. 82, 1996–7). A fall in public trust in the national 
government in the early 1990s (Miller and Listhaug 1998: 164) concerned Norwegian politicians in this 
reform process as well, although no scandals were present (Dok 8:17, 1994) and discourse on 
corruption was only moderate.71   
In 2002 two Labour MPs – Jens Stoltenberg and Hill-Marta Solberg – launched a third reform, aiming 
to extend the existing reporting obligations to regional and local party branches. They argued that 
political actors on subnational levels had more contact with individuals and businesses than those on 
the national level, which necessitated a greater focus on party finance transparency at the subnational 
level. The trigger for the proposal was a scandal in Oslo, in which the Conservative Party had been 
accused of intentionally circumventing the 1998 law by channelling large donations into local and 
regional branches to avoid public scrutiny (Dagens Næringsliv, 21.9.2002; Plenary debate, 3.12.2002; 
Torvik and Bjåland 2002).72 The motion was presented by a Labour Party in recovery after a massive 
electoral defeat in the 2001 parliamentary elections, and just a few weeks after reports of the scandal 
appeared. The process-tracing of the reform´s initiation thus yields support for the joint effects of H1 
(public scandal) and H2 (political competition). The Labour motion failed because of the right-leaning 
majority in the parliamentary committee at the time,73 the outcome thus confirming H3 on party 
competition. In the aftermath of this reform attempt, all parties agreed to establish the Financing 
 
71 International organizations, like GRECO or the Venice Commission, were not relevant for this reform (Øgrey 
2017), nor were international organizations mentioned in the documents related to it.  
72 The importance of media scrutiny of transparency issues is also emphasized by an interviewee from the 
Labour party (Anonymous 2017). 
73 Consisting of the Progress Party, the Christian People’s Party and the Conservatives. 
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Democracy Commission (FDC). Its mandate was to propose revisions to the law on party finance 
regulation in Norway, taking into account domestic demands, the Council of Europe´s (CE) 
‘Recommendation on Regulation against Corruption in the Financing of Political Parties and Electoral 
Campaigns’ (Rec 2003/4) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
In October 2003, Labour MP Trond Giske launched the fourth reform attempt when he proposed to 
expand transparency of party income to subnational levels, and introduce income transparency for the 
parties’ collateral organizations, such as youth groups. This occurred immediately after regional and 
local elections in which the Labour Party had urged its subnational branches to disclose all information 
about their donations. As the Conservatives stuck to their position of secrecy, the motion clearly 
targeted their reputation – Trond Giske claimed that ‘the starting point of this whole issue is that the 
Conservative Party does not want transparency regarding their donations’ (Plenary debate, 
15.12.2003). This reform initiative confirms H2 and H3 on party competition and was again, in line with 
H3, defeated by the parliamentary committee’s right-leaning majority. 
The fifth reform attempt resulted in a new law on political parties, the Political Party Act (PPA), which 
came into force in 2006.74 It was the most comprehensive reform of political parties and party finance 
transparency regulation in the history of Norway. The new rules included a ban on state entities 
donating to political parties, a ban on foreign and anonymous donations, a requirement to disclose 
both monetary and in-kind donations, and formal requirements for setting up financial accounts.The 
PPA also extended reporting-of-income obligations to the subnational branches of parties and – for 
the first time – introduced an (independent) supervisory organ the Political Party Act Committee. This 
Committee was vested with the power to withhold state support in the case of non-compliance with 
the PPA.75  
 In contrast to the previous reform attempts, this reform started with a proposal for a law on political 
parties issued by the FDC. As this had been established in the aftermath of the scandal stimulating the 
third reform process, we can also attribute the initiation of this reform attempt to the mechanism 
theorized in H1 (scandal). An additional reason was a substantial increase in state funding for political 
parties, at the same time as income from business donations was expected to decrease, mainly due to 
the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, a large corporate donor, deciding to terminate their 
political donations (Aftenposten, 23.8.2003). The parliamentary committee was concerned that 
 
74 Its official name is the Act on Certain Aspects Relating to Political Parties. 
75 The Political Party Act Committee was to comprise at least five members and be independent. However, its 
leeway was restricted, as it did not have the right to control the accuracy and completeness of the financial 
reports.  
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changing income structures would cause democratic internal activities in the parties to decline, in turn 
affecting opportunities for citizens to participate in democracy (Innst. O. nr 28, 2002–2003). 
The FDC concluded that more elaborate transparency regulation on party income was necessary to 
maintain public trust in political parties receiving significant state financial support. Figure 2.3 shows a 
rise in state funding, supporting H5 (state funds). Moreover, while acknowledging the importance of 
the CE´s recommendations for improving transparency regulations, the FDC considered some of the 
CE´s provisions too constraining for Norway. Echoing H7 (misfit), the FDC argued that Norway’s 
compliance with Rec 2003/4 in all matters would ruin the country’s historical and political tradition of 
party regulation: ‘The political tradition in Norway and Scandinavia is that the political parties and their 
internal doings generally are subject to little regulation’ (NOU, 2004(25): 77). The FDC therefore 
endorsed the CE´s recommendations on introducing income transparency regulation, to secure public 
trust in parties (NOU, 2004(25)), but not those on expenditure, promoted by the CE to guarantee 
parties´ autonomy from the state. This was also supported by all the parties in the parliamentary 
committee (Innst. O. nr 129, 2004–2005).76  
Surprisingly, the Conservative Party supported transparency requirements for party income on all 
levels and for the parties’ youth organizations – changing its previous position. Moreover, it also 
proposed obliging parties to report their business deals and in-kind donations, excluding regular 
voluntary work and services that were not usually paid for (Ot. Prp. nr. 84, 2004–2005). This change of 
heart is explained by the fact that some affluent party donors had publicly stated that they welcomed 
a more transparent approach to party finance (Storvik 2004a, 2004b). Consequently, transparency was 
no longer a risk to donations, so the Conservative Party could change its position on transparency at 
the same time as maximizing its revenue (Foss 2017), thus supporting H3 (party competition).   
In summarising the arguments for party finance transparency reform, both the government and the 
responsible parliamentary committee referred to the growing salience of transparency in political 
finance internationally, partly because of GRECO and public scandals abroad.77 The parliamentary 
committee noted the lack of major corruption scandals or financial misuse in Norwegian political 
history, but emphasized the importance of preventative measures, in order to secure high trust in 
political institutions (Innst. O. nr 129, 2004–2005; Foss 2017), echoing H1 (public scandals) and H6 
(policy diffusion). The importance of our argument in H1 is also reflected in the law itself. Article 1 of 
 
76 The committee at the time comprised the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the Progress Party, the 
Socialist Left, the Centre Party and the Christian People’s Party.  
77 The committee does not mention which scandals they are referring to, but the Norwegian news media 
broadly covered a party finance scandal related to the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in 1999 and 
2000 and one in France in September 2000, when the French president Jacques Chirac was accused of knowing 
about illegal donations to his party (Elsebutangen 2000). 
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the PPA states that the law aims to (among other things) secure the public’s right to counteract 
corruption and unwanted ties by keeping party finances and activities transparent (Party Political Act 
2006).  
Process-tracing reveals that state funding’s relevance for party accounts (H5), public discourse on 
corruption (H1), ideological party positions (H3), international recommendations (H7) and regulatory 
experience in other countries (H6) jointly contributed to the reform’s success.  
The sixth reform attempt was the introduction of amendments to the PPA in 2013 and 2014, resulting 
from GRECO’s recommendations to Norway (GRECO 2009). The updated version of the PPA included 
disclosure requirements for party expenditures, assets and debts, separate and complete reporting of 
campaign and regular finances in a standardized format, as well as more comprehensive sanctions, 
including formal warning, partial or complete withholding of state funding, administrative and criminal 
sanctions – all also applicable to the party branches. GRECO was solely responsible for the initiation of 
this reform. 
We find that the interplay between the high reputational costs of non-compliance and the presence 
of a majority centre-left governing coalition were fundamental to the success of this reform process, 
supporting H2 and H7. Specifically, half of GRECO’s recommendations to Norway had a high level of 
misfit with national regulation,78 strongly challenging the Norwegian tradition of political parties´ 
autonomy. So one would not expect them to be adopted. Indeed, the right-of-centre parties79 
emphasized the importance of independence from state control, and stressed the negative 
consequences for local party branches, as the recommended reporting obligations would increase 
operating costs.80 As expected from our H2 on party competition, however, the responsible 
parliamentary committee, now led by three centre-left governing parties,81 supported extending 
regulation in line with GRECO’s recommendations. 
Arguably, one of the reasons the incumbent government accepted the high degree of misfit – in line 
with our rationale in H7 – was the potentially high reputational costs to Norway. Specifically, the 
government referred to the increased salience of party finance transparency in Europe, due to the 
work of the UN, EU, OSCE/ODIHR, OECD, and Transparency International. It also emphasized the 
importance for Norway of remaining a trustworthy partner in international cooperation on tackling 
corruption (Fornyings- og administrasjonsdepartementet 2010). The government was proud of the 
 
78 An overview of recommendations and coding decisions is provided in the appendix.  
79 Christian People’s Party, the Conservative Party and the Progress Party. 
80 Moreover, the three right-of-centre parties – while opposing the proposed changes to campaign reporting – 
agreed to make reporting of donations continuous (Innst. 155L, 2012–2013). This suggests that the three 
parties were not opposed to all types of increased party finance transparency. 
81 The Labour Party, Centre Party and Socialist Left.  
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country’s engagement in GRECO’s work and the confidence international organizations had 
demonstrated in Norway. Finally, interviewees stressed the Norwegian commitment to implementing 
international recommendations (Foss 2017). Ultimately, Norway complied with all the GRECO 
recommendations.  
2.9. Discussion: Theoretical Implications from Party Finance Transparency Reforms  
This article has asked why and when political parties change party finance transparency regulation. 
The process-tracing analysis in Norway showed that left-of-centre parties tended to launch party 
finance transparency reforms in the aftermath of their own political defeats or minor public scandals. 
This mechanism was present in the Libertas, Solberg–Stoltenberg and Giske reforms. Echoing previous 
findings (Koss 2011), we find that political discourse on corruption alone is not sufficient to start 
transparency reforms. We argue, rather, that an intense political discourse on corruption combined 
with a political party that clearly benefits from instrumentalizing transparency are sufficient conditions 
to initiate reform. Our results indicate that such a party does not necessarily have to be either 
ideologically left or right, extending Nwokora’s (2014) findings, and underlining how the causal 
mechanism is linked to parties’ income structure and their pursuit of electoral gains.  
The Sponheim reform clearly illustrates this argument. Despite its centre-right views, the Liberal Party 
was the only party in parliament that primarily relied on direct state funding and membership 
contributions. Like Nwokora (2014), we found that the Conservative Party opposed transparency, as it 
feared a drop in private and corporate donations. We add a further dimension to this debate by 
showing that the donors’ changed views on transparency turned the Conservatives in its favour, as the 
threat of losing donations was lifted. An intense public discourse on corruption was a necessary 
condition for this change. Interestingly, parties’ left/right ideological preferences matter once we 
examine preferences for transparency of expenditure – left-of-centre parties favour tighter regulation 
than their right-leaning rivals. In a nutshell, party competition drives reforms increasing transparency 
of party finance. This can be contrasted to state funding reforms, where a consensus of relevant parties 
is a necessary condition for the introduction of state subsidies (Koss 2011). 
We find, too, that international organizations, like CE and especially GRECO, do indeed contribute to 
initiating regulatory reform and drawing public attention to corruption, by providing countries with 
tailormade recommendations and accelerating the international discourse on corruption.  
Once launched, what are the conditions responsible for the reform’s outcome? We argue that the 
government party’s policy position matters. A striking example is the failed reform of 1948, when the 
Labour Party initiated a regulatory change following the Libertas scandal, which concerned a 
foundation’s secret sponsoring of right-of-centre parties and non-socialist newspapers. The regulatory 
changes were never passed, due to possible disadvantages for the Labour Party itself. Another example 
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was the failure to introduce transparency in expenditure in the PPA reform, due to the right-of-centre 
coalition then in government.  
Interestingly, and related to our previous finding, parties’ positions on transparency are also affected 
by their relationship to the government. This is particularly so for junior partners in government 
coalitions. For example, the Progress Party and the Christian People’s Party both supported 
Sponheim’s reform proposal in 1994, but opposed that of Stoltenberg and Solberg in 2002. This shift 
was due to the fact that the government, which the Christian People’s Party was part of in 2002, 
wanted to retain ownership of the issue of party finance transparency and not let the Labour Party 
benefit from bringing it on to the agenda (Lånke 2017). Likewise, the Progress Party decided to join the 
right-leaning parties and oppose Stoltenberg and Solberg’s proposal because it was a supporting party 
of the government (Woldseth 2017). The implications of being in government or in opposition for the 
development of party finance transparency regulation is therefore an interesting topic for future 
research.  
We find that the policy diffusion mechanism, defined as up-to-date knowledge of party finance 
transparency regulation in other countries, in conjunction with the spread of discourse on corruption 
shape the type of transparency regulation introduced. As our findings further suggest, the successful 
regulatory experience of close neighbours is a necessary condition for a reform to succeed. This was 
the case when Denmark’s experience contributed to the success of Norway’s Sponheim reform, and 
when corruption scandals in Europe contributed to the success of the PPA reform. That said, having a 
party in government that favours a tighter regulatory regime is a necessary condition for the reform 
to pass. Finally, for the PPA and GRECO reforms, we observe that the outcome of party finance 
transparency reform is a function of the policy position of the parties in the governing coalition, 
domestic implementation costs and the international reputational costs of non-compliance.  
2.10. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the state of the art in two significant ways. Firstly, we theorize both when 
and why parties would initiate and pass party finance transparency regulation, building on and 
extending the theoretical advancements of previous studies (Koss 2011; Nwokora 2014; Pujas and 
Rhodes 1999; Scarrow 2004; Smirnova 2018). Secondly, we refine theory on party finance regulation 
reforms in light of the evidence from a deviant case, that of Norway, which did not experience any 
major corruption scandals, but nevertheless introduced an encompassing regulatory framework.  
Our process-tracing of reforms in Norway demonstrates that political competition best explains the 
timing of party finance transparency reforms. Discourse on corruption yields a high explanatory power 
for the initiation of reforms – supporting existing studies – but is never a sufficient factor that 
determines a reform´s success or failure. In Norway, we conclude that, generally, tightening up party 
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finance transparency regulation has been used as a weapon against political rivals, and only 
occasionally to also secure public trust in parties. This finding adds to previous studies that have found 
a positive relationship between the perceived level of party corruption and the high level of constraint 
inherent in party finance regulation (Casal Bértoa et al. 2014). Aside from domestic factors, the 
engagement of international organizations in party finance transparency reforms and experience of 
implementing party finance transparency regulation in other contexts are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions to explain the reforms` success. In sum, our findings expand our knowledge on which factors 
– beyond corruption scandals – explain party finance transparency reform, and pinpoint how exactly 
they are inter-related in reform processes.  
We acknowledge two limitations in this paper that provide interesting avenues for future research. 
First, while studying the deviant case of Norway has proved fruitful, future studies should find it 
productive to apply our theoretical framework to countries that differ on core factors, such as 
experience with corruption scandals and the intervention of international actors. Second, it has been 
beyond our scope to elaborate on the role of independent courts (Scarrow 2004) and commissions 
(Clark 2017), which we invite future scholars to investigate further.  
65 
 
2.11. Appendix 
2.11.1. Appendix A. The Ordinary Law-Making Procedure in Norway 
The Norwegian constitution (paragraph 76) allows both the government and individual MPs to 
propose new laws to the Storting. Normally, the government proposes new laws in the form of a 
so-called Proposition to the Storting. The state ministries are responsible for developing the law 
proposals within their policy fields. In the preparation of a new law proposal, the state department 
often sends it out on public consultation to relevant state entities, civil society organisations and 
other actors. If the law proposal is comprehensive, special commissions can be appointed to 
develop a report (Norsk offentlig utredning, NOU) outlining recommendations to the state 
department in charge of developing the law proposal. Sometimes the government decides to 
consult the Storting on certain issues or aspects before a law proposal is developed. This usually 
happens when larger reforms are to be introduced. In these cases, the government presents a 
report to the Storting (stortingsmelding), that the Storting can then comment on. 
After a MP or the government has proposed a new law to the Storting, the proposal is sent to the 
relevant parliamentary committee, which then gives its recommendation for a decision to the 
Storting. The committee can itself decide to gather additional information to shed light on 
different aspects pertaining to the proposal, for example through public consultations or letters 
to the state departments. If the law proposal comes from a MP, it is usually sent to the relevant 
state department for its views and to have consequences of the proposal outlined.   
The recommendation from the parliamentary committee is voted over in the Storting. If the 
proposal gets a majority of the votes, the proposal moves on to a second voting in the Storting (at 
least three days after the first voting).  Source: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-
demokratiet/Arbeidet/Lovarbeidet/. Accessed 03.01.2017.  
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2.11.2. Appendix B. Details on Composition of Parliamentary Committees 
Table B1. Composition of the Standing Committee on Family, Culture and Public Administration 
during the Sponheim reform. 
Party Number of MPs in 1993-1997 Number of MPs in 1997-2001  
The Socialist Left Party 2 1 
The Labour Party 5 (GP) 5 (GP from 2000-2001) 
The Centre Party 2 1 (GP from 1997-2000) 
The Christian People’s Party 1 2 (GP from 1997-2000) 
The Conservative Party 2 2 
The Progress Party 1 2  
Note: GP indicates governing parties. Source: www.stortinget.no   
 
Table B2. Composition of the Standing Committee on Family, Culture and Public Administration 
during the Stoltenberg-Solberg, Giske and PPA reforms. 
Party Number of MPs in 2001-2005 
The Socialist Left Party 2 
The Labour Party 3 
The Centre Party 1 
The Christian People’s Party 2 (GP) 
The Conservative Party 3 (GP) 
The Progress Party 2 
Note: GP indicates governing parties. The Liberal Party was also part of the governing minority 
coalition, but it did not have any representatives in this committee. Source: www.stortinget.no  
 
Table B3.  Composition of The Standing Committee on Local Government and Public 
Administrationduring the reform induced by the GRECO. 
Party MPs 
The Socialist Left 1 (GP) 
The Labour Party 5 (GP) 
The Centre Party 1 (GP) 
The Christian People’s Party 1 
The Conservative Party 2 
The Progress Party  3 
Note: GP indicates governing parties. Source: www.stortinget.no   
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2.11.3. Appendix C. Electoral Strength and Position of Political Parties During Reforms of Party 
Finance Transparency. 
Table C1. Composition of the Storting, 1993-2016. 
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2013 7 55 10 9 10 48 29 - 1 - 169 
2009 11 64 11 2 10 30 41 - - - 169 
2005 15 61 11 10 11 23 38 - - - 169 
2001 23 43 10 2 22 38 26 1 - - 165 
1997 9 65 11 6 25 23 25 1 - - 165 
1993 13 67 32 1 13 28 10 - - 1 165 
Source: www.stortinget.no  
Table C2. Overview of Norwegian parties’ vote share, seats and ideological positions, 1993-2001. 
Party  Vote share 
1993/1997 
Seats 
1993/1997 
Ideological 
position L/R 
Change in vote 
share 1993/1997 
The Socialist Left  7.9/6 13/9 1.6 -1.9 
The Labour Party 36.9/35 67/65 3.4 -1.9 
The Centre Party 16.7/7.9 32/11 4.7 -2.7 
The Liberal Party 3.6/4.5 1/6 5.1 +0.9 
The Christian People’s Party 7.9/13.7 13/25 5.9 +5.8 
The Conservative Party 17/14.3 28/23 7.9 -2.7 
The Progress Party 6.3/15.3 10/25 8.8 +9.0 
Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 201982), tabulated by the authors.
 
82 Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2019. Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov): Information on 
parties, elections and cabinets in modern democracies. Development version. 
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2.11.4. Appendix D. GRECO Recommendations to Norway 
To measure the level of misfit inherent in the GRECO recommendations to Norway, we 
disaggregate country recommendations on party finance regulation into quasi-sentences, 
denoted with i-indices in the original evaluation reports. Each quasi-sentence is coded to indicate 
whether it contains a high or a low level of misfit to the existing country regulation. A high misfit 
can be associated with the establishment of a new supervising institution, the introduction of a 
legal definition of political parties or a new requirement regarding party finance transparency. A 
low-misfit reform prescribes an adjustment of the existing regulation, for example an expansion 
of the group of parties eligible for state support. All codes on misfit are mutually exclusive.  
 
No. Text of the quasi-sentences Decision on misfit Misfit – code 
1 i. (i) to require party organisations to 
disclose expenditure annually, in 
addition to the current disclosure of 
income;  
A high level of misfit.  
A new rule. 
1 
i. (ii) to oblige party organisations to 
submit information on their assets and 
debts, as appropriate; 
A high level of misfit. 
A new rule. 
1 
i. (iii) to establish a standardised format 
(accompanied by appropriate 
guidelines, if necessary) for the 
provision of such information; 
A high level of misfit.  
A new rule. 
1 
2 ii. to provide further guidance on the 
reporting and valuation of in-kind 
donations as well as on the concept of 
‘political agreements’ which require 
reporting under the Political Parties Act;  
A low level of misfit.  
Section 19 of the PPA already 
provides some guidance. The 
recommendation asks for the 
extension of the existing norms.  
0 
3 iii. to consider introducing an obligation 
to report on income received and 
expenses incurred in connection with 
election campaigns; 
A high level of misfit. 
A new rule. 
1 
4 iv. to establish clear rules ensuring the 
necessary independence of auditors 
who are to audit the accounts of 
political parties; 
A high level of misfit. 
A new rule. 
1 
5 v. to ensure appropriate independent 
monitoring of political funding, 
including electoral campaigns, in line 
with Article 14 of Recommendation 
Rec(2003)4. 
A low level of misfit. 
Statistics Norway and the 
Political Parties Act Committee 
already work on monitoring 
party funding. The 
0 
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recommendation proposes to 
adjust their competences.  
6 vi. to introduce appropriate (flexible) 
sanctions for all infractions of the 
Political Parties Act, in addition to the 
current range of sanctions.  
A low level of misfit. 
A range of sanctions already 
exits. 
0 
 
Source for recommendations: GRECO Evaluation Report on Norway in the Third evaluation round, 19-20. 
2.11.5. Appendix E. State Dependency of Norwegian Parliamentary Parties in 2016 and 20172 
 
Party Income from the 
state, 2017 
(NOK)1 
Share of 
income from 
the state 2017 
(percent) 
Income from 
the state, 2016 
(NOK)1 
Share of 
income from 
the state 
2016 
The Red 2 890 356 24,9 2 850 448 34,3 
Socialist Left 14 606 176 49,7 14 404 512 65,6 
The Greens 11 128 776 49,9 10 986 956 66,9 
The Labour Party 85 922 604 60,2 84 736 296 72 
The Centre Party 18 303 452 41,8 18 050 744 49,7 
The Christian People’s 
Party 
18 596 520 41,7 18 339 764 46,7 
The Liberal Party 17 637 800 52,2 17 394 280 65,8 
The Conservative Party 75 157 012 62,7 74 119 340 64,9 
The Progress Party 47 272 144 86,2 46 619 472 86,8 
1 The category ‘state support’ is used here. Only figures from the central party branch are reported in the table. 
2 2017 was election year in Norway (parliamentary elections).  
Source: www.partifinansiering.no  
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2.11.6. Appendix F. List of Primary Sources, Newspaper Articles and Interviewees used in the 
Process Tracing Analysis 
Primary sources 
Council of Europe. 2003. “Recommendation Rec (2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member 
states on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns”. 
Adopted by the Committee of Ministers, 8. April 2003. Accessed 29.01.2017: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg1/legalcooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/cy%20activity%20interface2
006/rec%202003%20(4)%20pol%20parties%20EN.pdf.  
Dokument 8:17. 1994-1995. “Forslag fra stortingsrepresentant Lars Sponheim om å be Regjeringen 
vurdere innføring av regler som stiller krav til offentliggjøring av de politiske partiers inntekter».  
Dokument nr. 8:10. 2002-2003. “Privat forslag fra stortingsrepresentane Jens Stoltenberg og Hill-Marta 
Solberg. 
Dokument nr. 8:6. 2003-2004. “Privat forslag fra stortingsrepresentant Trond Giske”.  
Fornyings- og administrasjonsdepartementet (FAD). 2010. “Høringsnotat – forslag til endringer I 
partiloven (lov 17.06.2005 nr.102) som følge av Europarådet v/GRECOs rekommandasjoner”. 
(Consultation memorandum, Ministry for Renewal and Public Administration). Oslo. 17.11.2010. 
Accessed 29.01.2017: 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fad/vedlegg/partifinansiering/partiloven_GRECO_n
otat.pdf  
Innst. S. nr.275. 1969-1970. «Innstilling fra administrasjonskomiteen om generell støtte til de politiske 
partiers organisasjoner.» 28.05.1970.  
Innst. S. nr 167. 1994-1995. “Innstilling fra familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra 
stortingsrepresentant Lars Sponheim om å be Regjeringen vurdere innføring av regler som stiller krav 
til offentliggjøring av de politiske partiers inntekter”. 30.05.1995.  
Innst. S. nr. 28. 1997-1998. “Innstilling frå familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen om lov om 
offentliggjøring av politiske partiers inntekter».  
Innst. O. nr 28. 2002-2003. “Innstilling til Odelstinget fra familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiten.  
Innst. O. nr.39. 2003-2004. “Innstilling til Odelstinget fra familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen» 
Innst. O. nr. 129. 2004-2005. “Innstilling til Odelstinget fra familie-, kultur- og 
administrasjonskomiteen.  
Innst. 155L. 2012-2013. «Innstilling fra kommunal- og forvaltningskomiteen om endringer i partiloven“. 
Accessed 27.07.2017: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-
publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Innstillinger/Stortinget/2012-2013/inns-201213-155/ 
NOU 1973: 57. 1973. «Støtte til politiske organisasjoner og formål». Delutredning av 15.november 
1973 fra Hovedkomitteen for reformer i lokalforvaltningen.   
NOU 2004:25. 2004. “Penger teller, men stemmer avgjør. Om partifinansiering, åpenhet og 
partipolitisk fjernsynsreklame». Oslo: Statens forvaltningstjeneste. 
Ot. Prp. nr. 82. 1996-1997. “Om lov om offentliggjøring av politiske partiers inntekter”. Oslo: 
Planleggings- og samordningsdepartementet. 
Ot. Prp. nr. 84. 2004-2005. «Om lov om visse forhold vedrørende de politiske partiene (partiloven). 
Oslo: Moderniseringsdepartementet. 
Partifinansieringutvalget av 1968. 1969. «Innstilling fra Partifinansieringsutvalget av 1968». 
22.07.1969. Accessed 17.07.2017: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-
publikasjoner/Stortingsforhandlinger/Lesevisning/?p=1969-
70&paid=2&wid=a&psid=DIVL1177&pgid=a_1049&vt=a&did=DIVL1185. 
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Plenary debate. 03.12.2002. «Odelstinget. Møte tirsdag den 3. desember 2002, kl 12.45». Accessed 
09.10.2017: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-
publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Odelstinget/2002-2003/021203/5#a2 
Plenary debate. 15.12.2003. «Odelstinget. Møte mandag den 15.desember 2003, kl. 18.40». Accessed 
09.10.2017: https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-
publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Referater/Odelstinget/2003-2004/031215/2#a6 
Prop. 140 L. 2011-2012. “Endringar i partiloven”. Oslo: Det Kongelege fornyings-, administrasjons- og 
kyrkjedepartementet. 
St.meld. nr 19. 1974-1975. «Om offentlig støtte til de politiske partiers kommuneorganisasjoner og 
fylkesorganisasjoner og til gruppene i kommunestyrene og fylkestingene». Oslo: Forbruker- og 
administrasjonsdepartementet. 
Statistics Norway. Finansiering av politiske partier, accessed 29 January 2017 at https://www.ssb.no/  
St.prp. nr. 108. 1969-1970. «Om generell støtte til de politiske partiers organisasjoner». Oslo: Lønns- 
og prisdepartementet  
St. prp. nr 146. 1974-1975. “Offentlig støtte til de politiske partiers kommuneorganisasjoner og 
fylkesorganisasjoner og til gruppene I kommunestyrene og fylkestingene m.m. og om tilleggsbevilgning 
på statsbudsjettet for terminen 1975 under kap. 1525, tilskott til de politiske partier. Oslo: Forbruker 
og administrasjonsdepartementet  
 
Newspaper articles 
Aftenposten 30.06.2000. «Kohl: - Jeg var aldri til salgs» 
Aftenposten, 23.08.2003. «NHO: Vår holdning er prinsipiell».  
Aftenposten Aften, 04.09.2001. «Oslo Høyre skjuler sine sponsorer».  
Bjørnestad, Paal. «Krever politisk sponsor-register». Dagens Næringsliv, 06.10.1994. 
Dagens Næringsliv, 21.09.2002. “Finner det ikke problematisk».  
Dagens Næringsliv, 21.09.2002. «Samler pengegaver – satser på eiendom». 
Dagens Næringsliv, 27.09.2002. «Bekymring i Høyre».  
Elsebutangen, Kjetil. 2000. «Chirac avviser anklager om korrupsjon». NTB, 21.09.2000.  
Halvorsen, Irene. 2003. «Venstre med frontalangrep på LO». NTB, 29.08.2003. 
NTB, 07.08.2003. “Høyre fortsetter med hemmelig partistøtte”.  
NTB 20.08.2003. “Ap innskjerper åpenhet om partistøtte”.  
Spence, Thomas. 2003. “Kritiserer julegaven til Ap”. Aftenposten, 22.12.2003.  
Storvik, Kaia. 2004a. "Høyre håper på LO-effekt". Dagsavisen, 19.10.2004. 
Storvik, Kaia. 2004b. "Høyres rike onkler vil ha åpenhet om gaver". Dagsavisen, 14.10.2004. 
Torvik, Line and Bjåland, Nils. «Strammer grepet om partigaver». VG. 30.09.2002.  
Von Der Fehr, Anne-Lise and Mikalsen, Helge. 2003. “Oppgjør Bondevik”. VG, 29.08.2003. 
Wangberg, Marita and Henmo, Ola. 2002. «Frp får gaver fra anonyme bidragsytere». Aftenposten, 
03.10.2002.  
 
Interviews 
Anonymous, the Labour Party. Interview date: 04.09.2017. 
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Hans Antonsen, the Liberal Party. Interview date: 05.09.2017. 
Jens-Oscar Nergård, Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation. Email-correspondence 
11.01.2018 and 15.01.2018.  
Karin Woldseth, the Progress Party. Interview date: 05.09.2017 
Ola T. Lånke, the Christian People’s Party. Interview date: 13.09.2017 
Ole Willy Sandbekk, Director General in the Ministry of Planning and Coordination in 1997 and Head 
of the group that developed the law proposal that was later passed in parliament during the Sponheim 
reform. Interview date 15.12.2017.  
Per-Kristian Foss, the Conservative Party. Interview date: 12.09.2017. 
Randi Øgrey, the Liberal Party. Interview date: 06.09.2017. 
Tor Henriksen, Political Party Act Committee. Email-correspondence, 18.12.2017. 
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3. Parliamentary Ethics Regulation and Trust in European Democracies83 
 
Abstract 
This article presents a three-dimensional conceptualization of conflict of interest (COI) regulation 
directed towards assuring the impartial and unbiased decision-making of parliamentarians. It 
distinguishes and separately measures (based on a new dataset) COI Strictness, Sanctions and 
Transparency and shows that they indeed constitute empirically separate dimensions of parliamentary 
ethics regimes adopted in European democracies. To illustrate the usefulness of these indices, the 
article then examines the relationship between the three indices and trust in national parliaments 
across 25 democracies. Unlike the Sanction and Transparency Index, the COI Strictness Index 
(composed of strictness of rules and enforcement) has a significant and robust negative association 
with trust, which highlights the importance of disentangling different elements of COI regimes. While 
future research has to explore the causal relationships between COI regulation and trust, capturing 
the complexity of COI regimes in an unbiased fashion and thereby making them comparable across 
European democracies is an essential step towards doing so.  
Keywords 
parliamentary ethics, conflict of interest regulation, rule strictness, enforcement, disclosure, 
transparency, cross-national measurements 
 
3.1. Importance of Parliamentary Ethics Regulation  
Institutional accountability mechanisms in representative democracies ought to ensure that central 
democratic agents such as elected representatives act in line with citizens’ interests. They are essential 
to sustain democratic legitimacy (Olsen 2013). Yet to analyse their consequences requires us to 
conceptualize and measure them (Bovens 2010: 960-1). This paper does so with a focus on a group of 
accountability mechanisms whose usage has expanded considerably over the last years: the regulation 
of conflict of interest (COI) which encompasses the range of formal-legal requirements or restrictions84 
to assure publicly elected officials’ impartial or unbiased decision-making (Allen 2008a: 307-8; Nikolov 
2013: 407; Demmke and Henökl 2007). More concretely, we ask how conflicts of interest that national 
parliamentarians might encounter are regulated in European democracies. How can we systematically 
 
83 This is the authors´ accepted manuscript of the article Nicole Bolleyer and Valeria Smirnova ´Parliamentary 
ethics regulation and trust in European democracies´ published as the version of record in West European 
Politics, 40(6), 1218-1240 [2017] Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group, which can be accessed 
at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1290404. 
84 Our analysis excludes voluntary rules which are not formally enforceable (Sieberer et al 2016: 63).  
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capture differences in COI regulation suitable for large-scale cross-national analysis to assess how they 
matter?  
It is important to evaluate the nature of ethics regimes regulating parliamentarians in their activities 
as public representatives85, as self-regulation  – traditionally the norm in the field of parliamentary 
ethics – is increasingly considered insufficient. Both the autonomy of parliamentarians as individual 
office-holders as well as of parliaments as collective institutions to generate their own solutions to 
conflict of interest problems has generally decreased over the last decades, often in response to 
scandals or other crises (Atkinson and Mancuso 1991: 475; Williams 2006; Allen 2008a). The enhanced 
saliency of parliamentary ethics as regulatory ‘target area’ has become visible through new forms of 
transparency requirements, registers or the establishment of new ‘ethics bureaucracies’ that enforce 
such regulations. These developments not only highlight a growing complexity of parliamentarians’ 
regulatory environments as such. They point to a particular suspicion towards elected office-holders 
who (at least partly) regulate themselves, including sensitive areas such as the setting of their MP 
salaries or defining the rules of access to and usage of expenses, parliamentary grants or funding for 
political parties (e.g. Clark 2017; Demmke and Henökl 2007: 35; see also Allen 2011; Allen and Birch 
2015; Biezen and Kopecký 2008; Casal Bértoa et al 2014).  
COI regulation fundamentally refers to MPs’ exercise of their representative function as it aims at either 
preventing or disclosing those situations in which parliamentarians’ impartial and objective exercise of 
professional duties might be compromised (Messick 2014: 114-115; Nikolov 2013: 412). Consequently, 
unlike earlier cross-national studies focused on the regulation of financial asset disclosure (e.g. Djankov 
et al 2010; Krambia-Kapardis 2013; van Aaken and Voigt 2011), we propose a more encompassing 
concept as suggested in comparative law covering ‘preventing mechanisms’ (e.g. bans) and ‘disclosure 
mechanisms’ (e.g. transparency requirements) (Mattarella 2014: 33-4; Rose-Ackerman 2014: 14), 
thereby capturing the full range of constraints imposed on parliamentarians. More specifically, this 
paper conceptualizes a continuum of constraints as foundation for measuring different components 
of ‘COI regulatory regimes’ (Allen 2008b: 56-7): the strictness of the rules adopted, the presence and 
strength of enforcement structures, sanctions against rule violations and transparency requirements. 
While doing justice to the growing empirical diversity of COI structures (e.g. Demmke et al 2007), 
considering disclosing and preventive mechanisms as alternative means to counter unethical 
behaviour in legislative processes overcomes the methodological problem of functional equivalence, 
a challenge in comparative politics research more broadly (van Deth 1998). It recognizes that making 
positions or behaviour incompatible with public roles pre-empts the need for disclosure. Studying 
 
85 This is distinct from anti-corruption or anti-bribery legislation regulating MPs as self-interested individuals 
who try to gain financial benefits. Giving in to conflicts of interest in legislative decision-making is associated 
with bias but does not necessarily generate private financial gain. 
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disclosure regulation in isolation risks categorizing ‘most different’ regulatory environments jointly as 
‘weakly regulated’ or ‘permissive’, overlooking that disclosure regulation might be weak because 
democracies have adopted little COI regulation or because they heavily rely on bans instead.  
The study of COI regulation is of broader theoretical and empirical significance as it intersects with 
several on-going debates cross-cutting public policy, comparative politics and political theory. 
Conceptualizing and measuring multiple dimensions of COI regulation links important theoretical work 
on different public accountability mechanisms with empirical research on the changing nature and 
growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation (Bovens 2010; Demmke et al 2007; Olsen 2013). 
Importantly, it addresses calls for the development of conceptually sound, wide-ranging, comparative, 
and well-constructed indices of central mechanisms directed towards ensuring the ‘political integrity’ 
of public office-holders (Rose and Heywood 2013: 157; Rose-Ackerman 2014). We deliver such indices 
by systematically integrating – both conceptually and empirically - elements of COI regulation usually 
studied in isolation (Djankov et al. 2010, Krambia-Kapardis 2013, Nikolov 2013; van Aaken and Voigt 
2011), which has been highlighted as problematic by theoretical works, asking for the study of 
combinations of distinct measures (e.g. sanctions, the nature of enforcement structures) central to a 
more nuanced understanding of how accountability arrangements operate (Olsen 2013: 450). 
Furthermore, our analysis contributes to discussions about the consequences of adopting distinct 
types of mechanisms, such as transparency measures’ implications for citizens’ trust (O'Neill 2002), 
how distinct accountability mechanisms compare to each other in this respect (Bovens et al 2014), and  
about the consequences of regulation generally (economic or political) on citizens’ attitudes and 
beliefs (Aghion et al. 2010).  
In the following, we conceptualize and then measure COI regulation drawing on a new dataset covering 
26 European democracies. We show that – in line with our conceptualizations - COI regimes vary along 
three empirical dimensions and discuss the cross-national patterns found. Then, we illustrate the 
usefulness of distinguishing different dimensions of COI regimes by examining how our indices 
associate with trust in national parliaments. Different from COI Sanctions and COI Transparency, our 
COI Strictness Index shows a significant and robust negative association with individual level trust in 
national parliaments. This stresses the importance of disentangling different elements of COI 
regulation when trying to explore how such regulation relates to other variables, be they attitudinal or 
behavioural. We conclude with a discussion how the concept and measures presented can be made 
useful in other areas of comparative research. 
3.2. Conceptualizing Conflict of Interest Regulation 
COI regulation understood as ethics regulation directed against representative bias encompasses legal 
mechanisms directed towards either preventing situations (e.g. through bans and incompatibility 
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rules) or disclosing situations (e.g. through transparency requirements) where public officials’ impartial 
and objective exercise of professional duties might be compromised (Messick 2014: 114-115). This 
distinction between bans/limits and disclosure mechanisms is useful analytically since it allows us to 
systematically map out configurations of mechanisms according to the constraints they impose on the 
office-holders concerned across the core substantive areas of COI regulation (e.g. the receipt of gifts 
or the holding of ancillary posts). Disclosing constraints are less intrusive than preventive mechanisms, 
since MPs are not prevented from engaging in any behaviour. Distinguishing these mechanisms allows 
us to consider the compensatory nature between them, namely that preventive mechanisms that 
restrict politicians in what they can legally do (e.g. through incompatibilities rules or bans) decrease 
the need for disclosure requirements in the area concerned, essential to arrive at unbiased cross-
national measures of COI regulation.  
Three Elements of COI Regimes: COI Strictness, Sanctions, Transparency 
When distinguishing preventive from disclosing COI mechanisms we refer to the constraining nature 
of COI rules. However, the type of rules adopted is only one aspect of the ‘COI regime’ overall, which 
encompasses also the infrastructure or instruments created or available for rule implementation (Allen 
2008b: 56-7). We therefore distinguish three basic elements of the COI regime reflecting distinct ways 
of constraining the behaviour of the office-holder they apply to: ‘COI Strictness’ captures aspects in 
the regime that increase the likelihood that formal COI violations are officially detected and notified 
(the strictness of rules and the nature of enforcement); ‘COI Sanctions’ captures the costs imposed on 
parliamentarians when COI violations are detected and ‘COI Transparency’ captures the conditions for 
third party control. Figure 3.1 displays the analytical relationships of these three elements to the basic 
concept of ‘COI regime’ and to the analytical distinction between preventive and disclosing 
mechanisms used to characterize the constraints inherent in each of the elements. 
Among the three elements, COI Strictness is theoretically most central. The presence and strictness of 
rules determines the overall scope of incentives directly structuring the behavior of MPs as 
representatives and lawmakers. Strictness logically constitutes a necessary condition for both 
transparency measures and sanctions. Information about parliamentarians can only be made public, if 
it had to be officially reported in the first place. Only if we find COI rules, sanctions can be in place to 
punish their violation. Finally, rule specificity and the strength of enforcement affect how meaningful 
and effective both sanctions and transparency measures can be. Rules define which information ought 
to be made transparent, while separate enforcement structures create an important foundation for 
sanction mechanisms to be applied. 
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Figure 3.1. Core elements underpinning COI regimes 
 
     
 
 
 
   
Moving to the specification of each element and starting with COI strictness, from the perspective of 
parliamentarians, the presence and (if adopted) nature of COI rules can be conceptualized as 
constraints that make it more likely that officially recognized rule violations are detected. By definition, 
if conflicts of interest remain unregulated, parliamentarians cannot violate any rules. Vice versa, the 
higher the number of areas in which COI rules are adopted (e.g. regulation of gifts, accessory posts, 
assets), the stricter and more clear-cut and less ambiguous these rules are (e.g. through the complete 
ban of certain behaviours), the more likely rule violations become. If, in addition, any observable 
violations are investigated and confirmed by an actor formally in charge of doing so (Allen 2011: 213; 
Rosenthal 2006: 158; see also Gay 2006), the officially recognised violation of COI regulation as a form 
of misconduct is most likely. Consequently, conceptually, we need to consider rule strictness and 
enforcement in conjunction with each other.  
A strong enforcement structure for the implementation of regulation is usually associated with the 
capacity to sanction rule violations (e.g. Nassmacher 2003; O’Halloran 2011; Mattarella 2014). Yet 
there are two reasons to treat the ‘range of sanctions underpinning COI rules’ as a separate element 
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of the COI regime. First, conceptually speaking, COI strictness and COI sanctions impose different types 
of constraints on the public office-holders whose behaviour they aim at influencing. While strict rules 
combined with strong enforcement structures make it less likely that parliamentarians can hope for 
violations not to be officially detected, sanctions shape the relative costs of rule violations once they 
are detected. Second, empirically speaking, the assumed link between COI sanctions and enforcement 
structures is only partial: not all sanctions attached to violations of COI regulations are attached to or 
controlled by enforcement structures established for dealing with COI issue. In fact, we might have a 
COI regime that does not contain any enforcement structures in charge of COI regulation. Still, a 
considerable range of COI violations could be answered by criminal sanctions controlled by courts. 
Focusing on sanctions as controlled by enforcement structures in charge of COI monitoring (rather than 
on the full range of sanctions underpinning COI rules) would lead to misleading comparative 
evaluations of COI regimes’ properties. 
Public transparency requirements (rather than mere intra-institutional disclosure) assuring easy public 
access to a wide range of information about parliamentarians (usually via online release) can provide 
the basis for ‘third party control’ by the media, interested organizations or individual citizens (Djankov 
et al 2010). They are sometimes considered as a possible substitute for a strong institutional 
enforcement structure or as a complement to the latter (Nassmacher 2003: 10-12). However, for 
conceptual reasons, we treat transparency measures separate from COI strictness (of which 
enforcement forms a part). The mere release of information on MPs’ activities to the public might 
allow for third party control but does not necessarily contribute to the capacity of the COI regime to 
detect officially recognized non-compliance with COI rules, the theoretical underpinning of COI 
strictness.  Problematic practices might be occasionally picked up by the media and thereby generate 
reputational costs for the individual MP concerned (Krambia-Karpadis 2013: 46). However, 
accountability deficits can occur if the actors who are institutionally in charge to call others to accounts 
which might lack motivation, time and energy, knowledge or capabilities, a challenge particularly 
pronounced in the case of transparency measures where citizens play this role (Olsen 2013: 545; 556). 
Furthermore, ‘control activity’ of third parties or the media is bound to be much more time contingent 
(depending on the saliency of the issue area regulated), and thus not equivalent to the ongoing 
monitoring of rule compliance by a public body in charge of detecting formal misconduct (Allen 2011: 
213). 
3.3. Constructing Indices of COI Regulation 
To examine whether our three-dimensional conceptualization of COI regimes matches regulatory 
patterns across European democracies (i.e. whether they can indeed be systematized along three 
empirical dimensions) we compiled a new dataset. We coded COI regulation (covering both preventing 
79 
 
and disclosing mechanisms) based on the evaluation reports from the 4thGRECO round on “Corruption 
prevention in respect of members of Parliament, judges and prosecutors”, which provided the most 
encompassing and standardized information on COI regimes adopted in a wide range of EU 
democracies (see 3.9.1. Appendix A for details on alternative sources and the coding process). Among 
those democracies evaluated by GRECO86, we restricted our sample to fully consolidated European 
countries to assure basic unit homogeneity in terms of democratization, the centrality of parliamentary 
institutions, rule of law and of the basic administrative capacity to implement the studied regulation. 
This left us with a sample of 26 countries. 
3.4. Three Elements of COI Regimes – Three Empirical Dimensions?  
In a first step, we constructed four basic components that we expect to underpin three dimensions 
COI strictness (composed of rule strictness and enforcement), COI sanctions and COI transparency. For 
each, we made use of rankings and a linear aggregation method. This choice is important as we are 
interested in capturing the constraints inherent in the COI regime across several dimensions with 
various predictors on an ordinal scale. As most composite indicators (OECD 2008: 31) all our indices 
are constructed on the basis of equal weights, in line with our analytical set-up emphasizing equal 
importance of COI indicators capturing different constraints inherent in COI regimes (see Figure 3.1 
above). The final scores for each index are standardized from zero to one. 
To operationalize our analytical framework, we assess rule strictness by capturing the type of legal 
mechanism employed and rank the respective regulatory configurations according to the constraints 
they imply across 11 core areas of COI regulation. In line with earlier studies, those areas are: public 
and private accessory activities, assets, contracts with state authorities, employment offers (or cooling 
off regulations), income, liabilities, third party contacts, gifts, use of confidential information, handling 
of conflicts of interest in legislative decision-making87 (see Djankov 2010; Nikolov 2013; Mattarella 
2014). The distinction between preventive and disclosure mechanisms allows us to identify five rule 
configurations with regard to each of the areas that range from the absence of constraints to complete 
prohibition, which we assign scores from “zero” to “four” respectively (see Table 3.1). This coding 
approach assures an unbiased categorization of the legal mechanisms used across COI regimes in terms 
of constraints they impose on MPs and avoids counting requirements to disclose information as 
equally constraining as rules that prohibit or restrict actual behavior. The scores for each of the 11 
 
86 GRECO stands for the Group of States Against Corruption, an international forum which is part of the Council 
of Europe. GRECO was established in 1999 to monitor member countries’ compliance with the organisation’s 
anti-corruption standards. 
87 This contains two categories of regulation: those that obligate MPs to declare regarding individual decisions 
that they are affected by a conflict of interest or provisions that require MPs to excuse themselves. 
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substantive areas of COI regulation are standardized from 0 to 1 and averaged to an overall country 
score capturing the COI regime’s rule strictness. 88 
Table 3.1. Combinations of Legal Mechanisms and Rule Strictness Scores89 
Prevention on COI No rules No rules Restrictions Restrictions Total ban 
Disclosure of COI No rules Disclosure No rules Disclosure - 
Overall COI  
strictness score 
0 1 2 3 4 
Note: The darker the coloring, the higher the level of constraint in the combination of mechanisms.  
To capture the constraints inherent in the enforcement structures we assess whether we find 
monitoring bodies or units to underpin preventive rules and disclosure rules respectively. If present, 
we assess the nature of these bodies (or body – some countries use the same body for both types of 
COI rules, others use separate ones) using two criteria, reflecting our theoretical discussion of 
properties that make it more likely that such a body actively fulfills its monitoring function in terms of 
motivation and capacity. Regarding the motivation to monitor, we consider whether enforcement 
bodies are independent from parliament and not affiliated with any political party (Clark 2017; 
Nassmacher 2003: 13).90 For instance, in France we find an independent body responsible for 
implementing disclosing rules: the Supreme Authority for the Transparency of Public Life91, while 
preventive mechanisms are monitored by the National Assembly´s Commissioner for Ethical 
Standards, which is a part of the French parliament, thus, does not qualify as independent. Finland 
lacks any specific monitoring structures to implement disclosure rules, but speaker and committee 
chairs in parliament are responsible for monitoring compliance with preventive mechanisms, which 
again does not qualify as independent. Additionally, we account for a body’s monitoring capacity which 
is considered as broad if the body can examine the correctness of information provided by 
parliamentarians in relation to their compliance with preventive or disclosing COI rules. If that is not 
the case we consider its monitoring capacity as narrow.92 Countries are ranked from all-permissive 
regimes with no specific body for COI enforcement in place for either preventive or disclosing rules to 
 
88 The distribution of the rule strictness scores reflecting the combinations of legal mechanisms country by 
country is provided in the appendix. 
89 See the appendix for an illustration of this logic with the example of the regulation of gifts.  
90 See the appendix for an overview of the scores capturing enforcement in our sample. 
91 The Supreme Authority for the Transparency of Public Life is coded as an independent body as it consists of 
six appointees from the high courts of the state (Conseil d’État, Court of Cassation and Court of Audit), two 
parliamentary appointees and one appointee of the President of the French Republic. 
92 We assign a score “zero” on one end of the spectrum to the all-permissive regimes and a score “eight” to the 
most constraining ones. A regime without an enforcement structure for preventive COI rules but an 
independent watchdog with broad monitoring powers for disclosing rules takes an intermediate position with a 
score of “four”. 
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most constraining enforcement regimes with independent watchdogs with broad monitoring capacity 
for both types of rules.93 The final scores are standardized from zero to one. 
Both rule strictness and strength of enforcement contribute to the likelihood that formal COI rule 
violations are officially detected and notified, and hence belong together. Also, empirically, the 
Spearman test confirms that the two measures highly and significantly correlate with each other 
(N=26, ρ= 0.73, p<.01). The coefficient is positive and very high, thus the introduction of stricter COI 
rules is positively associated with the creation of stronger enforcement structures. Therefore, an index 
of COI Strictness should encompass both components. Figure 3.2 depicts a monotonic relationship, 
which underpins our conceptually driven decision to combine information on rule strictness and 
enforcement into one COI Strictness Index empirically.94  
Figure 3.2 also points to interesting cross-national variation, most notably that COI strictness tends to 
be lower in old democracies than in new ones. While we find a number of old democracies that have 
adopted constraining COI regimes (Ireland, Belgium and France), most old democracies show below-
average scores such as the Scandinavian countries. While we will return to this when discussing COI 
regimes as a means to reestablish trust in parliaments (trust that is notably lower in new democracies), 
it is noteworthy that we find similar patterns in other areas unrelated to parliamentary ethics such as 
party finance regulation (Casal Bértoa et al 2014: 359; 374-75) or party-specific regulations in 
constitutions (van Biezen 2012: 201). This enhances confidence in our measures but also echoes 
classical arguments associating democracies with national regulatory styles that cross-cut distinct 
areas of regulation (Epstein 1986; Jepperson and Meyer 1991). 
Following Casal Bértoa et al. (2014), we develop an ordinal scale for measuring the range of sanctions. 
This measure captures whether the violation of preventing and of disclosing rules in a given COI regime 
can be punished by criminal sanctions, by administrative sanctions or both. Criminal sanctions are 
treated as more constraining than non-criminal ones.95 Figure 3.3 shows considerable cross-country 
variation. Of 16 democracies with a sanction score above 0.5, only four are old democracies, with 
France and Belgium having maximum scores, echoing the earlier picture that new democracies have 
more constraining regulation. 
 
93 In comparison to the measurement of COI regime’s rule strictness, we capture the constraints inherent in COI 
enforcement structure overall (i.e. we do not weigh enforcement of preventive rules more heavily than 
enforcement of disclosing rules) to assess whether any given rules are underpinning by enforcement structures 
and if so by which type. 
94 It may seem that combining rule strictness and enforcement without weighing can lead to the unwanted 
weighting of the components constituting these two parameters (OECD 2008: 31). Yet we avoid this problem as 
we systematically transfer our ratings assigned to these components into the proportions of constraints in the 
regulation.  
See 3.9.6. Appendix F for the distribution of the COI Strictness Index in the sample. 
95 See further details on the rank assignment in 3.9.7. Appendix G. 
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 Figure 3.2. Relationship between COI rule strictness and enforcement 
 
Figure 3.3. Sanction scores underpinning COI regimes 
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Our transparency index captures the possibility for third party control and differentiates between 
modes of access to information related to COI rule implementation. We use three criteria to assess 
conditions for third party access to information as related to the compliance with or violation of 
preventive and disclosure COI rules. We consider whether information is disclosed publicly (whether 
no public access is possible, information is provided on request, or there is a free access via printed or 
online mass media); the scope (or completeness) of information that is made publicly available 
(whether the institutions that release information to the public present all or only part of the 
information they receive about the parliamentarian); and finally whether information about rule 
violations by MPs is released or not, a form of ‘shaming through transparency’.96 Figure 3.4 shows the 
variation in our sample.97 Compared to the other two indices, transparency scores are more diverse, 
highlighting the importance to keep the three aspects separate. Indeed, old democracies being located 
at both ends of the spectrum: the UK and Bulgaria have adopted the most extensive, compulsory COI 
transparency measures with Denmark having no compulsory transparency measures at all. 
Figure 3.4. Transparency requirements underpinning COI regimes 
 
 
96 A COI regime has a transparency rank of “eleven” if all the transparency options are coded as present, which 
indicates the maximum possible level of transparency with regard to both preventive and disclosure rules and a 
“zero” if none are present. Rank “five” is assigned to regimes that, for instance, have transparency 
requirements in relation to both preventive and disclosing rules, yet in either case the scope of the information 
published is limited, while no information on rule violations is released. Note this is only one possible 
institutional constellation that might receive a rank “five”. 
97 We construct an additive index of overall constraints implied by transparency requirements as linked to 
preventing and disclosing rules. We do not prioritize preventive rules over the disclosing rules in this case as 
there are no theoretical reasons or empirical indication that information release on non-compliance with one 
type of rule is perceived as more or less problematic by those regulated or by the public. Note that, as with the 
measure of rule strictness, the indicators are interdependent (e.g. if no public information release is required, 
the scope of such release is of no relevance). We consider the whole theoretically possible range of variation 
and also assure equal distances between the different levels of the index. 
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So how are our sanction and transparency indices related to each other and to our strictness index? 
Again, in line with our theoretical expectations both the COI Sanction Index and the Transparency Index 
correlate with our COI Strictness Index by far less strongly (ρ= 0.54, p<.01 and ρ= 0.54, p<.01 
respectively) than rule strictness and enforcement (see above). Our conceptual discussion has already 
pointed out that our three indices share some common variability. This is confirmed empirically: as 
correlations show COI strictness is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for adopting transparency 
requirements or sanctions. Simultaneously, the Spearman test between the COI Sanction Index and 
the COI Transparency Index is not significant indicating independence of these two indices from each 
other (ρ=0.21, p>.29). This stresses the different rationales underpinning countries’ adoption of 
sanctions and transparency requirements respectively and thus the need to treat COI Sanction Index 
and COI Transparency Index separately in empirical analyses. The empirical variability of combinations 
of different COI dimensions is illustrated by cases that prioritize individual dimensions such as in the 
case of the UK which has (with Bulgaria) the highest score on transparency but comparatively low 
scores on the two indices, particularly sanctions. Last but not least, the Cronbach´s α for the three 
indices put together constitutes only 0.64 signifying a lack of coherence between the indices when 
they are pulled together and treated equally, and thus supports our theoretical expectations.  
3.5. Why to Distinguish Different Elements of COI Regimes? COI Regulation and Trust in National 
Parliaments – An Empirical Illustration 
Among policy-makers ethics regulation applied to parliamentarians is often discussed as a potential 
remedy against citizens’ growing alienation and distrust in parliamentary institutions (OECD 2005: 16-
18; NDI 1999: 3-4). Figure 3.5 shows that the high mean trust levels in national parliament in a 
democracy98 is associated with a low COI Strictness Index (Pearson´s r=-0.76, p<0.01, n=25).  Countries 
such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg and Malta are particularly high on trust and low on 
COI Strictness, while Slovenia, Bulgaria and Lithuania show opposite patterns, with countries such as 
Germany, UK and Spain located in the middle. 
A number of scholars have been critical of the idea, widespread among practitioners, that stricter 
regulatory constraints could re-establish trust in those public officials no longer considered 
trustworthy. While we do not aim to test the nature of the relationship between COI regulation and 
trust as such, these arguments provide a theoretical rationale for engaging in an examination which 
aims at empirically demonstrating the usefulness of distinguishing different elements of the COI regime 
as proposed in our analytical framework. 
 
98 See for details on the trust data the next section and in the Appendix. Note Norway could not be included as 
the country was not covered in the Eurobarometer data used. 
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So what are the arguments in favour of a negative relationship between COI regulation and trust? For 
once, to make parliamentarians subject to a strict COI regime might convince citizens that 
parliamentarians won’t get away with unethical behaviour as easily. Yet if “calling someone 
trustworthy means that the person can be trusted with a wide variety of unspecified activities” (van 
Aaken and Voigt 2011: 307, italics added to original), the presence of effective controls is different 
from making parliamentarians more trustworthy. Instead COI rule might ‘institutionalize distrust’ and 
make ‘blind trust’ less necessary as the law coerces MPs to behave ethically instead of relying on 
internalized norms of behaviour (van Aaken and Voigt 2011: 307), as “where we have guarantees or 
proofs, we don't need to trust. Trust is redundant” (O’Neil 2002a). 
Figure 3.5. Trust in national parliament and COI strictness 
  
This points to two possible side-effects of stricter COI regulation: first, expanding citizens’ information 
on parliamentarians’ unethical behaviour is more likely to decrease trust in parliamentarians or 
parliament as institution, and stricter COI regulation does just that (Wilcox 2001: 10; see also Rosenthal 
2006: 175; Ginsberg and Shefter 1994: 7; Loewenstein et al 2011), a potential dynamic that is amply 
highlighted in debates on the consequences of transparency measures in public life generally (O’Neil 
2002b). COI regulation - as ethics regimes generally are - is preventive. It aims at creating norms 
through which ‘proper conduct can become second nature’ (NDI 1999: 3). Thus, strict COI regulation 
is likely to foster trust only once parliamentarians comply and no rule violations occur. If – at least 
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initially - tougher regulation sheds light on more rule violations (intentional as well as unintentional 
ones) rather than preventing them, to have proof about wide-spread unethical behaviour might make 
matters worse than distrust predominantly fostered by rumours and suspicions or revelation about 
individual cases (van Aaken and Voigt 2011: 307). Consequently, intense monitoring can weaken or 
undermine trust (Olsen 2013: 454). Second, COI regulation itself might – unintentionally – raise 
citizens’ expectations about what behaviour is acceptable and what is not, as ethics rules ought to be 
increasingly detailed to minimize misunderstandings (NDI 1999: 6). Specifying the formerly rather 
blurred boundary between what is acceptable and what not, COI regulation itself can become a 
catalyst enhancing public concerns about ethics (Rosenthal 2006: 175) and thereby raise the bar of 
what ethics regulation ought to achieve (Saint-Martin 2008: 48). 
3.6. Data and Operationalization of Variables 
To explore the relationship between our COI indices and trust, we make use of Eurobarometer 81.4 
(2014) which measures trust in national parliaments, covering 25 of 26 countries in our sample.99 Trust 
is measured with the question whether a respondent tends to trust (1) or tends not to trust (0) national 
parliament. In all countries the survey was conducted after all elements of the COI regime captured by 
our indices were already in place. We include a range of individual control variables, in line with earlier 
studies on trust in national parliaments and public institutions more generally (e.g. Catterberg and 
Moreno 2005: 42; van der Meer 2010; van Aaken and Voigt 2011: 312-13; Zwerli and Newton 2011; 
Torcal 2014). Zwerli and Newton (2011: 73) argue that citizens trust political institutions more if they 
consider themselves as winners, socially or politically. We therefore control for individuals’ perceived 
self-placement in society capturing their perceived status in society (and the political regime broadly 
conceived). The same goes for life satisfaction and for older and married respondents. In contrast, 
personal economic stability and perceived personal security should show a negative relationship. The 
former is measured as difficulties in paying bills ranging from frequent to seldom, the latter by 
expectations regarding one’s personal employment situation, and as feeling safe in one’s 
neighborhood. Psychological approaches, in turn, stress the role of personal interests – in our case in 
politics (Catterberg and Moreno 2005: 42). As our dependent variable is linked to the national level 
(individual trust in national parliament), we use an item capturing the self-perceived frequency of 
discussions regarding national political matters (ranging from low to high). Importantly, we control for 
trust in political parties which can be expected to ‘colour’ perceptions of trust in national political 
institutions composed of party politicians and control for the years of democratic development. The 
longer a democracy is established the more likely citizens have experienced changes in political 
leadership and been on the ‘winning side’. Furthermore, experiencing government alternation, citizens 
 
99 We lost Norway because Eurobarometer (EB) does not include information on it.  
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can be expected to gain trust in central democratic institutions such as parliament. Both rationales 
suggest a positive correlation. Finally, we coded a new macro variable ‘political instability’ which we 
expect to affect trust in parliament negatively. This dummy variable captures whether a country 
suffered from a destabilizing political event in the legislative term in which trust in parliament (our 
dependent variable) was measured or in the term prior or not (For more details on data and 
measurements see 3.9.8. Appendix H).  
3.7. Model Choice and Empirical Findings 
The analysis of the interclass correlation suggests we observe approximately a quarter of the variance 
in our dependent variable on the macro level as compared to the micro level (ICC = 0.24). We therefore 
fit a set of multilevel logistic regression models with a random intercept, as the Eurobarometer data 
measures trust to parliament in a binary fashion. Table 3.2 presents our results.100 Model 1 contains 
only control variables. Model 2 tests all the three indices against each other. Model 3 and 4 
demonstrate effects of macro-level controls in relation to our COI Strictness Index (the only index 
significant in Model 2).101 Model 5 shows the effect of the COI Strictness Index separately.    
Table 3.2 shows that our COI Strictness Index shows robust and significant effects (Models 2-5)102. 
Hence, the more constraints the COI regime imposes in terms of rule strictness and enforcement 
(covering both preventive and disclosing rules), the lower the log-odds, and hence the lower the 
probability that citizens tend to trust national parliament, holding all other parameters constant. Our 
COI Transparency Index has a negative association to trust. The COI Sanction Index correlates with 
trust positively. While neither of the latter two indices shows robust significant results (see Model 2), 
the COI Transparency Index outperforms the COI Sanction Index when treated alone.103 Thus, COI 
Sanctions have the least impact when comparing the three COI dimensions.  
These findings hold despite our control variables having the theoretically expected significant effects. 
The measure of years of democracy is positively associated with trust in national parliament but only 
significant as long as we don’t include our COI Strictness Index (Model 4). This might reflect a tendency 
in new democracies to impose stricter and more extensive COI regimes in comparison to the old 
democracies (Figure 3.2), which is in line with previous findings (Biezen and Kopecký 2008; Biezen 
2012; Casal Bértoa et al. 2014).  A higher self-placement in society, overall life satisfaction, better 
employment expectations, higher personal economic stability, a safe neighborhood, and marriage  
 
100 Note that tests for multicollinearity of the presented models do not reveal any problems.  
101 We are aware that 25 countries can be a critical sample size for a multi-level design. Note that the results of 
logistic regression with clustered standard errors are the same. 
102 3.9.9. Appendix I provides details on additional robustness checks and tests regarding endogeneity and 
reverse causation. 
103 For additional specifications see 3.9.9. Appendix I.  
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Table 3.2. Multilevel Logistic Regressions with Random Intercept on Trust in National Parliaments 
DV: Trust in parliament (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Controls      
Age 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Family status: married 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Life satisfaction 0.484*** 0.488*** 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.487*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Political knowledge 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Personal economic stability 0.166*** 
(0.037) 
0.166*** 
(0.037) 
0.165*** 
(0.037) 
0.166*** 
(0.037) 
0.166*** 
(0.037) 
Employment expectations 0.505*** 
(0.029) 
0.505*** 
(0.029) 
0.504*** 
(0.029) 
0.505*** 
(0.029) 
0.505*** 
(0.029) 
Safe neighborhood 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Self-placement in the society 0.166*** 
(0.033) 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
0.166*** 
(0.033) 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
Trust in parties 2.943*** 2.942*** 2.943*** 2.942*** 2.942*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Years of democracy 0.021***   0.006  
 (0.006)   (0.007)  
Political instability -0.694**  -0.470*   
 (0.245)  (0.232)   
IVs      
COI Strictness Index  -2.375*** -2.165*** -1.990** -2.354*** 
  (0.708) (0.497) (0.686) (0.527) 
COI Sanction Index   0.291    
  (0.512)    
COI Transparency Index  -0. 342 
(0.608) 
   
BIC 16746.5 16756.0 16743.1 16746.2 16736.9 
Chi2 3988.4 3989.5 3994.3 3988.9 3988.2 
Log Likelihood -8308.6 -8308.3 -8306.9 -8308.4 -8308.8 
Individual observations 20940 20940 20940 20940 20940 
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 
 
Log-odds; constants are not shown; standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
status taken as indicators associated with the “winner status” of citizens are positively associated with 
a probability to trust in national parliament (Dunn 2012; Zmerli and Newton 2011). High levels of 
political knowledge also significantly increase the log-odds of tending to trust national parliament. A 
very important predictor of trust in parliament is trust in political parties as adding this control 
significantly improves the fit of the model (BIC falls by more than 20 percent). That said, having this 
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variable excluded does not affect the performance of our indices (see appendix). Finally, our findings 
hold when entering our political instability dummy (Model 3), despite the latter – as theoretically 
expected - showing a significant and robust negative effect on tendencies to trust in parliament. 
Most importantly, we find a robust negative association regarding our COI Strictness index but not our 
other two indices, rather than finding similar relationships between trust and all three. This 
demonstrates the usefulness of our conceptual distinction between different types of COI constraints 
underpinning the separation of the indices. This is further substantiated as the nature of the 
constraints that our Strictness Index (composed of rule strictness and enforcement) reflects the 
theoretical mechanisms highlighted in the literature as rationalizing an expectation of a negative 
relationship between COI constraints and trust in the first place (see above): first, the tendency of 
tougher regulation to initially reveal more rule violations rather than preventing them, producing 
systematic evidence confirming citizens’ suspicions about parliamentarians’ unethical behaviour (e.g. 
Wilcox 2001; Rosenthal 2006); second, specifying the formerly blurred boundary between what is 
acceptable and what not or by problematizing behaviour that otherwise would have been accepted 
without question (e.g. Saint-Martin 2008).  
Returning to our conceptualizations of our three elements of COI regimes, the COI Strictness Index 
captures clear-cut and constraining ethics rules which make formal rule violations more likely and thus 
might unintentionally raise citizens’ expectations towards parliamentarians’ behaviour. Similarly, 
strong enforcement structures as the second index component systematically increase chances of 
official detection. In contrast, transparency requirements might – when media attention is high – lead 
to occasional public outcries but third-party control is not equivalent to a specialized enforcement 
structure engaged in on-going systematic monitoring of rule compliance. This finding echoes 
theoretical works on transparency measures and their implications for public accountability as well as 
trust that are sceptical about these measures’ effectiveness (Olsen 2013; O’Neil 2002). Furthermore, 
the detection of violations is likely to have more weight if confirmed as ‘official misconduct’ by a public 
authority (Allen 2011). Similarly, the relative severity and range of sanctions is unlikely to be as relevant 
to citizens, as compared to the official notification that MPs violate binding rules, as captured by our 
COI Strictness Index. These parallels between conceptual distinctions and the nature of our empirical 
findings stress the fruitfulness of conceptualizing and measuring different elements of COI regimes 
when engaging in cross-national analyses. 
3.8. Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research 
Over the last decade, the diversity of conflict of interest (COI) regulation applicable to national 
parliamentarians (as well as other public officials) has grown significantly in many democracies. 
Defined as the range of formal-legal restrictions to assure parliamentarians’ impartial or unbiased 
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decision-making when exercising their representative function (Nikolov 2013: 407), COI regulation 
embraces a wide range of diverse mechanisms which we capture across 11 substantive areas. These 
not only include (increasingly prominent) requirements for asset disclosure but also preventive rules 
able to impose constraints on parliamentarians’ behaviour, both while being in office (e.g. restrictions 
on the receipts of gifts) and afterwards (e.g. cooling off requirements). This growing diversity creates 
a major challenge for cross-national research: the development of measures capturing the different 
elements of increasingly complex ethics regimes in an unbiased fashion, able to ‘travel’ across 
European democracies.  
To tackle this challenge, this paper distinguished three conceptual dimensions of COI regimes applied 
to national parliamentarians as public representatives and developed measures to capture them 
empirically: COI strictness, sanctions and transparency. Based on a new dataset we showed that these 
indeed constitute empirically separate dimensions across the 26 democracies studied. To illustrate the 
usefulness of our analytical distinctions we then examined the relationship between the three COI 
indices and trust in national parliaments. Controlling for a range of individual-level and systemic factors 
theorized as relevant for trust in public institutions, our COI Strictness Index (combining rule strictness 
and enforcement structures) shows a significant and robust negative relationship with trust, while our 
COI Sanction and Transparency Indices do not, stressing the particular importance of COI Strictness, 
which mirrors theoretical arguments pointing to this element’s centrality. This  analysis on the 
relationship between COI regulation and trust highlights the fruitfulness of distinguishing these 
particular elements of parliamentary COI regimes in separate measures as compared to quantifying 
the intensity of regulation overall, a common strategy employed in  analyses of the regulation of 
political parties (e.g. Whitley 2011; 2014; but see van Biezen 2012; Casal Bértoa et al. 2014). To pin 
down causal relationships between regulation and trust (or alternative attitudinal or behavioural 
variables), future research needs to assess the over-time evolution of ethics regimes across a wider 
range of democracies as a subset of parliamentary rules, whose comparative, longitudinal study has 
made significant advances in recent years (Sieberer et al. 2011; 2016).  
Importantly, while our framework captures the central components of ethics regimes regulating 
parliamentarians as representatives, it provides a sound foundation to engage in comparative analyses 
of regulation of their behaviour as party politicians and self-interested individuals as well. For instance, 
our conceptual distinctions can be used as a template to develop measures to study party finance 
regulation. While drawing on the party finance literature (e.g. Nassmacher 2003) to develop our 
framework, only few large-N studies have measured qualitatively different elements of party finance 
regimes separately (e.g. Casal Bértoa et al. 2014). Similarly, comparative studies of regulation trying to 
prevent the partisan use of institutional resources by MPs or of the enforcement of funding regulations 
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more generally have received little attention so far (Bolleyer and Gauja 2015: 322; Clark 2017). Finally, 
a narrower yet highly sensitive area of regulation is the one of MP expenses aiming at preventing 
parliamentarians to exploit institutional resources for their own financial gain (Allen and Birch 2015). 
While none of these areas of regulation targets MP legislative decision-making as COI regulation does, 
they often are equally contentious as also here those subject to the rules are usually involved in their 
making.   
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3.9. Appendix 
3.9.1. Appendix A. Justification of the Data Source on COI Regulation and Details of the Coding 
Procedure 
The EU Anti-Corruption Reports of the European Commission would have been an alternative104 to the 
GRECO reports used in this study to code regulation application to national parliamentarians.105 
However, the GRECO reports (in contrast to the Anti-Corruption Reports) use the same structure across 
the whole sample of countries (reflecting a standardized questionnaire) which, in turn, supported a 
coherent coding process. Equally important, given the purpose of GRECO to generate detailed country 
reviews and to critically evaluate regulation in place across all substantive areas possibly affected by 
conflict of interest problems, the information provided mirrored all core elements of the COI regime 
captured by our analytical framework.  
Each GRECO country report has been double-coded by a pair of coders based on two standardized 
codebooks: one focusing on COI prevention mechanisms, another capturing COI disclosure 
mechanisms. Using predefined categories identifying the mechanisms in place across the substantive 
areas of COI regulation assure high levels of replicability of the coding process since, for each variable, 
each coder essentially confirms the presence or absence of mechanisms. This approach helped to 
assure a high level of consistency between coders. The Kappa value as calculated for 25 per cent of the 
data constitutes 0.89 reflecting an almost perfect agreement between the two coders.  
  
 
104EU Anti-Corruption Reports of the European Commission are available at URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm 
Evaluation reports from the 4th GRECO round on “Corruption prevention in respect of members of Parliament, 
judges and prosecutors” are available at URL: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/GRECO/evaluations/round4/ReportsRound4_en.asp  
105 Even though the ethics regulation adopted for first and second houses of parliament (or national and 
regional chambers) can differ, we focus on the regulation of members of the first house of parliament as the 
central legislative decision-making body in a democracy which is bound to attract most attention and be 
subject of most concern. 
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3.9.2. Appendix B. The Distribution of the Rule Strictness Scores Across the Sample 
 
The numbers on the x-axis correspond the following codes:  
0 – No Regulation,   
1 – Only Disclosure,  
2 – Only Prevention (Restriction),  
3 – A Mix of Prevention and Disclosure,  
4 – Only Prevention (Ban)  
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3.9.3. Appendix C. The Logic Underpinning the COI Strictness Index on the Example of the 
Regulation of Gifts 
Score “zero” indicates the absence of constraints (neither preventive nor disclosure mechanisms are 
in place), meaning all gifts to MPs are allowed and there is no need for declaration. Score “one” 
indicates a relatively more constraining regime that requires disclosure but again does not prohibit the 
receiving of gifts. This configuration is followed – in terms of constraints - by two configurations that 
combine preventive and disclosing elements – a partial prevention of gifts (i.e. above a certain size 
gifts are banned) without the permitted gifts being declared (assigned a “two”), followed by a partial 
prevention of gifts where all permitted gifts need to be declared (assigned a “three”). Finally, we can 
think of regimes that regulate this area through a purely preventive strategy by banning all gifts which 
is assigned score “four” indicating the highest level of constraint.  
Figure C1: Countries’ rule strictness scores for regulation of gifts  
 
We use the same five regulatory configurations to assure consistency in the assignment of scores all 
11 substantive areas of COI regulation coded (public and private accessory activities, assets, contracts 
with state authorities, employment offers (or cooling off regulations), income, liabilities, third party 
contacts, use of confidential information, handling of conflicts of interest in legislative decision-
making) to be able to aggregate them in one coherent index. 
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3.9.4. Appendix D. Rules Strictness Scores by Country  
 
3.9.5. Appendix E. Strength of Enforcements Structures by Country 
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3.9.6. Appendix F. COI Strictness Scores by Country (composed of rule strictness and 
enforcement) 
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3.9.7. Appendix G. Additional Information on Construction of the COI Sanction Index  
We use the following coding categories: a country gets the lowest sanctions score (“zero”) if it does 
not have any sanctions for either violations of preventive or disclosing mechanisms. It is followed by 
regimes that have non-criminal sanctions for both types of rules, which is followed by those that add 
criminal sanctions either to back up preventive or disclosing rules. The highest score means the regime 
has criminal and administrative sanctions to address both the violation of preventive and of disclosing 
rules respectively (“eight”).  Finally, the index is standardized from zero to one. 
Syntax on Computation of the COI Sanction Index with Stata 
gen sanc=. 
replace sanc=0 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==0  
replace sanc=1 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==0  
replace sanc=1 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==1  
replace sanc=2 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==1  
replace sanc=3 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==0 
replace sanc=3 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==0 
replace sanc=4 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==0 
replace sanc=4 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==0 
replace sanc=4 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==1  
replace sanc=4 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==1  
replace sanc=5 if ci_cr_sanc==0 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==1 
replace sanc=5 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==0  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==1 
replace sanc=6 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==0 
replace sanc=7 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==0 
replace sanc=7 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==0 &ad_noncr_sanc==1 
replace sanc=8 if ci_cr_sanc==1 &ad_cr_sanc==1  &ci_noncr_sanc==1 &ad_noncr_sanc==1 
gen sanc_per=sanc/8 
lab var sanc_per  "COI Sanction Index" 
Abbreviations:  
“ci_cr_sanc” stands for criminal sanctions for violations of preventive rules 
“ad_cr_sanc” stands for criminal sanctions for violations of disclosing rules  
“ci_noncr_sanc” stands for noncriminal sanctions for violations of preventive rules 
“ad_noncr_sanc” stands for noncriminal sanctions for violations of disclosing rules 
“1” indicates that the sanctions are present; “0” indicates that no sanctions are available. 
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3.9.8. Appendix H. The Distribution of Trust in National Parliament Across European Democracies  
    
Legend: “1” – tend to trust; “2” – tend not to trust; “3” – “do not know” 
Choice of the Data Source: Some recent studies use data on trust to parliament from the European 
Social Survey (ESS) because trust to parliament is measured there with a broader scale (from 0 “no 
trust” to 10 “completely trust”). We cannot use these data as the wave 6 was run in 2012 and most of 
the GRECO reports we code result one or two years after this date. Hence, release of GRECO reports 
and EB data is more suitable in terms of the timing of the survey. Another reason to use EB is that, at 
least in the wave we use, it covers most of the European democracies. The wave 7 of ESS conducted 
in 2014 contains only 13 country reports from our sample 
(http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ESS7e01&y=2014, retrieved 
09.12.2016).  
In sum, our final data set, based on Eurobarometer 81.4 (2014), covers more than 20940 respondents 
in 25 countries. The number of observations per country ranges from 372 individuals in Malta to 1,417 
individuals in Germany, with ca. 965 individuals per country on average. Note we omit observations 
with a response option “do not know” for an item ´trust in national parliament´.  
Additional Information on Measurement of Control Variables: The control variable capturing 
difficulties in paying bills can take one of three options: “most of the time”, “from time to time”, 
“almost never/never”. The dummy for ´political instability´ was coded 1 when a country experienced 
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the premature fall of government or a major scandal involving political elites beyond individual parties 
(indicating systemic problems) leading to large-scale public protests or the historical decline of 
mainstream party support (or combinations thereof). If not, it was coded 0. While a more nuanced 
measure of ‘scandal’ or ‘crisis’ would be preferable, coding a dummy variable based on the given 
indicators assured clear-cut and unambiguous coding decisions. 
 
3.9.9. Appendix I. Results of Additional Robustness Checks and Endogeneity Tests 
We are aware that other control variables like gender, age (as a non-linear transformation), and 
population size (in absolute values, as a logarithm, and population density) as a proxy for a country 
size have been used in earlier work. We omit these variables from our final analysis as they did not 
show any robust significant effects and did not affect the results shown by our three indices when put 
in the regression models. 
The case-wise exclusion of countries also does not affect the overall findings. 
Furthermore, we are aware of the potential problem of endogeneity and reverse causality between 
trust in national parliament and COI regulation. Yet, tests for endogeneity of the COI Strictness Index 
do not reveal any problems. In particular, had we had the endogeneity problem, difficulties resulting 
from reverse causation, or third factors affecting simultaneously both trust and regulation, we would 
have done a regression analysis with the instrumental variable to be able to estimate the effects of 
interest (as Rosenson 2009, and Whiteley 2014 suggest to do to address similar problems). To decide 
whether it is necessary to use an instrumental variable model, we estimated a probit model with 
instrumental variables and clustered standard errors: COI Strictness Index was instrumented with 
the COI Sanction and COI Transparency Indices. We believe the quality of the instruments used is high 
as they clearly correlate with the potentially exogenous variable COI Strictness Index but the 
correlation between the instruments and the dependent variable – trust in parliament - is theoretically 
impossible otherwise than via COI Strictness Index. For instance, sanctions can hardly have any effect 
on trust if no requirements to disclose or prevent the conflict of interest is present in the regulatory 
system as pointed out earlier. The results of the Wald test of the probit model were not significant. 
We concluded that the application of an instrumental variable model is not necessary.   
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Additional Regression Analyses  
Table I1: Results of Multilevel Logistic Regressions with Random Intercept on Trust in National 
Parliaments omitting ´trust in parties´ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Trust in 
parliament 
Trust in 
parliament 
Trust in 
parliament 
Trust in 
parliament 
Trust in 
parliament 
Controls:      
Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Family status: married 0.061 
(0.036) 
0.062** 
(0.036)  
0.061** 
(0.036) 
0.062** 
(0.036) 
0.062** 
(0.036) 
Life satisfaction 0.674*** 0.673*** 0.674*** 0.674*** 0.674*** 
 (0.055) (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  (0.055)  
Political knowledge 0.247*** 
(0.026) 
0.246*** 
(0.026) 
0.247*** 
(0.026)  
0.247*** 
(0.026) 
0.246*** 
(0.026) 
Personal economic stability 0.182*** 
(0.032) 
0.181*** 
(0.032) 
0.182*** 
(0.032) 
0.182*** 
(0.032) 
0.181*** 
(0.032) 
Employment expectations 0.642*** 
(0.025) 
0.641*** 
(0.025) 
0.642*** 
(0.025) 
0.642*** 
(0.025) 
0.641*** 
(0.025) 
Safe neighborhood 0.180*** 
(0.023) 
0.179*** 
(0.023) 
0.180*** 
(0.023) 
0.179*** 
(0.023) 
0.179*** 
(0.023) 
Self-placement in the 
society 
0.203*** 
(0.029) 
0.202*** 
(0.029) 
0.203*** 
(0.029) 
0.202*** 
(0.029) 
0.202*** 
(0.029) 
Years of Democracy 0.021** 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.008) 
0.021** 
(0.008) 
0.019** 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
IVs:      
COI Strictness Index  -2.088**   -2.272* 
  (0.719)   (0.751) 
COI Sanction Index   -0.133  0.050 
   (0.073)  (0.066) 
COI Transparency Index    -1.088 
(0.613) 
 
BIC 21112.0 21114.7 21121.9 21119.0 21124.1 
Chi2 1376.1 1389.8 1376.2 1381.3 1391.1 
Log Likelihood -10501.3 -10497.7 -10501.3 -10499.8 -10497.7 
Individual observations 20940 20940 20940 20940 20940 
Countries 25 25 25 25 25 
 
Log-odds; standard errors in parentheses; * p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001 
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Table I2: Results of Multilevel Logistic Regressions with Random Intercept on Trust in National 
Parliaments Capturing Effects of COI Sanction and COI Transparency Indices and with Political 
Instability as a Macro Control Variable  
 (1) (2) 
 Trust in Parliament  Trust in Parliament  
Controls   
Age 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Family status: married 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Life satisfaction 0.489*** 0.490*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) 
Political knowledge 0.168*** 0.168*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
Personal economic stability 0.165*** 0.166*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
Employment expectations 0.507*** 0.507*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Safe neighborhood 0.174*** 0.174*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
Self-placement in the society 0.167*** 1.167*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) 
Trust in parties 2.942*** 2.943*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) 
Political Instability -0.590 -0.648* 
 (0.309) (0.272) 
COI Sanction Index -0. 462  
 (0.543)  
COI Transparency Index  -1.426* 
  (0.583) 
BIC 16756.5 16751.8 
Chi2 3976.8 3981.0 
Log Likelihood -8313.0 -8311.3 
Individual Observations 
Countries 
20940 
25 
20940 
25 
 
Log-odds; Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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4. Conflict of Interest Regulation in European Parliaments: Studying the 
Evolution of Complex Regulatory Regimes106 
 
Abstract 
The growing complexity of parliamentary ethics regulation adopted over the last decades makes the 
systematic examination of its nature and the rationales underpinning regulatory choices an important 
endeavour. In this paper we introduce conceptualizations and measurements of conflict of interest 
(COI) regulation directed toward assuring the impartial and unbiased decision-making of national 
parliamentarians. We distinguish the strictness of rules, the nature of enforcement, sanctions, and 
transparency requirements as core elements defining COI regimes. Applying our framework to 27 
European democracies, we select two cases for in-depth analysis in which legislators chose very 
different solutions in response to growing pressures to regulate themselves, to inductively explore the 
drivers underpinning the choice of COI mechanisms: the United Kingdom, which adopted a highly 
transparency-oriented regime, and Belgium, which adopted a highly sanction-oriented COI regime. 
Echoing neo-institutionalist perspectives, the longitudinal analyses indicate how the two democracies’ 
different institutional environments shape distinct answers to similar functional pressures. 
Keywords 
conflict of interest regulation, cross-national indices, longitudinal case study, parliament, regulatory 
reform 
4.1. Introduction 
Contemporary democracies have adopted a variety of accountability mechanisms for assuring that 
officeholders act in the public interest (Olsen 2017, p. 30).107 Trying to prevent the misuse of political 
power, they aim to establish trust and bolster the legitimacy of representative democracy, which is 
widely perceived to be in decline (Dalton 2004; Rosanvallon 2008). Mechanisms applicable to elected 
 
106 This is the authors´ accepted manuscript of the article Bolleyer, N.; Smirnova, V.; Di Mascio, F.; Natalini, A. 
´Conflict of Interest Regulation in European Parliaments: Studying the Evolution of Complex Regulatory´ 
Regimes first published online on the 04th of October 2018 as the version of record in Regulation & 
Governance [2018] John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd, which can be accessed at 
https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12221. This article is the result of a common undertaking and the authors equally 
contributed to the coding and compilation of the cross-national ‘Conflict of Interest Regulation Dataset’. 
However, Di Mascio took the lead on writing the discussion section, Natalini on the Belgian case study, 
Smirnova on the cross-sectional analysis, while Bolleyer was in charge of the remaining parts of the paper, 
including its theoretical and conceptual foundation and the UK case study, as well as the overall set-up of the 
paper. 
107 Accountability mechanisms are understood as a set of behavioural rules and organized practices, according 
to which office holders have to justify their behaviour and performance and face sanctions for misbehaviour 
and power abuse (Olsen 2017: 30). 
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officeholders have gained particular prominence as the “rule makers” are also the “rule takers” 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005, p. 13), that is, officeholders often regulate themselves in sensitive areas, 
such as the setting of Member of Parliament (MP) salaries, regulation of expenses, parliamentary 
grants, or funding for political parties (e.g. Demmke and Henökl 2007, p. 35; van Biezen and Kopecký 
2008; Allen 2011; Casal Bértoa et al. 2014; Clark 2015). Declining trust in traditional democratic 
institutions in conjunction with the rising complexity of regulation trying to remedy this problem makes 
research on newly adopted accountability mechanisms paramount (Olsen 2017). 
This paper conceptualizes and empirically investigates (cross-nationally and longitudinally) conflict of 
interest (COI) regulation108 applied to parliamentarians in European democracies, an area traditionally 
characterized by self-regulation that has become less and less acceptable, leading to what Williams 
has called an “ethics eruption” (Atkinson and Mancuso 1991, p. 475; Williams 2006, p. 29; Allen 2008a; 
Saint-Martin 2008). The striking expansion of ethics regulation – including COI regulation – has been 
the subject of much debate. Meanwhile, the growing diversity of different combinations of COI 
mechanisms (e.g. Demmke and Henökl 2007; Nikolov 2013; Rose-Ackerman 2014) raises an equally 
important puzzle about specific regulatory choices that has received less attention – namely which 
mechanisms different democracies choose to develop their COI regimes and why. 
To address this question, we draw on comparative law to define COI regulation broadly as all formal-
legal mechanisms directed toward either preventing or disclosing those situations in which public 
officials’ impartial and objective exercise of professional duties might be compromised (Nikolov 2013: 
412; Messick 2014: 114–115). Importantly, this definition captures bans and incompatibility rules on 
the one hand and disclosure requirements on the other, that is, the full spectrum of COI mechanisms, 
which contrasts with existing cross-national studies that tend to focus on financial asset disclosure (e.g. 
Djankov et al. 2010; Van Aaken and Voigt 2011). 
Drawing on historical institutionalist theory, we expect the choice of COI mechanisms to be shaped by 
institutional contexts emerging out of long-term path-dependent processes rather than by functional 
considerations of how best to solve the problem at hand (Thelen 1999; Fioretos et al. 2016). More 
specifically, we draw on the strand of literature focusing on the institutionally determined variance of 
national administrative traditions and styles of regulation (Knill 1998; Adam et al. 2017). Based on an 
analytical framework capturing the multidimensionality of this complex area of regulation, we 
comparatively assess core dimensions of COI regimes across 27 European democracies with the help 
of three newly developed indices. This grounds our selection of Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK) 
 
108 Following James (2000: 327), regulation is defined as directed toward “achieving public goals using rules or 
standards of behaviour backed up by sanctions or rewards of the state,” that is, only rules for which 
compliance is compulsory are considered (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 10). 
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as “extreme cases” in terms of reform choices to longitudinally explore different paths of COI reform 
and their institutional drivers. 
To propose tools for cross-national and longitudinal analysis of core elements of COI regulation and to 
explore whether and how institutional features shape the particular choice of COI mechanisms 
adopted is central to understand the working and evolution of increasingly elaborate and diverse ethics 
regimes applied to public officeholders. The insight that choices of COI mechanisms are shaped by 
internal institutional factors has central implications for debates around regulatory innovation 
understood as processes that seek to encourage the development of domestic regulation according to 
“best practice” standards provided by external organizations (Lodge 2005, p. 650): if the choice of 
different COI mechanisms as qualitatively different responses to the same problem is driven by the 
nature of the institutional setting in which parliamentarians operate, the scope of regulatory 
convergence through transnational communication is considerably restricted (Lodge 2003; Holzinger 
and Knill 2005, p. 790). This is highly salient in light of widespread attempts of international 
organizations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or the 
Council of Europe, to promote the adoption of specific COI mechanisms as “good practices” (e.g. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OEDC] 2005; Group of States Against 
Corruption [GRECO] 2014a). Similarly, as far as the adoption of specific (and possibly particularly 
effective) COI mechanisms is unlikely because of their “misfit” with the given institutional 
environment, ethics reforms are less likely to resolve the problems they are – at least officially – 
supposed to address. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first specify our research puzzle on the distinctiveness of 
regulatory choices used to address COI problems in the parliamentary arena, which we expect – in line 
with historical institutionalist theory – to be shaped by institutional factors that generate internal 
regulatory dispositions. We then present concepts and measures that allow us to assess the complexity 
of COI regimes comparatively across 27 European democracies, which, in turn, ground our selection of 
two cases for in-depth study. The longitudinal analyses of UK and Belgian COI regulation reveal how 
entrenched institutional features structuring the political process constrain the choice of COI 
mechanisms when parliamentarians are pressured to adopt stricter ethics rules. We conclude by 
summarizing our findings and suggest avenues for future research. 
4.2. Regulatory Dispositions and the Choice of Conflict of Interest (COI) Mechanisms: Theoretical 
Expectations 
The expansion of COI regulation raises two fundamental questions. Its growth points to the puzzle why 
parliamentarians adopt and expand COI regulation that increasingly constrains their own behaviour. 
The growing diversity of COI mechanisms across democracies (e.g. Demmke et al. 2008; Nikolov 2013; 
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Rose-Ackerman 2014) points to the puzzle of what leads parliamentarians in different settings – when 
adopting stricter regulation – to choose such distinct COI mechanisms to strengthen their 
parliamentary ethics regimes, despite numerous parallels in the problem pressures parliamentarians 
are exposed to. This paper deals with this second puzzle from an historical–institutionalist perspective. 
According to this perspective, COI regulation can be understood as a set of formalized rules “that assign 
normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors” – in our case parliamentarians – whose 
stability is not solely reliant on the self-interest of those involved but is a matter of “public interest” 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005: 10–12). In many democracies, the reform of COI regulation is best 
characterized as “displacement:” as the traditional configuration – that is, the self-regulation of 
parliamentary ethics – has been discredited, alternative institutional solutions are cultivated (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005: 19–20). While COI regulation has generally been pushed into a more constraining 
direction, we expect the nature of the particular responses to be shaped by regulatory dispositions, 
which follow particular institutional logics. As institutions are perceived as arising out of long-term 
processes shaping historical development along a specific “path” (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004), the 
same functional pressures are unlikely to generate cross-national convergence of reform choices. 
Instead, the effects of problem pressures are expected to be mediated by institutional features of the 
setting in which a reform takes place (Clift and Fisher 2004; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017). Those 
institutional features (dis)favor the adoption of specific regulatory solutions depending on their (mis)fit 
with the respective domestic environment, thereby leading to different answers to the same problem 
(Knill 1998; Maggetti 2012: 45). 
To examine how institutional features shape our outcome of interest in European democracies 
requires us to move beyond the assessment of cross-national variation in current regulation toward 
tracking the long-term evolution of COI regimes with a focus on the institutional factors that influence 
the choice of COI mechanisms (Thelen and Mahoney 2015: 3). However, a systematic overview of 
cross-national differences is still essential to select suitable cases for in-depth study that have adopted 
(similarly) strict parliamentary COI regulation, while having done so through different types of COI 
mechanisms. 
In the following we present the analytical tools that are used to explore the core elements of COI 
regulation, first across 27 European democracies and second over time within two case studies. 
4.3. Comparative Study of COI Regulation 
4.3.1. Defining COI Regulation: Preventive Versus Disclosing Mechanisms 
To capture the diversity of COI mechanisms, we define COI regulation broadly as the range of legal 
mechanisms directed toward either preventing situations (e.g. through bans and incompatibility rules)  
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Table 4.1. Four elements of COI regimes, COI mechanisms, and their purpose 
Core COI 
regulation 
Regulatory 
dimension 
Purpose of COI mechanisms Specification of COI mechanisms covered 
Strictness of rules Preventive To prohibit biased behaviour of 
parliamentarians 
Bans or restrictions on public and private accessory activities, 
assets, contracts with state authorities, employment offers (or 
cooling off regulations), income, liabilities, third party contacts, use 
of confidential information, handling of COIs in legislative decision-
making* 
Disclosing To reveal biased behaviour of 
parliamentarians 
Requirements to disclose public and private accessory activities, 
assets, contracts with state authorities, employment offers (or 
cooling off regulations), income, liabilities, third party contacts, use 
of confidential information, handling of COIs in legislative decision-
making** 
Enforcement Preventive To officially detect violations of preventive COI 
rules 
Regulation of enforcement body (its mandate and independence) 
monitoring implementation of preventive COI regulation 
Disclosing To officially detect violations of disclosing COI 
rules 
Regulation of enforcement body (its mandate and independence) 
monitoring implementation of disclosing COI regulation 
Sanctions Preventive Define costs for the violation of preventive 
COI rules 
Non-criminal (e.g. fines) and/or criminal sanctions 
Disclosing Define costs for the violation of disclosing COI 
rules 
Non-criminal (e.g. fines) and/or criminal sanctions 
Transparency Preventive To facilitate third party control (media, 
societal actors, or citizens) of the impartiality 
of parliamentarians 
Requirements to disclose information; scope of publicly available 
information; requirements to release information on violations of 
preventive rules (“shaming through transparency”) 
Disclosing To facilitate third party control (media, 
societal actors, or citizens) of the impartiality 
of parliamentarians 
Requirements to disclose information; scope of publicly available 
information; requirements to release information on violations of 
preventive rules (“shaming through transparency”) 
*This contains two categories of regulation: those that obligate Members of Parliament (MPs) to declare that they are affected by a conflict of interest (COI) 
(while still being able to participate) or provisions that require MPs to excuse themselves. **The 11 regulatory areas were identified based on Djankov et al. 
2010; Nikolov 2013 and Mattarella 2014. 
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or disclosing situations (e.g. through transparency requirements) where public officials’ impartial and 
objective exercise of professional duties might be compromised (Nikolov 2013: 412; Messick 2014: 
114–115). This distinction allows us to systematically map out distinct types of constraints imposed on 
the officeholders across central substantive areas of COI regulation (e.g. the receipt of gifts or the 
holding of ancillary posts; see Table 4.1 for all areas covered) and allows us to consider the 
compensatory nature between them: preventive mechanisms that restrict politicians in what they can 
legally do (e.g. through incompatibilities, rules, or bans) decrease the need for disclosure 
requirements, essential to arrive at unbiased cross-national measures of COI regulation. 
4.3.2. Core Elements of COI Regimes, the Range of COI Mechanisms, and Their Purpose 
Drawing on previous research (Allen 2008b: 56–57), we distinguish four basic elements of COI regimes 
reflecting distinct ways of constraining the behaviour of the officeholder they apply to (i.e. reflecting 
the distinct purposes regulatory mechanisms are directed toward): the strictness of rules and the 
enforcement structures underpinning them capture aspects in the regime that should increase the 
likelihood that formal COI violations are officially detected and notified; COI sanctions capture the 
costs imposed on parliamentarians when COI violations are detected; and transparency requirements 
capture the institutional conditions for third party control. Table 4.1 categorizes the range of COI 
mechanisms according to the analytical distinctions introduced so far. 
By definition, if COIs remain unregulated, parliamentarians cannot violate any rules. Vice versa, the 
higher the number of areas in which COI mechanisms are adopted (e.g. regulation of gifts, accessory 
posts, assets), the stricter and less ambiguous these rules are (e.g. the complete ban of certain 
behaviours), the more likely rule violations occur and become visible. We consequently assess a COI 
regime's rule strictness by capturing the type of COI mechanism employed (preventive and disclosing) 
and rank the respective regulatory configurations according to the constraints they imply for 
parliamentarians in each of the core areas of COI regulation listed in Table 4.1.109 
The logic underpinning our COI Strictness Index is illustrated by the example of the regulation of gifts: 
Score “zero” indicates the absence of constraints (neither preventive nor disclosure mechanisms are 
in place), meaning all gifts to MPs are allowed and there is no need for declaration. Score “one” 
indicates a relatively more constraining regime that requires disclosure but again does not prohibit the 
receiving of gifts. This configuration is followed – in terms of constraints – by two configurations that 
combine preventive and disclosing elements – a partial prevention of gifts (i.e. gifts above a certain 
size are banned) without the permitted gifts being declared (assigned a “two”), followed by a partial 
prevention of gifts where all permitted gifts need to be declared (assigned a “three”). Finally, we can 
 
109 For more details on data, methodology and the construction of the index on rule strictness see appendix. 
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think of regimes that regulate this area through a purely preventive strategy by banning all gifts, which 
is assigned a score of “four,” indicating the highest level of constraint. The interplay of the two logics 
– prevention versus disclosure – is visualized in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Combinations of legal mechanisms and rule strictness scores 
Prevention on COI No rules No rules Restrictions Restrictions Total ban 
Disclosure of COI No rules Disclosure No rules Disclosure - 
Overall COI  
strictness score 
0 1 2 3 4 
   Note: The darker the colouring, the higher the level of constraint in the combination of mechanisms.  
If COI rules are monitored and their violation investigated and confirmed by enforcement structures 
formally in charge of implementing COI rules, the official detection of rule violations is most likely 
(Rosenthal 2006: 158; Allen 2011: 213; see also Gay 2006). If such COI-specific monitoring bodies or 
units exist, we assess the nature of these bodies (or body – some countries use the same body for both 
types of COI rules, others use separate ones) considering their motivation and capacity to monitor. 
Regarding the motivation to monitor, we assess whether enforcement bodies are independent from 
parliament and not affiliated with any political party (Nassmacher 2003: 13; Clark 2017). Regarding 
monitoring capacity, we assess whether the body can examine the accuracy of information provided 
by parliamentarians in relation to preventive or disclosing COI rules or not. 
A strong enforcement structure for the implementation of regulation is usually associated with the 
capacity to sanction rule violations (e.g. Nassmacher 2003; O'Halloran 2011; Mattarella 2014). We 
nonetheless treat the sanctions underpinning COI rules as a separate element. First, COI sanctions 
impose a different type of constraint on public officeholders. While strict rules combined with strong 
enforcement structures make it less likely that parliamentarians can hope for violations not to be 
officially detected, sanctions shape the relative costs of rule violations once they are detected. Second, 
the assumed link between COI sanctions and enforcement structures is only partial: not all sanctions 
attached to violations of COI regulations are attached to or controlled by enforcement structures 
established for dealing with COI issues. We might have a COI regime that does not contain any 
enforcement structures specifically in charge of COI regulation. Yet COI violations might be 
underpinned by criminal sanctions controlled by courts. Focusing on sanctions as controlled by 
enforcement structures in charge of COI monitoring (rather than on the full range of sanctions 
underpinning COI rules) would lead to misleading comparative evaluations of the properties of COI 
regimes. The costs of rule violations as defined by COI sanctions vary with the type of sanctions. In line 
with earlier work (Casal Bértoa et al. 2014; Mattarella 2014) criminal sanctions are treated as more 
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constraining than non-criminal ones (e.g. fines). Thus, we differentiate between sanction regimes using 
non-criminal sanctions, criminal sanctions, or both.110 
Rather than mere intra-institutional disclosure to a monitoring body, public transparency 
requirements (usually releasing information online) can provide the basis for “third party control” by 
the media, interested organizations, or individual citizens (Djankov et al. 2010). We consider whether 
information is disclosed publicly (whether no public access is possible, information is provided on 
request, or there is free access via printed or online mass media); the scope (or completeness) of 
information that is made publicly available (whether the institutions that release information to the 
public present all or only part of the information they receive about the parliamentarian); and finally, 
whether information about rule violations by MPs is released or not, a form of “shaming through 
transparency.”111 Transparency measures are sometimes considered as a possible substitute for a 
strong institutional enforcement structure or as a complement to the latter (Nassmacher 2003: 10–
12). As with sanctions, we treat transparency measures separately from COI enforcement. Indeed, the 
mere release of information on MPs’ activities to the public might allow for third party control but 
does not necessarily contribute to the capacity of the COI regime to detect officially recognized 
noncompliance with COI rules – the theoretical underpinning of COI enforcement. While problematic 
practices might be occasionally picked up by the media and thereby generate reputational costs for 
the individual MP concerned (Krambia-Karpadis 2013: 46), this is not equivalent to the systematic 
monitoring of rule compliance by a public body detecting formal misconduct (Allen 2011: 213). 
4.3.3. Developing Cross-national Measures to Capture the Multidimensionality of COI Regimes 
To measure the four COI elements across a wider range of democracies, we compiled a new dataset 
on the properties of parliamentary COI regulation based on the evaluation reports released by the 
Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), which applies the collaborative practice of peer review 
to assess the performance of its member states (De Francesco 2016: 354). More specifically, we drew 
on data from the 4th GRECO round on “Corruption Prevention in Respect of Members of Parliament, 
Judges and Prosecutors,” which provides the most encompassing and standardized information on COI 
 
110 For our COI Sanction Index, we use the following coding categories: a country gets the lowest sanction score 
(“0”) if it does not have any sanctions for either violations of preventive or disclosing mechanisms. It is followed 
by regimes that have non-criminal sanctions for both types of rules, which is followed by those that add 
criminal sanctions either to back up preventive or disclosing rules. The highest score means the regime has 
criminal and administrative sanctions to address both the violations of preventive and of disclosing rules, 
respectively (“8”). Finally, the index was standardized from 0 to 1. 
111 A COI regime has a transparency rank of “11” if all of the transparency options are coded as present, which 
indicates the maximum possible level of transparency with regard to both preventive and disclosure rules and a 
“0” if none are present. Rank “5” is assigned to regimes that, for instance, have transparency requirements in 
relation to both preventive and disclosing rules, yet in either case the scope of the information published is 
limited, while no information on rule violations is released. Note this is only one possible institutional 
constellation that might receive a rank “5”. 
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regimes in place in European democracies in the years 2012–2015.112 We restricted our sample to fully 
consolidated European democracies to assure basic unit homogeneity in terms of the centrality of 
parliamentary institutions, rule of law, and of the basic administrative capacity to implement the 
regulation. This left us with a sample of 27 countries. 
Based on the specification of COI mechanisms detailed in the section above, we constructed an index 
for each core element: rule strictness, enforcement, sanctions, and transparency. For each index we 
made use of rankings and a linear aggregation method. This choice is important, as we are interested 
in capturing constraints across several COI dimensions with various predictors on an ordinal scale. As 
with most composite indicators (OECD 2008: 31), our indices are based on equal weights, emphasizing 
equal importance of indicators inherent in COI regimes. All indices are standardized from zero to one. 
How do the four dimensions relate? The Spearman test indicates that rule strictness and strictness of 
enforcement positively, highly, and significantly correlate (n = 27, ρ = 0.73, p < 0.01). We therefore use 
one “COI Strictness Index,” encompassing these two dimensions, capturing – in line with our 
conceptualization – the likelihood that formal COI violations are officially detected and notified. The 
other elements, in contrast, constitute separate dimensions. The “COI Sanction Index” and the “COI 
Transparency Index” moderately correlate with the COI Strictness Index (ρ = 0.53, p < 0.01 and ρ = 
0.42, p < 0.05, respectively). The Spearman test between the COI Sanction Index and the COI 
Transparency Index is not significant, indicating the two dimensions’ independence (ρ = 0.2, p > 0.31). 
Consequently, the multidimensional nature of European democracies is best analysed along three 
dimensions.113 
4.4. The Diversity of COI Regimes in Europe: Selecting Cases for In-depth Study 
Figure 4.1 visualizes the distribution of the three COI indices across the 27 democracies covered, 
grouped into old versus new democracies, as previous research points to substantial regulatory 
differences between these two groups (e.g. van Biezen 2008, 2012; Casal Bértoa et al. 2014).114 It 
shows that new democracies, on average, tend toward stricter COI regulation than old democracies. 
The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test indicates that the difference between the new and old democracies 
on the COI Strictness Index and on the COI Sanction Index is statistically significant (z = 2.99, p < 0.01 
 
112 Although the ethics regulation adopted for first and second houses of parliament (or national and regional 
chambers) can differ, we focus on the regulation of members of the first house of parliament as the central 
legislative decision-making body in a democracy that is bound to attract most attention and be subject of most 
concern. 
113 See 4.8.1. Appendix A for country scores for all indices across the sample. See Bolleyer and Smirnova (2017) 
for a more detailed assessment and a quantitative application of the indices. 
114 In line with earlier studies we categorized democracies stable since WWII plus Malta and Cyprus as old 
democracies and the Southern democracies Spain, Portugal, and Greece plus the Central European 
democracies as new democracies. 
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and z = 2.68, p < 0.01, respectively). Furthermore, Figure 4.1 displays the relative variability of each of 
the indicators within the subsamples, showing that new democracies tend to be less internally 
diverse.115 Unlike old democracies, new democracies have been subject to more intense external 
pressures to adopt ethics regulation as a part of a “good governance agenda” promoted by 
international actors, such as the European Union or the OECD (Börzel et al. 2008). 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of conflict of interest (COI) indices across 27 European democracies 
 
Considering the differences displayed in Figure 4.1, we select two old democracies to carry out a paired 
comparison of factors driving the longitudinal development of COI regimes, as regulatory choices in 
these systems can be more unambiguously linked to domestic institutional factors that constrain the 
selection of reform options according to the historical institutionalist approach (Lodge 2003). Thus, the 
selection of old democracies (which have developed their current COI regime over many decades) 
minimizes the influence of conditionality monitoring mechanisms, which in the case of new 
democracies interact or overlap with external pressures, such as those exercised by GRECO reviews 
(Borz 2018). 
 
115 See 4.8.1 Appendix A for the descriptive statistics on the two groups. 
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Suitable for an exploratory investigation of systemic dispositions shaping COI regulation over time, we 
moreover choose two extreme cases that maximize differences in the COI regulatory strategies chosen 
by old democracies.116 This choice is based on countries’ COI Sanction and COI Transparency scores, 
which – as shown earlier – are independent of each other, that is, they reflect separate regulatory 
strategies. Figure 4.2 shows the discrepancy between COI Sanction and COI Transparency scores across 
the 27 democracies, thus, the extent to which democracies develop their COI regime through 
transparency measures rather than sanctions or vice versa.117 Most countries put a stronger emphasis 
on sanctions than transparency. Only one of 13 new democracies stresses transparency over sanctions 
– Croatia. Importantly, we find greater variation among old democracies: six of them stress 
transparency over sanctions; eight, the reverse pattern, showing a much more balanced distribution 
of “regulatory dispositions.” We choose the two old democracies with the biggest discrepancy 
between COI Sanction and COI Transparency scores from our sample for in-depth study, the UK and 
Belgium. 
Consequently, the selection of the UK and Belgium as extreme cases to engage in a pairwise 
comparison of COI evolution has several advantages. First, it is particularly suitable to explore the 
trajectories of COI reform as they allow us to distil the drivers underlying the distinct regulatory choices 
that pushed the nature of the two COI regimes into a transparency-oriented (UK) as opposed to 
sanction-oriented direction (Belgium) “in especially stark or obvious forms” (Bennett 2004: 40; 
Seawright and Gerring 2008: 297). Second, they are among the four old democracies with the highest 
COI Strictness scores (See 4.8.1. Appendix A). Both have repeatedly suffered from serious political 
crises that pushed parliamentarians to tighten their COI regimes over the last decades, a similarity that 
allows us to focus on the particular COI mechanisms chosen in these processes, taking the overall trend 
toward stricter COI regulation as a given. Third, given our interest in the influence on COI regimes of 
regulatory dispositions underpinning democracies’ domestic institutional settings, these can be more 
easily “isolated” in old democracies less influenced by international pressures. 
 
116 Matching procedure based on propensity scores is not possible for our small-N sample. 
117 As both indices are standardized between 0 and 1, they could be subtracted from each other. The difference 
is visualized in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. Discrepancies between COI sanctions and COI transparency across 27 democracies 
 
4.5. The Long-term Evolution of COI regimes in the UK and Belgium 
As in earlier studies on regulatory reform (e.g. Clift and Fisher 2004; Quack and Djelic 2005; Jones 2007; 
Little and Stopforth 2013; Hine and Peele 2016), we reconstruct the evolution of COI regimes 
applicable to national parliamentarians in the UK and Belgium from the introduction of the first COI 
elements until 2015 using document analysis. The latter combines primary legislation and regulation 
as well as failed draft proposals, backed up by parliamentary debate and official reports justifying 
provisions and their amendment or rejection, complemented by secondary literature. 
4.5.1. UK: The Evolution of a Transparency-oriented COI Regime 
Although conflicts of interest have been long regulated by parliamentary conventions alone, over time, 
the House of Commons (HoC) has adopted an increasing number of resolutions formalizing those 
conventions and made existing provisions stricter, usually in the aftermath of scandals in an attempt 
to re-establish public confidence (Hine and Peele 2016). 
The transparency dimension has been strengthened most unambiguously. This began in 1974 with the 
introduction of the Register of Members’ Interests, a compulsory public register to disclose MPs’ 
pecuniary interests, and the formalization of the long-standing convention for MPs to have to declare 
financial interests in parliamentary debate (House resolution 1974). Both provisions were overseen by 
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a permanent select committee created in 1976.118 In the aftermath of the 1972 Poulson bankruptcy 
hearings, which revealed that MPs took bribes to secure lucrative government contracts, the pressure 
to create a compulsory register (which had previously been proposed but rejected) had become 
intense. While the proposal to publish MPs’ income tax returns was rejected because of privacy 
considerations, the new register aimed at protecting the public reputation of the House. The resolution 
required the register to be “available for public inspection” – annually published in the HoC paper.119 
Transparency was further strengthened by the online publication of the register, introduced as part of 
the Nolan reforms in 1995 in the aftermath of the 1992 Matrix Churchill affair and the 1994 cash for 
questions scandal. The proposal to hold evidence hearings of the committee in public, however, was 
again rejected.120 As far as “shaming through transparency” goes, initially unresolved disputes about 
noncompliance – be it regarding asset or COI declarations – would initially go to the select committee 
overseeing the Members’ register without the MP's name being mentioned. Transparency of 
(suspected or established) noncompliance was eventually introduced in 2010, in the aftermath of the 
expenses scandal. Since then, information on all inquiries (including relevant evidence) and outcomes 
(concerning disclosing and preventive rules) is released online.121 Statistics about complaints 
identifying Members under inquiry are published monthly (GRECO 2013: 19). These basic steps were 
accompanied by expanding what ought to be included in the asset declarations, that is, enhanced rule 
strictness, thereby making transparency requirements more significant. While strongly held notions 
about popular control of representatives are central to British parliamentary traditions, recent 
developments took place in a context of strong legal provisions to assure freedom of information that 
shaped parliamentary regulation generally, as illustrated by the expenses scandal triggered by freedom 
of information requests.122 
Comparing the use of disclosing as compared to preventive constraints more generally, the UK system 
relies much more on the former than the latter. Considering the following much debated preventive 
measure is indicative of a disinclination to impose actual constraints on MP behavior: in 1996, the 
newly created Code of Conduct of the House enshrined a pre-existing ban on paid advocacy and 
 
118 Since 1967 there was a voluntary register established by Liberal MPs, available for public inspection, Aspects 
of Nolan – Members’ Financial Interests, Research Paper 95/62, 16 May 1995, Home Affairs Section, HoC 
Library, p. 1 
119 Aspects of Nolan – Members’ Financial Interests, Research Paper 95/62, 16 May 1995, Home Affairs Section, 
HoC Library: 4, 6. 
120 Ibid.: 31–2. See also: https://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-financial-
interests/parliamentarycommissioner-for-standards/registers-of-interests/register-of-members-financial-
interests/, retrieved 14 August 2016. 
121 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards: Review of the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of 
Members, Consultation Paper, 19 January 2012: 46. 
122 The Freedom of Information Act 2000 in force since 2005, allows members of the public to request 
disclosure of information from public bodies. 
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expanded it. A 1947 House resolution already prohibited the initiation of parliamentary proceedings 
solely or principally because of a contractual agreement with an outside interest, as such practice 
would undermine MPs’ ability to represent constituency and broader society in favor of sectional 
interests. After 1992, the regulation was tightened with MPs required to declare their interest in select 
committees, not only in debate, and stand aside if their pecuniary interests were concerned.123 The 
post-Nolan regulations then prohibited ministers or public officials to initiate proceedings or 
participate in any delegation124, while introducing rules regulating the use of confidential information 
(Coxall 2001: 103). A proposed ban on holding consultancies with multi-client lobbying companies 
recommended by Nolan, however, was not picked up. In 2002, the 1996 regulation was relaxed, 
allowing initiation and participation in proceedings as long as doing so does not generate “exclusive 
benefit” to someone the member has a financial relationship with, meaning as long as at least one less 
dominant provider benefits as well. Despite criticism that this provision de facto legitimizes MPs to 
“undertake lobbying which might substantially have benefited a dominant presence in a particular 
market”125, and renewed debates around it in 2010 and 2012, it has remained unaltered. This was 
justified by the importance of MPs being able to bring their current outside experience to 
parliamentary proceedings126, arguably being incompatible with any effective restrictions on their 
ability to lobby for the interests they are involved with, as long as they declare their financial interests 
in the process. 
Similarly, resistance against independent enforcement and a more robust sanction regime continues 
to shape the COI regime today. This is justified referring to reputational costs imposed by the citizens 
as the ultimate sanction for politicians, while insisting that the House (i.e. MPs) needs to maintain sole 
jurisdiction over its own matters, including the sanctioning of MPs for breaking House rules. The 
permanent select committee created in 1976 to oversee the Members’ register was only entitled to 
act when complaints were received, but would “under no circumstances” act as enforcement officer 
with powers to inquire into the circumstances of members.127 The Nolan reform in the mid-1990s 
strengthened COI enforcement. The new commissioner for standards dealing with MP violations of 
COI regulation, however, was and is still is an officer of the House. He/she has to work with a 
Committee of Standards (composed of MPs) and – yet again – for a long time had no authority to 
proactively examine a case without a complaint being issued, although post-Nolan they were allowed 
 
123 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards: Review of the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of 
Members, Consultation Paper, 19 January 2012: 36. 
124 Ibid.: 35–6. 
125 Ibid.: 39. 
126 Ibid.: 38–40. See also: Committee on Standards and Privileges, Ninth Report of Session 2010–2012, HC 654, 
Volume II, paragraph 733. 
127 Aspects of Nolan – Members’ Financial Interests, Research Paper 95/62, 16 May 1995, Home Affairs Section, 
HoC Library: 7, 9, 25. 
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to actively check the facts and make enquiries.128 Meanwhile, the House as a whole remained the 
ultimate decisionmaker in serious cases of misconduct.129 Nolan's proposal to create an offence of 
misuse of public office applicable to MPs failed (Foreman 2002: 280), being in tension with the principle 
of “parliamentary privilege,” which gives MPs immunity for actions or statements made in the course 
of their legislative duty.130 Later proposals to strengthen the independence of the Standards 
Commission, such as by introducing an investigative tribunal with a legal chairman, were also rejected. 
After the Expenses Scandal in 2009, yet again discrediting parliamentary self-regulation, a House 
resolution in 2010 broadened the commissioner's scope of review allowing for proactive investigations 
(without receiving a complaint on a matter first). A report in 2012, however, suggested that the 
resolution had not been implemented.131 Since 2013, three lay members have formed part of the 
Committee of Standards and proposed equal numbers of MPs and lay members on the Committee, 
which was adopted in 2015. While lay members can issue a “minority report” to Committee 
publications (a right that to date has not been used), they have no voting rights, thereby leaving MPs 
in control.132 
The regulation of COI sanctions underwent the least change. Today the House still controls any 
penalties for MP misconduct, which conventionally includes reprimands, repayment of moneys, a 
written apology, an apology to the House, or a period of suspension (with loss of pay and pension 
rights), and expulsion (last used in 1947). In 1999, a proposal for the introduction of fines as a sanction 
was made but not realized.133 The House code of conduct only contains a brief reference that sanctions 
can be imposed by the House, without specification as to what they are and which violations they apply 
to.134 Only recently, the Sixth Report of the Committee of Standards – while recognizing that it is 
problematic that MPs have a final say over their own sanctions – pointed to “strong constitutional 
reasons against purely external regulation of standard issues.” The committee considered the range of 
 
128 Ibid.: 30. 
129 Summary of the Nolan Committee’s First Report on Standards in Public Life, 
www.pavs.org.uk/about/documents/TheSevenPrinciplesofPublicLife.doc, retrieved 14 August 2016. Committee 
on Standards - Sixth Report -The Standards Systems in the House of Commons –Committee on Standards, 10 
February 2015, (point 71) http://www.publications. 
parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmstandards/383/38305.htm, retrieved 12 August 2016. 
130 http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ape_previous.pdf, retrieved 14 August 2016. See 
also Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Wicks Committee), Sixth Report, January 2000, 
recommendation 9. 
131 Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards: Review of the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of 
Members, Consultation Paper, 19 January 2012: 46. 
132 See: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/standards/lay-
members/, retrieved 30 May 2018. 
133 Ibid.: 5. 
134 The Standing Order of the House only refers to possible sanctions (withdrawal from the House, suspension 
from the services of the House) for grossly disorderly behavior or disobedience (Art 44, 45), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmstords/700/700.pdf, retrieved November 20, 2016 
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sanctions “appropriate and sufficient” and stressed the reliance of the system on “reputational 
costs,”135 which again highlights the centrality of the normative foundation of British democracy, 
whose basic functioning relies on notions of popular control exercised by citizens, rather than 
institutional checks and balances between institutions. 
4.5.2. Belgium: The Evolution of a Sanction-oriented COI Regime 
Although some COI mechanisms date back to the 1930s, the development of the COI regime as it exists 
today began in the 1990s. Since the 1991 election, in which alienation between citizens and established 
parties triggered the national breakthrough of the extreme right Vlaams Block party, the Belgian 
political system has been confronted with major governance crises. The Augusta–Dassault affair136, a 
corruption scandal, as well as policy failures like the Dutroux pedophilia case, exacerbated the crisis in 
the late 1990s. Belgium scored relatively low on the level of perceived corruption and almost no MPs 
were convicted of corruption in connection with their mandates (GRECO 2014b: 4). Meanwhile, 
Belgium was one of the countries with the highest level of party patronage in Western Europe (Müller 
2000: 151). Thus, the overall legitimacy of the system rather than the failures of particular MPs fueled 
reform debates (Maesschalck and Van de Walle 2006). COI regulation became a part of wider statutory 
reforms of public governance (inter alia federalization, public management reform, anticorruption) 
launched to restore public trust, with COI regulation applicable to public officials (including 
parliamentarians) aimed at curbing partisan control of the Belgian state (De Winter and Brans 2003; 
Van de Walle et al. 2005; Transparency International 2012). 
Among the core COI elements, sanctions have been reinforced most unambiguously, while 
transparency measures were only reluctantly adopted. In the late 1980s, calls for disclosing 
mechanisms emerged to complement long-existing preventive rules, such as restrictions on the 
concurrent holding of public offices introduced by the Belgian Constitution of 1831 and reinforced in 
the Law of 6 August 1931, which also contained the requirement of a “cooling off” period for MPs 
before being appointed to other paid public positions. Calls for transparency gained further saliency in 
the 1990s as consociational bargaining between major government parties was increasingly 
considered dysfunctional (Peters 2006) and MPs were suspected of serving hidden interests.137 
 
135 The Standards Systems in the House of Commons – Sixth Report- Committee on Standards, 10 February 
2015, http:// 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmstandards/383/38305.htm, retrieved 12 August 
2016, sections 72–4; 150-7. 
136 The scandal broke in the early 1990s over bribes that had been paid for the procurement of helicopters for 
the military. Several high-profile politicians, including several government ministers from the Walloon and 
Flemish Socialist parties, resigned as a result of the scandal. 
137 Senate de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 1994–1995, n. 1,334/3: 3, 21. 
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The first set of laws introducing the disclosure of declarations of interests (covering appointments, 
activities, and professions) was passed on 2 May 1995. Parliamentary debates predating this reveal 
MPs’ reservations. Such declarations – so the argument – would provide incentives for politicians to 
no longer take on outside positions crucial for the development of technical skills and competences138 
(an argument used in the UK to fend off stricter rules on paid advocacy). More significantly, the initial 
legislative proposal of 1993 planned to make asset declarations public as well, to let citizens decide 
whether MPs are subject to COIs. This was substituted in the 1995 legislation by a requirement to 
provide an asset declaration in a sealed envelope to the Court of Accounts that could only be opened 
in the event of a criminal investigation for illicit enrichment. MPs justified this provision following 
recommendations of the Belgian data protection authority, which indicated that publicly open 
declarations restrict MPs’ privacy and might lead to harmful consequences for MPs, their spouses, and 
relatives.139 Instead of publishing MPs’ declarations, the 1995 laws required the publication of a “black 
list” of those MPs who failed to submit declarations of interest or asset declarations to publicly shame 
non-compliant MPs. 
Already watered down, this legislation existed only on paper for many years. In a country like Belgium, 
the Rechtsstaat administrative tradition requires that the procedural details of rule application and 
enforcement are codified by law. The broad scope of COI regulation encompassing thousands of 
individuals across different categories of public office holders at the national and local levels further 
heightened the already high costs for passing operational provisions in the fragmented consociational 
Belgian system because of struggles over how to apply the same framework to such a diverse range of 
officials. Meanwhile, some MPs pushed for delays given the uncertainty over when and how 
declarations should be lodged and reviewed.140 Consequently, operational provisions were only 
adopted in 2004, leading to the publication of the first “black list” in 2005, nine years after the initial 
law had been passed.141 At the same time, the 2004 legislation added a “procedure of resolution” that 
allowed non-compliant MPs to appeal to the parliamentary commission deciding about the inclusion 
of MPs in the “black list,” thereby allowing parliament to prevent the public shaming of noncompliant 
MPs. It further allowed for corrections to be made to declarations at different stages, including after 
noncompliance had been detected, reducing instances in which noncompliance are openly publicized 
(GRECO 2014b: 21). 
 
138 Ibid.: 4. 
139 Ibid: 29; Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 1995–1996, 457/6: 15; Senate de Belgique, 
Doc. Parl., 1997–1998, 621/12: 39–40, 48. 
140 Senate de Belgique, Doc. Parl, 1997–1998, 621/12: 15–78. 
141 Ordinary and Special Laws of 26th June 2004. 
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The publication of declarations of interest in the official gazette was delayed even longer (17 years 
after the 1995 law, eight years after the 2004 operational provisions) as disagreement over its content 
persisted until 2012.142 Proposals to disclose compensation for public jobs were presented in 2006 and 
2010 and for all jobs in 2015 (along with a new call for the publication of asset declarations), 
complemented by recommendations by GRECO to enhance public disclosure (GRECO 2017: 3–4). All 
of them were rejected, reflecting parliamentary tradition to not grant extensive rights to access 
information about the legislature in a context where privacy is constitutionally protected (Article 22). 
Freedom of information applies only to the administrative functions of parliament as an institution, 
while MPs enjoy the same protections of privacy as ordinary citizens.143 
In the meantime, long-standing preventive measures were strengthened. The Law of 4 May 1999 
prohibited MPs to become board members of public companies, reinforcing the long existing 
provisions included in the Belgian Constitution and in the 1931 Law (see above). Moreover, 
parliamentary mandates could not be combined with more than one paid executive office and a cap 
was set on the remuneration that could not exceed the equivalent of half of the parliamentary 
allowance (De Winter and Brans 2003: 61). 
A deep political crisis a decade later presented another window of opportunity for reform. The 
coalition agreement of October 2011 suggested major state reform to overcome tensions between 
different segments of Belgian society (Brans et al. 2016: 453), and contained a chapter on ethics (Di 
Rupo 2011: 5–7). It proposed Codes of Deontology for both houses of parliament that were adopted 
on 17 and 19 December 2013, respectively, including preventive and disclosure measures. In the case 
of the Chamber of Representatives, the code required MPs to orally declare any COI in parliamentary 
proceedings and prohibited them from receiving any financial or material benefit in return for acts 
performed in connection with their parliamentary mandate, including any gift that exceeded a 
symbolic value. The code also prohibited MPs from sharing confidential information. 
To enforce the new code, the Law of 6 January 2014 established a Federal Ethics Committee. Its 
composition and the appointment procedure resemble those of the Constitutional Court to enhance 
the body's independence – although the complexity of the appointment procedure, requiring the 
qualified majority of two thirds, delayed the appointment of its members until May 2016.144 That said, 
independent enforcement had already replaced parliamentary self-regulation by 1995 when MPs 
entrusted the Court of Accounts as an actor outside parliament trusted by MPs and the public to keep 
both declarations of interests and assets. However, its ability to operate was curtailed as long as 
 
142 Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 2005–2006, 2,652/001: 9–20. 
143 Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 2014–2015, 0951/001: 4.; Global Right to Information 
Ranking, www.rt-rating.org, retrieved July 14, 2017. 
144 See Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 54 1828/001, May 19, 2016. 
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operational provisions had not been adopted (see above). Concerns were raised about the ability of 
the Court of Accounts to manage the excessive workload resulting from a declaratory system 
applicable not only to MPs but also to thousands of officeholders at the central and local levels. The 
2004 Law therefore streamlined the submission procedure. Nonetheless, concerns remain that the 
Court of Accounts is not able to accurately verify the declarations it receives145 and is reluctant to 
enforce the consequences of an inaccurate/incomplete declarations, which undermines the 
transparency of the system (GRECO 2014b: 20–21; Cour des Comptes 2015: 21–29). 
In contrast, the sanctions underpinning COI disclosing mechanisms introduced in 1995 were severe 
and little contested as they signalled the credibility of reform efforts in a context marked by severe 
dissatisfaction in the face of an extensive level of party patronage (De Winter et al. 1996).146 Article 6 
of the 1995 law penalizes the non-submission of both declarations with a fine between 600 and 6,000€. 
It also postulates that criminal sanctions are applicable to public officeholders in case of forgery and 
use of falsified documents (Article 194 of the Criminal Code) with 10–15 years’ imprisonment plus 
incidental penalties (Article 31 of the Criminal Code). Regarding sanctions underpinning preventive 
mechanisms, the anticorruption Law of 10 February 1999 introduced criminal penalties for any person 
holding public office who acquired interests unlawfully (Transparency International 2012: 49).147 This 
already extensive arsenal of sanctions was complemented by the new Rules of Procedure of the Low 
Chamber in 2014. They introduced political sanctions (exclusion from confidential proceedings, 
possibly all proceedings) and pecuniary sanctions (withholding of emoluments) for the misuse of 
confidential information.148 
4.6. Discussion 
Table 4.3 reports the key findings of the case studies, identifying four institutional features as central 
for shaping the choice of COI mechanisms in line with our theoretical expectations (e.g. Knill 1998; 
Lodge 2003; Clift and Fisher 2004). In essence, the nature of executive–legislative relations, as well as 
the nature of administrative traditions, fundamentally shaped the “fit” of transparency measures and 
formal legal sanctions in the two institutional settings analysed. This finding is coherent with previous 
research that drew on historical institutionalist theory to assess the impact of politico-administrative 
structures upon cross-national variation in reform choices (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017).  
 
145 This explains several proposals for further simplification of the declaratory system in the post-2004 period. 
See Chambre des Representants de Belgique, Doc. Parl., 2008–2009, 1,507/001: 5. 
146 Debate Senate 6 April 1995, Doc. Parl., 1994–1995, 1,334/3: 16. 
147 Article 245 of the Criminal Code carries a prison sentence of one to five years and/or a fine and/or exclusion 
from office, separating taking an interest while holding public office from instances of corruption. 
148 Legal Department of the Belgian House of Representatives, Rules of Procedure of the Belgian House of 
Representatives, Rule 67, October 2014. 
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With regard to the nature of executive–legislative relations, our analysis confirms that majoritarian 
systems (as in the UK) facilitate rapid and large-scale reform, whereas incremental decision-making 
takes place in consensual systems (as in Belgium) (Lijphart 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017: 47). It also 
shows that majoritarian systems generate an appreciation of transparency, as their accountability 
processes are based on popular control that apportions blame to individuals or groups (McCarthy-
Cotter and Flinders 2018: 201). Accordingly, UK parliamentarians – to a considerable extent – were 
able to fend off demands for independent enforcement and sanctions to start with, referring to long-
standing notions of parliamentary privilege and sovereignty. Conversely, consensual systems, such as 
that in Belgium, are built on a notion of keeping the process of elite bargaining secret, with little direct 
intervention by the public at large (Peters 2006). This gave elites some latitude to accommodate 
fragmented interests by means of patronage but it raised credibility issues that were dealt with 
through independent enforcement and sanctions. 
As for the nature of the administrative tradition, Rechtsstaat systems like Belgium's are stickier and 
slower to reform than “public interest” systems, as in the UK (Pierre 1995: 8). This is because reform 
choices and their implementation do not require statutory action in the latter (Pollitt 2013). 
Conversely, a codified body of law regulates any action of public officeholders in Belgium where the 
judiciary assures that legal procedures are being followed. Differences between administrative 
traditions are amplified by broader variations in societal values, such as differences in power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede 2001). Belgium scores a lot higher than the UK on both indices 
and this widens the gulf between the legalist and the flexible approaches to reform, which are 
embedded in the two administrative traditions, respectively (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017: 63–66). 
Furthermore and also in line with institutionalist accounts of path dependency (Mahoney 2000: 528), 
the link between COI and state reform (Bezes and Parrado 2013: 45) played an important role. 
Whereas in the UK COI reform has been developed on an ad hoc basis, in Belgium it has been part of 
comprehensive state reforms. This link has broadened the scope of COI reform, thus multiplying veto 
points as well as exacerbating legalist intricacies of implementation. Finally, pre-existing legal 
provisions shaping the rights and the obligations of parliamentarians fed into debates on whether to 
adopt disclosing or preventive COI measures, respectively. Sensitivity toward the downsides of 
transparency measures has been higher in Belgium with its stronger protection of MP privacy, whereas 
in the UK strong freedom of information provisions supported their adoption instead. 
Importantly, our case studies have highlighted the importance of types of reform sequences that can 
be reactive or self-reinforcing (Mahoney 2000; Pollitt 2008; Howlett 2009).  
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Table 4.3. Differences in COI reforms and their implications 
Institutional Factors  Belgium United Kingdom 
Nature of Executive–
Legislative Relations 
High number of parties working 
in oversized coalition 
governments bridging ideological 
and territorial divides 
Implications: 
• Blurred lines of accountability 
and secrecy facilitating 
agreement between multiple 
partners creating resistance 
against transparency measures 
• Decision-making costs of 
negotiating/passing reform 
proposals high 
Alternation between ideologically 
narrow, single party governments 
 
 
 
Implications: 
• Clear lines of accountability 
enhancing the suitability of 
transparency as a disciplining 
mechanism 
• Decision-making costs of 
negotiating / passing reform 
proposals low 
Administrative 
Tradition 
“Rechtsstaat” System 
Implications: 
• Demanding legal procedures for 
changing 
COI machinery 
• Involvement of state authorities 
outside 
parliament (e.g. courts) in rule 
implementation 
• Broad cultural climate of high 
uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance 
strengthening 
the legalist approach 
“Public Interest” System 
Implications: 
• No need for statutory change to 
change 
COI machinery 
• No involvement of state 
authorities outside 
parliament (e.g. courts) in rule 
implementation 
• Broad cultural climate of low 
uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance 
sustaining 
the flexible approach 
Interaction Between 
COI and State Reform 
COI reform linked to broader 
reform efforts tackling wider 
systemic crises 
Implications: 
• Broad scope of the reforms 
encompassing 
multiple public offices beyond 
Parliament 
• Increasingly stricter reforms, 
but delayed implementation 
because of the scope of 
regulation 
COI reform not linked to other 
reform efforts 
 
 
Implications: 
• Narrow scope of the reforms 
confined to 
Parliament 
• Reforms as short-term responses 
to specific scandals allowing for 
policy reversals when salience 
decreases 
Pre-existing Legal 
Provisions on 
Parliamentarians’ 
Rights/ 
Obligations Affecting 
COI 
Regulation 
Weak freedom of information 
provisions applicable to 
parliamentarians/strong 
provisions to protect MPs’ privacy 
Implications: 
• Resistance against transparency 
measures 
Strong freedom of information 
provisions applicable to 
parliamentarians/weak provisions to 
protect MPs’ privacy 
Implications: 
• Underpinning transparency 
measures 
 
Note: COI, conflict of interest; MP, Member of Parliament. 
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COI regimes in both the UK and Belgium have become more constraining over time, as is visible in their 
high strictness scores. Yet once attention on parliamentary ethics died down in the UK, provisions were 
partially relaxed – mostly justified by practical difficulties in implementation or by the undesirable side 
effects of overly strict regulation that was quickly adopted in the aftermath of a crisis. These reactive 
“cycles” reflecting the salience of COI issues echo not only the majoritarian character of British 
executive–legislative relations with the government (usually) able to rely on stable parliamentary 
support, but also the fact that COI reform is implemented through changes to intra-parliamentary 
rules, as statutory action is not required by the “public interest” model of administrative tradition. The 
lack of interaction between COI reform and other areas of state reform contributed to keeping the 
reform process flexible, allowing for COI mechanisms to be designed as a narrow response to scandals 
involving MPs. As a response to scandals, transparency measures were expanded for citizens to punish 
the government in office as “alternative enforcement mechanisms,” mechanisms unsuitable in the 
Belgian setting with its oversized government coalitions and its strong protection of privacy. 
In the Belgian context, the embeddedness of COI reform in wider state reform sequences operates in 
conjunction with the consensual nature of executive–legislative relations and the Rechtsstaat 
tradition. By extending the scope of COI regulation to a wide array of public office holders, this factor 
has increased the political costs of reform, as well as making legal procedures for implementing change 
more demanding. The “spillover” effect produced by the inclusion of COI reform into a broader agenda 
of administrative modernization contributed to the reproduction of an institutional pattern in which 
COI rules are changed through statutory reforms implying independent enforcement by state 
authorities that are equipped with severe sanctions. Legal provisions have proliferated over time in a 
“self-reinforcing” fashion but they have become increasingly complex, reflecting Belgium's legalistic 
tendencies toward rigid legal procedures associated with Napoleonic legal traditions (Beck et al. 2003; 
Heirbaut and Storme 2006: 648–649) that parliamentarians exploited to delay implementation. 
4.7. Conclusion 
Over the last decade, the diversity of COI regulation applied to national parliamentarians (as well as 
other public officials) has grown significantly in many democracies. Defined as the range of formal legal 
restrictions to assure parliamentarians’ impartial or unbiased decision-making (Nikolov 2013: 407), COI 
regulation embraces diverse mechanisms, such as requirements for asset disclosure, but also 
incompatibilities of parliamentary office with other private or public roles. This growing diversity 
creates a major challenge for cross-national research: the development of measures capturing the 
different components of increasingly complex ethics regimes in an unbiased fashion, able to “travel” a 
wider range of democracies, as well as understanding the rationales behind often very distinct 
regulatory choices in this contentious area of regulation. 
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This paper conceptually distinguished core dimensions of COI regimes and developed cross-national 
indices to capture the nature of COI regimes currently in place in Europe empirically: COI Strictness 
(covering the strictness of rules and enforcement), COI Sanctions, and COI Transparency. Based on a 
new dataset covering 27 European democracies we showed that these three indices capture 
empirically separate dimensions, stressing the importance of systematically exploring and studying the 
sources of the diversity within COI regimes applied to national parliamentarians. Studying the empirical 
variation allowed us to select two extreme cases in terms of the particular choices of COI mechanisms 
– Belgium (a sanction-oriented regime) and the UK (a transparency-oriented regime) – to explore the 
institutional drivers of these regulatory tendencies over time. 
Our case studies revealed how the nature of the institutional settings constrain the choice of reform 
measures chosen to address the same problem, by making the same arguments more or less effective 
depending on the environment parliamentarians operated in. Measures imposing reputational and 
political costs on MPs through public disclosure were applied in both systems as alternative to external 
enforcement and formal legal sanction mechanisms, but were much more effectively employed in the 
majoritarian democracy of the UK than in consensual Belgium, underpinning a focus on transparency 
measures in the former. Similarly, privacy considerations fed into debates on COI transparency 
measures in both settings, yet were much more effectively used against the adoption or to weaken 
the COI transparency measures in Belgium. The functioning of the latter fundamentally rests on often 
secretive negotiations between party elites, lowering expectations toward the clear-cut responsibility 
of individual political actors and raising sensitivity toward the downsides of transparency measures. 
These findings are of particular relevance for old democracies, which, unlike new democracies, are less 
affected by external pressures; hence, where reform processes are most exposed to domestic 
institutional factors highlighted by historical institutionalist accounts of cross-national variation of 
reform choices (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017). This is especially the case for countries like France or 
Norway with similarly strong tendencies toward sanctions or transparency mechanisms, respectively. 
Although the study of extreme cases allowed us to distil the drivers of highly distinct regulatory choices 
with particular clarity, to avoid overgeneralization (Bennett 2004: 40–41) future research needs to 
complement our findings with the study of cases that have adopted constraining COI regimes by 
combining both types of mechanisms. Ideally, such a study would include not only old but also new 
democracies, and contrast internal institutional constraints as explored in this paper with external 
pressures pushing COI regimes in new democracies increasingly into similar directions. While these 
challenges need to be addressed in future research, the cross-national assessment provided here can 
provide a systematic foundation to address them. 
125 
 
Finally, our findings point to the institutional constraints that are involved in processes of regulatory 
innovation, such as those promoted by GRECO evaluations. If COI regimes are shaped by institutional 
factors, we can expect limited effectiveness of collaborative peer reviews to promote the 
implementation of those measures that require far-reaching changes in existing institutional 
arrangements (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 791). This scenario applies to the evolution of the Belgian case 
after the GRECO evaluation, in which the reform process remains at an “embryonic stage” (GRECO 
2018: 15) with regard to the implementation of recommendations on transparency measures. The 
comparative analysis of developments triggered by GRECO evaluation is a promising avenue for future 
research, which can draw on our set of institutional factors to investigate how international standards 
are adopted in countries with different historical trajectories. 
126 
 
4.8. Appendix 
4.8.1. Appendix A. The Distribution of COI Indices Across 27 European Democracies 
 
New Democracies Old Democracies 
Min Max Mean St.Dev. Min Max Mean St.Dev. 
COI Strictness 0.28 0.78 0.58 0.16 0.42 0.65 0.31 0.23 
COI Sanction 0.25 1 0.77 0.23 0.13 1 0.48 0.29 
COI Transparency 0.18 1 0.45 0.21 0 1 0.36 0.26 
Source: Own data 
Figure A1: Variation across COI Strictness Index on Old vs. New Democracies 
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Figure A2: Variation across COI Transparency Index on Old vs. New Democracies 
 
Figure A3: Variation across COI Sanction Index on Old vs. New Democracies 
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4.8.2. Appendix B. Validation of the COI Strictness Index 
Even though COI regulation and anti-corruption measures are analytically distinct, they are related as 
they are concerned about assuring the impartial or unbiased decision-making of public office-holders. 
Consequently, we also find practitioners discussing COI regulation as one type of ‘anti-corruption’ 
measure and actively pushing – especially new – democracies or transition countries to adopt tighter 
COI regulation in their attempts to fight corruption (e.g. Transparency International 2010; European 
Union 2015). If our measurements of COI regulation are valid and such regulation constitutes an 
attempted response to the above problems, we should find a negative correlation between levels of 
trust in national parliament and COI regulation on the one hand and a positive correlation between 
COI regulation and perceived corruption on the other. Figures B1 and B2 explore this argument with 
regard to our COI Strictness Index.  
Figure B1: Trust in national parliaments and COI Strictness in 25 European Democracies149 
 
Data: Data on Trust come from Eurobarometer 81.4 (2014) 
As expected, Figure B1 shows that the higher the mean trust levels in national parliament in a 
democracy, the lower our COI Strictness index. Countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Malta score particularly high on trust and low on COI Strictness, while Slovenia, 
 
149 Note we lose Croatia and Norway because the data on trust in national parliament on them is not available. 
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Bulgaria, Lithuania and Cyprus show opposite patterns, with countries such as Germany, UK and Spain 
in the middle. Vice versa, Figure B2 shows (although the relationship is somewhat weaker) a trend in 
the opposite direction: the higher the level of perceived corruption is, the higher our COI Strictness 
index. We find similar country clusters as perceived corruption is associated with trust.  
Figure B2: Perceived Corruption and COI Strictness in 27 European Democracies 
 
Note: Data on Corruption Perception Index come from Transparency International 
 
Figures B1 and B2 point to, as one would expect, a systematic difference between old and new 
democracies when it comes to COI regulation. As both patterns are in line with what we know from 
earlier qualitative research and, thus, enhance confidence in our measure. 
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